UJPPS

Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Policy and Society

Contemporary Political Challenges

Volume 1, Spring 2018

Editorial Team

Front row: Sara Minaeian, Romina Raeisi, Jasmine van Schouwen, Tulsi Vyas
Back row: Brianna Puigmarti, Justin Patrick, Sara Bourdeau, Dana Fan, Usman Khan, Emily Mayrand, Taha Doueidar, Daniel Stockemer

Acknowledgments

The publication of our first edition of the Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Policy and Society, could not have been made possible without the assistance and patience of many people. First of all, to all the authors who submitted to our journal, we greatly appreciate your excellent work and contribution to making this first edition a success. We would like to specifically thank Lucas Cherkewski for providing the technical assistance and creating the journal's website. Additionally, we would like to thank Dr. Daniel Stockemer for providing insight and excellent guidance to ensure a smooth process of publication.

There are some institutions that, without their assistance, would have made this first publication impossible. We owe a special thanks to the University of Ottawa's Faulty of Social Science, for providing us the support and the space for conducting the journal's operations. Additionally, we thank the School of Political Science for providing the necessary funding for the publicity of the journal and the prize money for the Article of the Year.

Introduction

The Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Policy and Society (UJPPS), established in 2018, is the University of Ottawa's undergraduate academic political studies journal with articles from students from across the globe.

This journal is unique because it serves as a learning opportunity for students at the University of Ottawa, as it is run by undergraduate students. An upper year political science course has been created to institutionalize the journal, it will operate for one semester every year and produce a yearly issue. The journal's editing team will change every year, making the publication increasingly vibrant and relevant. The ultimate mission of the UJPPS is to empower undergraduate students to learn more about the world of academic publishing, whether it be by submitting an article or by enrolling in the course - it serves as a wonderful learning opportunity for the next generation of academics.

The journal's first theme is contemporary political challenges, such as populism, activism and social movements, political conflict, youth politics, challenges to democracy, as well as technology and media politics. We received 25 submissions in total for our first issue from a multitude of universities in the United States, Canada, and Europe, with notable mentions including submissions from students studying at Harvard University and the City University of London. The team was consistently impressed by the caliber of writing and research done in the articles, and it was difficult to pick which to publish. The articles chosen cover a diverse collection of topics, from understanding how environmental change has influenced political opportunity and power in Afghanistan, to analyzing diplomatic discourse through political memes.

Our featured article, "How Does Union Strength affect Economic Development in Latin America?" by Giacomo Mattei is a case study analyzing the effects of union strength on economic development in Argentina, Mexico, and Peru. By testing the effects of union strength against various economic development indicators, this study finds that unions correlate positively with research and development as well as wages. However, union strength has a diminishing returns effect on productivity, equality, employment, and social well-being, and overall on economic development.

Following the topics of equality and development, "Gender Quotas as Strategy: Exploring the Relationship Among International Perceptions of Democracy, Transnational Influence, and Female Representation in Sub-Saharan Africa" by Paige Hill uses the case study of Rwanda to argue that there is a gap in scholarship on whether or not strategic gender quotas are efficient tools in making regimes appear more democratic to the international community. Using statistical test methods and qualitative analysis, her article shows how countries that adopted quotas had higher percentages of women in parliament, ranked higher for female representation, and saw their freedom scores improve more over time compared to the countries that did not have quotas.

Moving on to the topic of special needs education policy, "Children Are Left Behind: An Analysis of Special Needs Education Policy in the United States since *No Child Left Behind*" by

Roksolana McVicar, explores the impacts of centralized education policy in the United States on special education by examining the Bush administration's No Child Left Behind Act, policies enacted during the Obama administration, and policies under consideration by President Trump.. Her paper demonstrates how key policy initiatives including better-trained teachers, better access to the classroom and funding fall short of the practical implications.

Transitioning to healthcare on the other side of the world, Daniel Shtein's "Almost a Paradox: Healthcare, Neoliberalism, and the "Risk Society" in Russia 1992-2000," discusses the privatization of state-funded healthcare in Russia and the corresponding detrimental effects on the population's well-being using Ulrich Beck's theory of the "risk society". Shtein finds that Russian society became politically lethargic as living conditions worsened despite unpopularity of Boris Yeltsin and his healthcare policy. He concludes that individual risk management options became sought after to the detriment of most other concerns while the mutual distrust inherent in the risk society enabled Yeltsin's authoritarian tendencies and neoliberal social policy.

« Le rôle de l'Église catholique dans le nationalisme catalan et québécois », rédigé par Grace Angkasa retrace historiquement le rôle l'Église Catholique dans le développement de mouvements nationalistes au Québec et en Catalogne. L'article démontre que tandis que l'Église Catholique catalane a réussi à revitaliser le nationalisme catalan à travers sa relation étroite avec le régime Franquiste, l'Église Catholique québécoise a perdu son rôle dominant dans le nationalisme québécoise suite aux changements laïcisants de la Révolution tranquille. L'article démontre également en quoi les nationalismes construits à travers l'intervention de l'église se distinguent de mouvements nationalistes non-religieux : ces nationalismes religieux sont caractérisés par leur rhétorique de survivance, d'antiétatisme, et de leur rejet du centre urbain au profit de la communauté rurale paroissiale.

The topic of institutions is also discussed in Selena Zhao's "The Deficiencies of Nigerian Power-sharing Institutions", in which the concept of consociationalism, an institutionalized form of power-sharing within a democratic state to guarantee political representation of all key ethnic or religious groups to promote cooperation, is explored by analyzing Nigeria's governance of its Christian and Muslim ethnicities. Zhao argues that, in the long term, this type of power-sharing entrenches ineffective governance by keeping political elites in power, which fosters more corruption and lack of representation amongst ethnicities politicized by officials. Zhao highlights examples of its failure since consociationalism under the British prior to Nigeria's independence, as evidenced by Nigeria's ethnically charged political instability that led to elite power consolidation.

"What factors explain the uneven development of democracy across Asian states?" by Hanna Ahlqvist seeks to outline various factors that can help explain why some Asian states have had positive democratic development while others have not. To explore this issue, she focuses on India and Pakistan in a dual-most-similar case study. The states have taken fairly different paths; India was able to successfully consolidate its democracy and Pakistan is still struggling to do so. She finds that both states differ quite heavily in terms of their party politics, economic development and the impact of foreign aid, which she attributes to uneven political development.

On to the ever-pressing issue of the environment, “The Butterfly Effect: How Environmental Change Shapes Political Opportunity and Power in Afghanistan” by Annika Bratton explores how environmental change has influenced political opportunity and power in Afghanistan and how these findings can be applied to other areas of the world as well. By measuring two environmental variables,desertification and drought, alongside relevant political indicators of poverty, opium poppy cultivation, and the number of terrorist attacks over a fifteen-year period, the study identifies clear trends suggesting that there is a significant correlation between the environment and sociopolitical conflict.

“Vindication for Anthropocentrism” by Dylan Edmonds, which discusses growing support for a pre-emptive treaty ban on lethal autonomous weapons and addresses the most feasible strategy for such a ban. It draws on International Humanitarian Law and the norms of military necessity, Marten’s Clause, and the emerging norm of meaningful human control to make a humanitarian-driven case for a treaty ban. By conducting an analysis of successful attempts of civil society campaigns at building humanitarian arguments, the article ultimately argues that if humanitarian reframing has been so persistently successful for the making of treaty bans that cover different weapons, it remains the surest strategy toward a pre-emptive treaty ban for lethal autonomous weapons.

On the topic of security, “Regional Security in the South China Sea: what are its Ramifications for Chinese National Security?” by Nicholas Scott puts forth the argument that Chinese national security concerns are heavily influenced by the regional security framework of the South China Sea, which encompasses China’s perpetual aggression, ASEAN’s lack of cohesiveness, and the United States’ attempts to balance power. The author contends that if China hopes to bolster their economic and national security, they must acquire new sources of energy to sustain their industrial economy, begging the question as to what new developments will occur in the South China Sea if the nation decides to pursue its desires.

The 2018 issue concludes with Jennifer Clark’s highly unique “Memes of Mass Destruction: What Do Memes Indicate About Nuclear Power Relations?” that examines the relationship between diplomatic discourse and political memes, and what these themes show us about contemporary power relations. Concentrating on Kim Jong-Un and President Obama’s discourse regarding North Korea between 2011 and 2016,, Clark provides a critical examination of how diplomatic discourse is compressed into visual digital arguments, also known as Internet memes.. This analysis shows that memes about Kim Jong-Un reflected and reinforced the recurrent motifs of President Obama’s diplomatic rhetoric: oriental masculinity, isolation, and nuclear terrorism. The author argues that memes represent a new form of visual political rhetoric that reflect the current international political environment and condense theories of diplomatic relations to a single picture.

Table of Contents

Volume 1, Issue 1, April 2018

How Does Union Strength affect Economic Development in Latin America?

Giacomo Mattei, The University of Tampa, Tampa, Florida, United States

Abstract

This case study analyzes the effects of union strength on economic development in Argentina, Mexico, and Peru. This topic has formerly been given restricted scrutiny. Economic development in this paper is operationalized comprehensively, rather than as isolated factors. The theory tested is whether union strength has a diminishing returns effect on various economic development indicators. By testing the effects of union strength against various economic development indicators, this study finds that unions correlate positively with research and development as well as wages. However, union strength has a diminishing returns effect on productivity, equality, employment, and social well-being, and overall on economic development. This may be due to the measures used in the study. This Index could only rely on indicators for which country-specific and regional data was available, so more research is necessary to draw more confident conclusions.

Keywords: Unions, Economic development, Diminishing returns effects, Wages, Productivity, Equality, Employment, Social well-being, Argentina, Mexico, Peru

Introduction

Understanding the role of labor unions and worker rights in the larger Latin American economy, and, specifically, their effect on national development, can be vital in explaining the process of economic development. This insight could allow Latin American governments to formulate strategic policies relating to worker rights and unions that skillfully spur economic growth. Alternatively, this understanding could induce other social groups to mobilize, in association with unionized classes, to support socio-political, and therefore socio-economic, change in their respective countries. Unions are decreasing in influence: leaving them vulnerable to government policy which can either revive or destroy them.

A trade union can be defined as an organization "whose purpose is to improve the material welfare of members, principally by raising wages above the competitive level" (Booth, 1995, p. 51). The purpose of this study is to determine whether the effects of unionization expand further than this intended purpose to include a general increase in economic development.

The expected effects of strong labor unions and worker rights on national development are positive overall, depending on the metric employed to operationalize "development" in the analysis. For example, unionization promotes job security and raises wages, which could signify a higher standard of living for more people, less income disparity, more research and development, and expanded economic and emotional wellbeing.

Conversely, there are those that argue that unionization is a negative development marker. Such arguments generally expose a political bias for a capitalist economic model that views unions as an impediment to growth. Arguments to this effect are that strong unionization inhibits GDP growth by stifling competition and that, in the rare cases where unions are left unchecked, economic progress may be hindered by unregulated strikes and underproductive workers.

In Latin America, unions have held an important role in political mobilization, especially in the 20th century when union membership was substantial enough to have noticeable impacts on business and industry. Most economic growth in Latin America has generally been associated with the dictatorial periods, while the unions were more visible during periods characterized by democracy. Union influence on policy-making lessened after the 1980s when Latin American governments liberalized the economy in response to a debt crisis (Rios-Avila, 2014). The union-friendly reforms prior to this period did not satisfactorily address changes in the economic structure and the circumstances of globalization, and the influence of unions diminished (Anner, 2008). More research is necessary to understand the historical impact of unions on economic growth.

Literature Review

The existing literature on the effects of unionization is mixed: with some finding that unions have a positive, others a negative, and still others a statistically insignificant effect for virtually all the facets of the economy. This area of study calls for further research, particularly in Latin America. This research would be an essential aid in formulating policies that aid development.

The existing data and research highlight several recurring themes, as follows:

- Union functions
- Union structure
- “Growth” in general terms
- Productivity
- Wages or Income

- Wage Gap or Income Inequality
- Employment or Unemployment
- Research and Development (R&D) or Innovation or Investment
- Social Well-being

I view these topics comprehensively as indicators of economic development. Countries exhibiting high levels of multiple indicators may be considered relatively well-developed.

The Function of Trade Unions

The roles and functions of unions have shifted over time, but Ewing (2005) identifies five main existing functions of trade unions. These represent the different stages in the evolution of a trade union organization's maturity. In order, they are: 1) a *service* function – providing services and benefits to members; 2) a *representative* function – representing the individual or collective interests in the workplace; 3) a *regulatory* function – direct multi-employer collective bargaining, or indirect involvement through policymaking; 4) a *government* function – through voter mobilization; and 5) a *public administration* function – through lobbying and policy enforcement.

Union Structure

Unions range in structure from centralized to decentralized, meaning that collective bargaining is either carried out at the national/multi-company level or at the firm or plant level (Katz, 1993). The literature shows that decentralized unions appear to have a more positive effect on innovation and technology licensing than centralized unions (Mukherjee and Pennings, 2005 & 2011). Decentralized unions that promote firms to engage in cooperative R&D, which in turne contributes to economic growth.

Economic Growth

Unions have direct and indirect effects on economic growth. The effects emphasized depend on the method of research used, so results are mixed. For example, Ji, Chang, and Huang (2016) minimize unionization's impact on economic growth while Kuder (2015) finds that, in the United States, a decrease in unionization level produces an increase in the rate of economic growth. McGuire (1999) finds that labor union strength exerts a weak positive effect on growth in Latin America specifically.

If we examine specific findings the results are even more varied. Irmen and Wigger (2003) view wage-oriented unions as redistributing income from the owners of capital to the workers, thus fostering economic growth if the workers' marginal propensity to save overtakes that of the capitalist. Chang and Hung (2016) note the possibility of both high unemployment and high growth coexisting because each unionized worker delivers more work in terms of hours than a non-unionized worker would. McCallum and Blais (1987) note the positive effects special interest groups, proxied by unions, have on the growth-promoting properties of the welfare state. Holcombe and Gwartney (2010) state that unions are in line with economic freedom, which enhances growth, but that union-promoted labor law restricts economic freedom thus inhibiting and burdening the economy. Aghion, Caroli, and García-Peñalosa (1999) focus their research on the effects of inequality on the rate of growth and find that the two are inversely related. Therefore, if unions can reduce inequality, they may boost the rate of economic growth.

Productivity

It is difficult to find consensus on the effects of unionization on productivity overall, although Latin America-specific studies show a positive relationship (Cassoni, Labadie, and Fachola, 2002; Rios-Avila, 2014). On the other hand, Addison and Hirsch (1989) find that unionization actually has a negative impact on the productivity growth rate of firms and industries, and Hirsch and Link (1984) conclude that there is no support for the view that unionization produces a net positive increase in productivity.

However, unionization seems to be related to increased productivity in Latin America because unionization can cause firms to invest in more capital-intensive technologies in response to wage inflation (Cassoni, Labadie, and Fachola, 2002). Menezes-Filho, Zylberstajn, Chahad, and Pazello (2002) find that the relationship between unionization and productivity is concave, indicating that union density first promotes productivity up to a certain point before then reducing productivity in a manner reminiscent of the law of diminishing returns. Indirect effects on productivity include the significant positive correlation of union wage premiums with outsourcing, which is related to higher labor productivity (Magnani and Prentice, 2010).

Wages or Income

The notion that unionization increases wages for union members is well supported (Hara and Kawaguchi, 2008; Fichtenbaum and Olson, 2002; Menezes-Filho, Zylberstajn, Chahad, and Pazello, 2002; Cassoni, Labadie, and Fachola, 2002; Rios, 2013; Lee, 1978; Ji, Chang, and Huang, 2016; Ashenlelter, 1971; Johnson and Mieszkowski, 1970; Schultz and Mwabu, 1998). Menezes-Filho, Zylberstajn, Chahad, and Pazello, (2002) again find the relationship between unionization and wages to be concave, and that union density helps increase wages up to a certain point but then reduces them or causes stagnation beyond that point.

The effect on non-unionized workers is less certain. Some hold that union members gain higher wages at the expense of non-members (Johnson and Mieszkowski, 1970; Schultz and Mwabu, 1998). Heywood (1993) argues that under an efficient bargains model, union wage increases spillover and correspond to higher non-union wages. However, Pencavel (1991, p. 174) criticizes studies that find a positive spillover effect, noting that "the direction and magnitude of this correlation is disturbing fickle."

Wage Gap or Income Inequality

Unionization has been found to have beneficial effects for wage distribution by reducing inequality among members (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; Hara and Kawaguchi, 2008; Rios 2013).

However, the result is a wider wage differentiation between union members and comparable non-union workers.

Existing studies on income inequality and unionization offer contradicting conclusions. Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) state that "the net impact of unions on the distribution of earnings is ambiguous." Unionization may produce reductions in income inequality in the long run (Herzer, 2016). Schultz and Mwabu (1998) hold that reducing unionization would redistribute wage payments to lower-wage non-union workers and the poor who are often marginalized from participating in the labor force. McGuire (1999) found that labor union strength in Latin America has a weak negative effect on income equality, potentially because unions persuade governments to create policies that support urban workers or particular sectors, neglecting the poorer rural population or shanty town inhabitants.

Employment or Unemployment

An increase in unionization is correlated with a decrease in employment (Chang and Hung, 2016; Ji, Chang, and Huang, 2016; Long, 1993; Schultz and Mwabu, 1998). In one case, Schultz and Mwabu (1998) estimated that if the relative wage increases from unionisation were halved, employment would rise by a few percentage points and participation would also increase "substantially." In another study, Long (1993) notes that unionized firms experienced slower employment growth than similar non-union firms.

A Latin America-specific study finds that greater unionization translates into an increase in employment and a decrease in labor turnover (Cassoni, Labadie, and Fachola, 2002). Finally, Menezes-Filho, Zylberstajn, Chahad, and Pazello (2002) point to a concave relationship between labor unions and employment.

Research and Development (R&D) or Innovation or Investment

Studies on whether R&D, innovation, and investment are impacted by the level of unionization in a particular industry lean towards exposing a negative bearing (Rios-Avila, 2014; Addison and Hirsch, 1989; Bradley, Kim, and Tian, 2017). In a recent study, Bradley, Kim, and Tian (2017) note that patent counts and citations "decline significantly" after the introduction of unions. One explanation is that unions engage in rent-seeking over long-term tangible and intangible capital, which may decrease firms' investments in physical capital, R&D, and other innovations (Addison and Hirsch, 1989).

Cassoni, Labadie, and Fachola (2002) point towards unionization actually promoting investment and the use of capital-intensive technologies, finding that, because of the increase in wages, firms substitute labor with capital. Conversely, Ji, Chang, and Huang (2016) find unionization has no significant real impact on investment.

Social Well-Being

Results indicating the relation between unionization and well-being are, again, mixed. This indicator of development is observed through a variety of lenses including domestic welfare, job satisfaction, life satisfaction, and others. For example, unionized workers are less affected by anxiety related to organizational change in the workplace, indicating that unions have a mediating effect (Bryson, Barth, and Dale-Olsen, 2013). Flavin and Shufeldt (2016) note that unionized workers have higher levels of life satisfaction and that union membership is a strong predictor of quality of life.

The positive effects seem to spill over to non-union members and society at large as well. Bandyopadhyay and Bandyopadhyay (2001) find that stronger wage-oriented unions are related to higher domestic welfare. To Flavin, Pacek, and Radcliff (2010), unions have a positive impact on the life satisfaction of all citizens.

On the other hand, other studies indicate negative results. Haile, Bryson, and White (2015) find union members have lower job satisfaction than comparable non-unionized workers. The relationship between unionization and job satisfaction is found to be rather country-specific, and it only impacts those material aspects of job satisfaction they can more feasibly change (Hipp and Kolins Givan, 2015).

McGuire (1999) finds that in East Asia and Latin America, labor union strength negatively affects human development. His study shows that unionization has negative effects on progress in infant survival rates and life expectancy levels. McGuier attributed this negative effect to the fact that governments may respond to unions and other interest groups with policies that are urban- and sector-focused which neglect more marginalized populations.

Theory

This paper aims to contribute a testable theory to the topic of unionization and economic development in Latin America. There is a clearly identifiable gap in the literature with regards to the effects of labor unions on economic growth, broadly, and in Latin America, specifically. My theory is that unionization has a diminishing returns effect on economic development in Latin America.

Prior research has mostly focused on the effects of union strength on single indicators of economic development, such as GDP, for example, rather than viewing indicators in conjunction with one another. Thus the existing literature may not provide a complete picture. My aim is to consider all of the effects of unionisation as intermingling features of a whole model of development: analyzing the effects on GDP, on wages, on employment (and so on for each indicator listed in the literature review) to determine the comprehensive effect of union strength on economic development.

I theorize that unionization has a diminishing returns effect on economic development, depending on its centralization and strength. Menezes-Filho, Zylberstajn, Chahad, and Pazello (2002) find that unionization in Latin America can have a concave effect on some of the indicators that I use to gauge economic development. I expect that unionization is beneficial to economic development up to a certain point before yielding diminishing returns, eventually producing negative effects.

First, in terms of union structure, it is anticipated that the more unions in Latin American countries lean towards a "centralized" structure, the less beneficial they become to national economic development. Mukherjee and Pennings (2005 & 2011) found that decentralized unions have a more positive relation to innovation and technology licensing than centralized unions.

Additionally, the strength of unions is anticipated to have a "diminishing returns" effect on employment, wages, and inequality. It could be argued that, since unions raise wages and reduce wage inequality for members (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; Hara and Kawaguchi, 2008; Rios

2013), if membership were near-universal, wage inequality would virtually disappear. However, as Menezes-Filho, Zylberstajn, Chahad, and Pazello (2002) find that unions in Latin America have a concave effect not only on wages but also on employment, the above argument does not hold. There may well be a point where unionization levels become so bloated that wages and employment suffer. If unionization passes the equilibrium point, then it risks exacerbating inequality which Aghion, Caroli, and García-Peñalosa (1999) conclude reduces growth rates. This may fit, not only, with McGuire's (1999) finding that unionization raises both growth and inequality, but also with the notion of a concave effect because of inequality's detrimental effect over the long run.

The hypotheses (HP) tested are as follows:

- HP1: The more centralized unions are, the less R&D there is.
- HP2: As a country's union strength increases on the Union Strength Index, economic growth and productivity initially increase before reaching diminishing returns.
- HP3: As a country’s union strength increases on the Union Strength Index, wages initially increase before reaching diminishing returns.
- HP4: As a country’s union strength increases on the Union Strength Index, income inequality initially diminishes before increasing again.
- HP5: As a country’s union strength increases on the Union Strength Index, employment initially increases before reaching diminishing returns.
- HP6: As a country’s union strength increases on the Union Strength Index, social well-being initially increases before reaching diminishing returns.

- HP7: As a country's union strength increases on the Union Strength Index, overall economic development, as measured in my Economic Development Index, initially increases before reaching diminishing returns.

In the following section, I will outline how the countries for this comparative case study will be selected. I will then review the control, independent, and dependent variables. Finally, I shall explain how I intend to operationalize the variables.

Methodology

This research is organized as a comparative case study of three different Latin American countries: Argentina, Mexico, and Peru. I chose these countries because of their specific similarities and differences in relevant variables, using the most similar system design method of research. This means I hold the control variables (CVs) constant across cases to avoid having my results skewed by intervening variables, while I allow the independent variable (IV) and the dependent variable (DV) to vary. Any change in the DV is attributable directly to the IV. Accordingly, the three cases selected have uniformity in intervening variables, differences in levels of unionization, and variation in economic development.

Variables that are controlled for (CVs) include inflation, natural resource income as a percentage of GDP, population growth rate, political stability and structure, culture, and human capital (using educational attainment as a measure). Argentina, Mexico, and Peru are similar for each CV, as explained below. Levels of political stability are comparable across the selected cases. All three countries considered here are presidential representative democratic republics with three government branches and a multi-party system.

It should be noted that neither inflation nor human capital is as perfectly controlled for as they ideally would be. Inflation in Latin America was unfathomably high after the 1980s. In 1990, some countries had and inflation rate of over 100%, while others had it in the thousands. If the average (arithmetic mean) inflation for the era is taken starting a few years after 1990, the stability increases and the similarities among countries magnify.

For human capital, comparable data is also difficult to attain as it is a rather difficult concept to measure. Comparative descriptions like the Human Capital Report were unavailable in the 1990s. Comparable country-specific data is also difficult to come by, as the departments of education for many Latin American countries did not collect data on educational attainment, and those that did often used differing measures. Thus, the most direct measure I can employ for educational attainment (as a proxy for human capital) is the literacy rate as gathered by the World Bank.

Controlled variable 1: Inflation

Inflation can erode a county's purchasing power, thus impacting the economic development of a country. Dissimilar rates between countries in this study could interfere with the relationship between union strength and economic development, thereby voiding any attribution of an effect in the DV to the IV. Although it is difficult to control for inflation in Latin American countries in the 1990s, the three cases chosen have agreeably similar rates relative to neighboring countries at the time. The mean inflation between the years 1992-2005 was 6.77% for Argentina, 13.49% for Mexico, and 13.47% for Peru (Public Data, 2017a).

Controlled variable 2: Population Growth

Population growth may also affect economic development, as it may result in growth in the labor force. Choosing countries with similar population growth rates allows me to discount the possibility that economic development in one case is attributable to this variable. The trend in many Latin American countries was a slightly declining population growth rate. The three selected countries, however, all had similar rates of population growth: Argentina's average population growth rate between 1990-2005 was 1.21%, Mexico's mean was 1.50%, and Peru's average was 1.60% (Public Data, 2017b).

Controlled variable 3: Natural Resource Income

The natural resources of the three selected countries may differ, however, for the purpose of this study, the revenue gained from the resources – i.e., how well these resources are managed and channeled into the market, is what is of interest rather than what resources each country possesses. The most important natural resources in Argentina include "oil, natural gas, coal, minerals, and the forest" (TheGlobalEconomy.com, 2017a). It's natural resource rents as a percent of GDP average 2.15% between 1990-2005 (World Bank, 2018). Mexico contains stores of natural resources including oil, minerals, coal, natural gas, and the forest (TheGlobalEconomy.com, 2017b). Despite these resources being funneled into the economy, they only composed 3.17% of Mexico's GDP between 1990-2005 (World Bank, 2018). Peru has similar natural resources. The rents it reaped from these natural resources between 1990-2005 made up 2.42% of its GDP (World Bank, 2018). Thus, the three countries possessed similar natural resource revenues as a percentage of GDP for the period in study.

Controlled variable 4: Human Capital

Human capital is key for economic development, and imbalances in this variable across cases could cause the relationships observed to be severely spurious. With limited data on the educational attainment of the Argentinian labor force in the 1990s, the World Bank determined that the literacy rate (% of people aged 15 and above) for the Argentinian labor force in the 1990s was 96.1% (Reyes and Sawyer, 2016). The literacy rate in Mexico was lower but relatively similar at 87.6% (Reyes and Sawyer, 2016). The same can be said of the Peruvian labor force at 87.2% literacy (Reyes and Sawyer, 2016).

Independent Variable: Unionization

Unionization is commonly operationalized in terms of density and centralization. McGuire's (1999) Labor Strength Index is a useful tool. He uses data from the International Labour Organization (ILO) from 1997 weighed against four dimensions of unionization to measure union strength. The first two dimensions determine density levels (the proportion of the unionized labor force), while the second two combined calculate unions' function and structure. The four dimensions are:

> (1) union members as a proportion of the non-agricultural labor force; (2) the proportion of formal-sector workers under collective contracts; (3) the dominant level of collective bargaining (national/sectoral, company/plant, or both); and (4) the number of major ILO conventions ratified. (McGuire, 1999)

On the Labor Strength Index, Argentina scores 0.67, ranking 20th in a 93-country dataset, Mexico scores -0.15, ranking 47th, and Peru scores -0.83, ranking 81st (McGuire, 1999, Table 1).

In terms of the Labor Strength Index, Argentina ranked strongly in all four dimensions. Unions were centralized. They were politically and legally influential as exemplified by the number of ILO treaties Argentina ratified. And, union membership in the non-agricultural sector and the percent of formal sector employees covered by collective contracts circa 1995 were both impressively high (McGuire, 1999, Table 1).

Mexico has somewhat weaker labor strength than Argentina. The union membership was high, but there is no information on contract coverage in those years, and the dominant level of collective bargaining took place at the firm level between 1985-1995 (McGuire, 1999, Table 1). The Mexican government ratified the same number of ILO conventions as Argentina as of 1996 (McGuire, 1999, Table 1).

Peru's score is low on the Labor Strength Index in the 1990s. Membership was very low, data on collective contract coverage is lacking, and, as in Mexico, unions in Peru organized collective bargaining mainly at the firm level (McGuire, 1999, Table 1). Peru also ratified fewer ILO conventions than Argentina and Mexico in the relevant period.

Dependent Variable: Economic Development

The dependent variable (DV) is the umbrella term "economic development," and is operationalized using various proxies. The individual indicators of economic development, i.e. proxies, include change in GDP/productivity, wages, inequality, employment levels, R&D (gauged in terms of the number of patents per year), and social well-being (measuring life expectancy and life satisfaction). Data observed to gauge these indicators relate to the 1990-2000s period to provide a comprehensive enough picture of the economic environment while avoiding the extreme circumstances of both the so-called "Lost Decade" in Latin America and the Great Recession of the late 2000s.

To interpret the final effect of unionization on economic development, I created the Economic Development Index. The three countries were chosen for their differing levels of unionization. For each given country, each proxy of economic development is valued designating "Very Low" to "Very High" levels. I sum up a country's scores on all the proxies to reach the country's overall economic development score ranging from "Very Low" to "Very High." The economic development scores of the three countries will then be compared to determine the net effect of unionization on economic development.

Index

To comprehensively calculate economic development in a systematic way, it is useful to scale all the indicators on one index. Each indicator were weighed against the baseline for the region, and a difference of (X) from that baseline was scored as (Y) or (-Y), depending on the direction of the difference. On a seven-point scale, ranging (-3) to (+3), lower values are associated with less development and higher values with more development. Each integer on the Index scale denotes the cutoff point for the interval (X) of the given indicator. For example, in the case of R&D, an increase from (+1) to (+2) on the Index scale indicates an increase of 100 patent applications. Each indicator is scaled slightly differently on the Index.

In order, the rankings (-3) to (+3) translate to: "Very Low," "Low," "Medium-Low," "Medium," "Medium-High," "High," and "Very High" levels of economic development for each indicator.

The regional average for each indicator is scored as (0) on the seven-point scale, which translates to "Medium" levels of the given indicator. To have a "buffer zone" surrounding (0) for countries with near-baseline scores to be ranked at (0) as well, each cutoff interval is halved, and half is added to the baseline value while half is subtracted from the baseline value. This provides seven equal intervals to be used in scale. Using the example of R&D, if each interval represents 100 patents, then the buffer zone for (0) will be the baseline of 317 patents +/- 50 patents.

The country-specific data in the table is the same as one used in the paper itself and comes from a variety of sources. The more complex regional averages will be explained below.

Available data for R&D, as proxied by patent applications, is severely limited for Latin America.[1] Interval cutoffs are every 100 patent applications, so the buffer zone will be 317 +/- 50 patent applications. Therefore, "Medium" levels of R&D in a country range from 267 to 367 patent applications every year; "Very Low" from 0-67; "Low" from 67-167; "Medium-Low" from 167-267; "Medium-High" from 367-467; "High" from 467-567; "Very High" from 567 and above.

Figure 1. R&D Scale

0 | 67 | 167 | 267 | 317 | 367 | 467 | 567 | 667<

| -100 | -100 | -100 | -50 | +50 | +100 | +100 | +100 |

-3 | -2 | -1 | 0 | +1 | +2 | +3

Public Data (2017) reports the average GDP per capita, based on purchasing power parity. The regional average for 1990-2005 is $10,888.60. Interval cutoffs are every $1500, so the buffer zone will be $10,888.60 plus or minus $750. Thus, "Medium" levels of GDP per capita, PPP, in a country range from $10,138.60 to $11,638.60, "Very Low" from below $5,638.60 to $7,138.60;

[1] The regional average for the era of interest must be calculated using the World Bank data available for 1993 (World Bank, 2017). The countries in the region (excluding the Caribbean) for which there is data that will be used to calculate the regional 1993 patent application average are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. The regional average in 1993 was 317 patent applications.

"Low" from $7,138.60-$8,638.60; "Medium-Low" from $8,638.60-$10,138.60; "Medium-High" from $11,638.60-$13,138.60; "High" from $13,138.60-$14,638.60; "Very High" from $14,638.60 and above.

Figure 2. GDP per capita, PPP, Constant 2005 $ Scale

<5638.6 7138.6 8638.6 10138.6 10888.6 11638.6 13138.6 14638.6 16138.6<

| -1500 | -1500 | -1500 | -750 | +750 | +1500 | +1500 | +1500 |

-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3

Wages as a share of GDP are reported for individual countries for 1990 and for 2000 in Abeles, Amarante, and Vega (2014). I first calculated the 1990-2000 average for each country,[2] and then I calculated the regional averages for the same time period.[3] The regional average for 1990-2000 was 47.8%. Interval cutoffs are every 5%, so the buffer zone will be 47.8 plus or minus 5, thus, "Medium" levels of wages in a country range from 45.3 to 50.3 percent of GDP. The "Very Low" level ranges from below 30.3 to 35.3 percent; "Low" from 35.3-40.3 percent; "Medium-Low" from 40.3-45.3 percent; "Medium-High" from 50.3-55.3 percent; "High" from 55.3-60.3 percent; "Very High" from 60.3 percent and above.

[2] although only data from 2000 was available for Guatemala and Uruguay,
[3] The regional average was calculated using data for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Figure 3. Wages as a Share of GDP Scale

<30.3 35.3 40.3 45.3 47.8 50.3 55.3 60.3 65.3<

| -5 | -5 | -5 | -2.5 | +2.5 | +5 | +5 | +5 |

-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3

Regional data for the Gini coefficient average is unavailable for 1998 and has, therefore, been personally calculated using World Bank data[4] (2017). Because income inequality negatively affects economic development, the value on the Index must be adjusted and the sign (+/-) of the difference from the regional mean should be flipped. For example, a 2-point increase from the regional mean would indicate that the given country has 2 points more inequality, or is 2 points worse off than the region, an increase in inequality being matched with a decrease in score on the Economic Development Index. For this indicator, each 2-point difference in the Gini coefficient shall correspond to a 1-point difference on the Index scale. The regional average Gini coefficient in 1998 was 53.4. Interval cutoffs are every 2 Gini-points, so the buffer zone will be 53.4 plus or minus 1 Gini-point. "Medium" levels of Income Inequality in a country range from 52.4 to 54.4 using the Gini coefficient. "Very Low" from below 46.4 to 48.4; "Low" from 48.4-50.4; "Medium-Low" from 50.4-52.4; "Medium-High" from 54.4-56.4; "High" from 56.4-58.4; "Very High" from 58.4 and above. Recall the signs will be flipped to show a positive effect on Economic Development for lower levels of inequality and vice versa.

[4] The twelve countries for which data is available, and which have been included to calculate the arithmetic mean for the region are: Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru.

Figure 4. Income Inequality Scale

<46.4	**48.4**	**50.4**	**52.4**	**53.4**	**54.4**	**56.4**	**58.4**	**60.4<**

| -2 | -2 | -2 | -1 | +1 | +2 | +2 | +2 |

+3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3

The unemployment average for Latin America is also reported in Public Data (2017). Unemployment has a negative effect on economic development, so the scoring must be adjusted. The same method would be employed as for income inequality to readjust the score for unemployment. The regional unemployment average for 1991-2005 was 9.8%. Interval cutoffs are every 2%, so the buffer zone will be 9.8 plus or minus 2: "Medium" levels of wages in a country range from 8.8 to 10.8 percent unemployment. "Very Low" levels range from below 2.8 to 4.8 percent; "Low" from 4.8-6.8 percent; "Medium-Low" from 6.8-8.8 percent; "Medium-High" from 10.8-12.8 percent; "High" from 12.8-14.8 percent; "Very High" from 14.8 percent and above. Recall the signs will be flipped.

Figure 5. Unemployment Scale

<2.8	**4.8**	**6.8**	**8.8**	**9.8**	**10.8**	**12.8**	**14.8**	**16.8<**

| -2 | -2 | -2 | -1 | +1 | +2 | +2 | +2 |

+3 +2 +1 0 -1 -2 -3

Social well-being encompasses two indicators (life expectancy and self-reported satisfaction), reported completely differently. To make up for this discrepancy, I first report the average life expectancy for the region (Public Data, 2017) and calculate the mean self-reported happiness score from every country in Central and South America reported in Ortiz-Ospina and Roser[5] (2017). I then calculate the percent difference between a given country's score on life expectancy and the regional average life expectancy. I do the same for self-reported life satisfaction. To come up with a single social well-being score for the given country, I calculate the average of the two differences. This provides an average-difference score from the regional mean to gauge how well the given country fares from the regional norm. Both the original values for each proxy and the average difference value are listed on the Index.

The regional social well-being average for 2005 will be represented as 100%. Interval cutoffs are every 5% difference from the baseline of 100%, so the buffer zone will be 100 plus or minus 2.5%. "Medium" levels of Social Well-being range from 97.5 to 102.5 percent; "Very Low" levels range from below 82.5 to 87.5 percent; "Low" from 87.5 to 92.5 percent; "Medium-Low" from 92.5 to 97.5 percent; "Medium-High" from 102.5 to 107.5 percent; "High" from 107.5 to 112.5 percent; "Very High" from 112.5 percent and above.

[5] this excludes Belize, Guyana, Suriname, and French Guiana

Figure 6. Social Well-Being Scale

<82.5 87.5 92.5 97.5 100 102.5 107.5 112.5 117.5<

| -5 | -5 | -5 | -2.5 | +2.5 | +5 | +5 | +5 |

-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3

A country's overall score can naturally only fall between +/-18: there are 6 indicators, and each indicator can only be between +/-3. There are 37 possible integer scores on this Index including (0). Dividing 37 by 7 (to have a final 7-point scale) provides the value for each interval to be scored from (-3), meaning "Very Low" to (+3), meaning "Very High" levels of economic development. The quotient is 5.29, rounded to two decimal points. The buffer zone around (0) is 2.64, rounded to two decimal points. "Medium" economic development scores range from -2.64 to 2.64; "Very Low" from -18 to -13.22; "Low" from -13.22 to -7.93; "Medium-Low" from -7.93 to -2.64; "Medium-High" from 2.64 to 7.93; "High" from 7.93 to 13.22; and "Very High" from 13.22 to 18.

Figure 7. Economic Development Index Scale

-18 -13.22 -7.93 -2.64 0 2.64 7.93 13.22 18

| -5.29 | -5.29 | -5.29 | -2.64 | +2.64 | +5.29 | +5.29 | +5.29 |

-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3

The next section will provide an overview of the facts that are pertinent to testing the hypotheses.

Case Study Results

In the section above, I listed the similarities across cases in terms of intervening variables and outlined the differences in levels of union strength, providing the basis for a viable comparison of the variables of interest. This section is dedicated to laying out the relevant facts for each of the countries with regards economic development.

Argentina

Unions were greatly impacted by Juan Peron, both during his years as Secretary of Labor and as President of Argentina. Many unions had and continue to maintain links with Peron's Justicialist Party (Gonzalez, Medwid, and Trajtemberg, 2009). The Law on Contract Employment was passed in 1974 and was amended several times since (Bronstein, n.d.). With the trade liberalization of the late 20th century, the traditional industrial sector contracted while the service sector expanded, and unions (most active in the industrial sector) were weakened (Gonzalez, Medwid, and Trajtemberg, 2009). The most unionized sectors were manufacturing, construction, transportation, and retail (Gonzalez, Medwid, and Trajtemberg, 2009).

Union membership composed 25% of the non-agricultural labor force in 1995 (McGuire, 1999, Table 1). The collective contract coverage shows even more impressive union impacts. The percentage of formal sector employees covered by collective contracts circa 1995 was a striking 73% (McGuire, 1999, Table 1). Collective bargaining occurred mostly at the industry level between 1985-1995 (McGuire, 1999, Table 1). Finally, unions were politically and legally influential, as the country ratified three out of six identified major International Labor Organization (ILO) conventions as of 1996 (McGuire, 1999, Table 1).

Economic growth or productivity followed an upward trend with a slight dip in 2002. The GDP per capita, based on purchasing power parity (PPP) and using constant 2005 international exchange rates, was encouraging compared to many other Latin American countries. The average between 1990-2005 was $14,004.24 (Public Data, 2017c). The lowest was in 1990, at $10,815.72, and the highest was in 1998, at $15,894.56 (Public Data, 2017c).

Real wages remained steady between the years 1990-1997. The average from 1990-1997 was 101.1% the rate of 1990 (Marshall, 2000, Table A). Wages as a share of GDP at factor prices were 44.7% around 1990 and 40.5% around 2000, and the average for the decade was 42.6% (Abeles, Amarante, and Vega, 2014).

Wage inequality, as proxied by the Gini coefficient, was mid-range. In terms of the Gini coefficient, an index showing how income among a population deviates from a perfectly equal distribution (0 indicating perfect equality and 100 representing perfect inequality), Argentina placed firmly in the middle in 1998 with a coefficient of 50.7 (World Bank, 2017a).

Employment was highest in the service sector, followed by the industrial sector, and then finally the agricultural sector (Public Data, 2017d, e, and f). The most relevant measure for this study is unemployment, which displayed an “M” shape over the abovementioned era, peaking in 1995 and 2002. The average for the era was 13.69% (Public Data, 2017g).

Research and development, as proxied by the number of patent applications, was reasonably high for a Latin American country in the 1990s. There were yearly fluctuations, but the average number of applications from 1990 to 2005 was 834 (World Bank, 2017b).

Social wellbeing was at respectable levels during the 1990s and early 2000s. Life expectancy levels reached 74.69 in 2005 (Public Data, 2017h). Self-reported life satisfaction in 2006, using data collected by the World Happiness Report, Argentina scored 6.31 out of 10 (Ortiz-Ospina and Roser, 2017, Responsive Table 1). This means that people answering the question "Please imagine a ladder, with steps numbered from 0 at the bottom to 10 at the top. The top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you and the bottom of the ladder represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at this time?" averaged to the abovementioned score.

Mexico

A plurality of unions in Mexico are urban-based. Many unions are included in the Confederation of Mexican Workers (Confederacion de Trabajadores Mexicanos, or CTM), which is affiliated to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) (CountryStudies.us, n.d.). The Labor Code supposedly controlled the labor-management relations. "Corruption, paternalism, and abuse of union funds" caused this control to be circumvented (CountryStudies.us, n.d.). Unions had less political influence in the 1990s than before, as the government adopted neoliberal policies (CountryStudies.us, n.d.) The industrial sector in Mexico has generally been more heavily unionized relative to other developing countries (Grajeda, 2014). The most highly unionized sectors were "mining, electricity, water, and gas transmission," and these were followed by services, "transportation, mail, shipping and warehousing," and manufacturing (Fairris and Levine, 2004, Chart 2).

Mexico has somewhat weaker labor strength than Argentina according to McGuire (1999, Table 1). The union membership in 1995 was 31% of the non-agricultural labor force (McGuire, 1999, Table 1). There is not much information on collective contract coverage for comparable years. The dominant level of collective bargaining took place at the firm level between 1985-1995 (McGuire, 1999, Table 1). The government ratified three out of six major ILO conventions as of 1996, showing medium involvement internationally with regards to labor (McGuire, 1999, Table 1).

Economic growth and productivity, as measured GDP per capita based on PPP in constant 2005 international exchange rates, rose slightly between 1990-2005. The mean for the 1990-2005 period was $13,950.52 (Public Data, 2017c).

Real wages rose for the first half of the 1990s. The mean level between 1990-1997 was 110.4% the rate leading into 1990 (Marshall, 2000, Table A). Wages as a share of GDP at factor prices averaged 33.3% over the decade (Abeles, Amarante, and Vega, 2014).

Mexico also placed rather mediocrely on the Gini index in 1998, with a coefficient of 49.0 (World Bank, 2017a). It did, however, have slightly less inequality than Argentina (above).

Employment was highest in the service sector between 1990-2005, followed by employment in industry and agriculture (Public Data, 2017d, e, and f). Unemployment in Mexico for the 1991-2005 period remained relatively low. The average unemployment rate for those years was 3.6% (Public Data, 2017g).

R&D was moderate between 1990 and 2005. The average number of patent applications by residents over this period was 506 (World Bank, 2017b).

Social wellbeing in Mexico is one of the highest in the region in the era of interest. Life expectancy was 70.8 in 1990 and followed a rising slope to 75.28 in 2005 (Public Data, 2017h). Mexico's score on self-reported life satisfaction in 2005 was 6.58 (Ortiz-Ospina and Roser, 2017).

Peru

Unions in Peru have traditionally been weak. Until the late 1960s, they were closely tied to the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), which had near monopoly of worker mobilization, using the labor movement mainly for its own ends. The unions became more active during the following decade – the military years – with the new Industrial Reform Law, but the economic decline of the 1980s drastically weakened the movement (CountryStudies.us). The General Confederation of Peruvian Workers (Confederacion General de Trabajadores del Peru, or CGTP) persisted to become the most influential union confederation during the 1990s. Trade liberalization and new labor laws in the early 1990s diminished union bargaining power (Saavedra and Torero, 2002). Unions were present in non-trade sectors (such as banking), soft budget constraint sectors (such as public administration and state-owned enterprises), and the manufacturing sector, among others (Saavedra and Torero, 2002). More recently, other sectors impacted by unions have included electricity, water, construction, and mining (Peru Country Commercial Guide, 2017).

Labor strength was very weak in the 1990s. Only 8% of the non-agricultural labor force was unionized in 1995 (McGuire, 1999, Table 1). Unions in Peru organized collective bargaining mainly at the firm level (McGuire, 1999, Table 1). Peru only ratified two out of six major ILO conventions McGuire identifies in his 1999 study.

Economic growth and productivity exhibited a positive trend but remained relatively low. This minimal economic growth was unremarkable in fluctuations. GDP per capita based on PPP remained relatively flat for the early 1990s and only gradually sloped up. Between 1990-2005, it averaged $6,300.98 (Public Data, 2017c).

Peru experienced much positive growth in real wages between 1990-1997. The wages rose, peaked, and fell, but the overall average was 112.8% the rate of 1990 (Marshall, 2000, Table A). Wages as a share of GDP at factor prices averaged 27.9% between 1990-2000 (Abeles, Amarante, and Vega, 2014).

Unsurprisingly, the Gini coefficient for Peru was slightly higher than the regional mean, with a score of 56.1 (World Bank, 2017a). This puts Peru in its usual position, lagging behind the region in terms of development.

Employment was highest in the service sector between 1990-2005, at a rate tripling that of employment rate in the industry sector and making employment levels in agriculture seem negligible. Unemployment levels also remained relatively stable in the 1990s and early 2000s. The mean unemployment rate for the years considered was 7.59% (Public Data, 2017g).

Peru saw low levels of R&D as proxied by patent applications by residents. The data is incomplete for the years 1990-2005, but the average was only 37 patent applications per year (World Bank, 2017b). This rate of parent applications was stable over the 15-year period.

Social wellbeing was also on the lower end. Life expectancy in 1990 was 65.53, and although this trend was growing positively, life expectancy only reached 72.46 years in 2005 (Public Data, 2017h). Peru scored 4.81 on the self-reported life satisfaction in 2006, well below both Mexico and Argentina (Ortiz-Ospina and Roser, 2017).

Case Study Analysis

This section now directly applies the facts collected in the previous section to the hypotheses outlined in the theory section.

Hypotheses

Considering the information collected above, the hypotheses laid out in the theory section can now be tested. The data is shown again here in the Economic Development Index, which shows the country scores to be tested in HP7.

Table 1: Economic Development Index, scores in parentheses

	Argentina	**Mexico**	**Peru**	**Region**
R&D (patent applications, 1993)*	834 **(+3)**	506 **(+2)**	37 **(-3)**	317
GDP per Capita, PPP (1990-2005 average, using 2005 constant international $)**	$14,004.24 **(+2)**	$13,950.52 **(+2)**	$6,300.98 **(-3)**	$10,888.60
Wages (as a share of GDP 1990-2000 average)***	42.6% **(-1)**	33.3% **(-3)**	27.9% **(-3)**	47.8%
Income Inequality (Gini coefficient, 1998)****	50.7 **(+1)**	49.0 **(+2)**	56.1 **(-1)**	53.4
Unemployment (1991-2005 average)*****	13.7% **(-2)**	3.6% **(+3)**	7.6% **(+1)**	9.8%
Social Well-being (life expectancy and self-reported life satisfaction, 2005)******	74.69; 6.31 105.3% (of the regional social well-being) **(+1)**	75.28; 6.58 108.1% (of the regional social well-being) **(+2)**	65.53; 4.81 86.2% (of the regional social well-being) **(-3)**	72.91; 5.83 100% (of the regional social well-being)
Overall Country Score	**+4**	**+8**	**-12**	

* cutoff every 100 patent applications
** cutoff every $1500
*** cutoff every 5%
**** cutoff every 2 Gini points
***** cutoff every 2%
****** cutoff every 5%

HP1: *"The more centralized unions are in a country, the less R&D there is"* is visibly not supported by the cases at hand and must be rejected. In fact, the cases of Argentina, Mexico, and Peru support the notion that countries with stronger, more centralized unions also enjoy more patent applications every year.

The second hypothesis, "*As a country's union strength increases on the Union Strength Index, economic growth and productivity initially increase before reaching diminishing returns"* is supported in this study. The expected finding was that Peru, with its weak unions, would have little productivity; that Mexico, with moderate unions, would have high productivity; and that Argentina, with strong unions, would have diminishing returns exemplified by lower productivity. The returns have not yet become negative in Argentina *at this time,* but the productivity outputs in Argentina and Mexico are so similar as to suggest that the rate of return has diminished and is nearly flat.

The notion of diminishing returns is central to HP3. The three cases seem to lend little support for the hypothesis "*As a country's union strength increases on the Union Strength Index, wages initially increase before reaching diminishing returns.*" In terms of wage growth rate, Argentina and Mexico fall perfectly in line with the expected finding that moderate union strength would heed a high wage growth rate while great union strength would experience diminishing returns. However, Peru, with its weak unions, has greater real wage growth than either of the other two countries, making the relationship appear linear and negative. In terms of real wages and labor productivity, used in the Economic Development Index, it appears that union strength has a linear positive correlation with wages as a share of GDP. In Argentina, wages in 2000 constituted a 6% higher share of GDP than in Mexico and a 13.5% higher share than in Peru. In either case, HP3 must be rejected, as wages comprise a greater share of GDP as union strength increases.

The cases of Argentina, Mexico, and Peru appear to support HP4: "*As a country's union strength increases on the Union Strength Index, income inequality initially diminishes before increasing again*" depending on the measure used. Using wage dispersion coefficients for the manufacturing sector, again, as similarly to the case for HP2, this relationship appears linear and negative. The argument regarding the concave effect unionization has on wage inequality does not hold true in this case. However, because no data is available for wage dispersion coefficients for a regional average, it would not have been possible to insert "Income Inequality" into the Economic Development Index. I, therefore, also observed the relationship between union strength and the Gini coefficient for inequality, which actually supports HP4.

This case study seems to moderately support hypothesis 5. HP5, "*As a country's union strength increases on the Union Strength Index, employment initially increases before reaching diminishing returns*" appears validated in the sense that Peru and Argentina, with weak and strong unions respectively, have higher levels of unemployment than Mexico, with moderate unions.

The sixth hypothesis, "*As a country's union strength increases on the Union Strength Index, social well-being initially increases before reaching diminishing returns,*" is also supported by this case study. Weakly unionized Peru performs poorly in both indicators of social well-being.

Argentina and Mexico have a narrow difference, which indicates that diminishing returns may be occurring.

The final hypothesis is *HP7: As a country's union strength increases on the Union Strength Index, overall economic development, as measured in my Economic Development Index, initially increases before reaching diminishing returns.* The Index does show an overall inverted U shape representation of the diminishing returns effect of union strength on economic development. Argentina (+4), with its strong unions, scores worse than Mexico (+8), with its medium strength unions, but better than Peru (-12), with its weak unions, on the Index. Using the Economic Development Scale to interpret the Economic Development Index, I find that Argentina has "Medium-High" economic development, Mexico has "High" economic development, and Peru has "Low" economic development. This supports the diminishing returns relationship between union strength and economic development.

Conclusion

This study observed the effect of union strength on economic development in Argentina, Mexico, and Peru. Through my analysis, I hope to have shed light on a topic that had formerly received restricted scrutiny. Economic development in this paper has been operationalized comprehensively, using various indicators. The theory tested is whether union strength has a diminishing returns effect on the various economic development indicators.

Using the most similar system designs, the findings are that with some indicators, union strength seems to have a positive linear correlation, but overall, there is a diminishing returns relationship at play. As union strength rises, economic development rises, levels off, and eventually diminishes in a sort of inverted U shape. This may be because of the data used in the operationalization of indicators, so more research is necessary to draw more confident conclusions.

Some shortcomings of this research include the lack of data on collective contract coverage rates in Mexico or Peru for the 1990s; the fact that the calculation of union strength did not include union dues as a factor, as data pertaining to dues is often not available to common libraries; the limited data for measuring educational achievement, which only included comparable data on literacy rates for the period; the fact that trade openness was not included as a confounding variable, and aggregate savings and foreign direct investment were not included as indicators of economic development. Shortcomings of the Economic Development Index are the same as above: lacking data. Comparable data to calculate regional averages is scarce, so one indicator may be calculated for a different year than another indicator.

Further research is necessary to fine-tune the operationalization of the variables, provided better data is available for such a feat, so that findings may be stated with more confidence. It would also be necessary to take aggregate savings and foreign direct investment into account as controlled variables, as both greatly support economic development. Furthermore, it would be useful to clarify whether the differences in results across cases are substantively significant. I would encourage further research on the reasons causing the diminishing returns effect of union strength. However, as a preliminary survey of the comprehensive effects of union strength on economic development in Latin America, it can confidently be stated that this essay has made reasonable headway.

References

Abeles, M., Avarante, V., & Vega, D. (2014). The earnings share of total income in Latin America, 1990-2010. *Cepal Review.* 114, December 2014.

Addison, J. T., & Hirsch, B. T. (1989). Union Effects on Productivity, Profits, and Growth: Has the Long Run Arrived?. *Journal of Labor Economics,* Vol. 7, No. 1 (Jan., 1989), pp. 72-105.

Agion, P., Caroli, E., & Garcia-Peñalosa, C. (1999). Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories. *Journal of Economic Literature,* Vol. 37, No. 4 (Dec., 1999), pp. 1615-1660.

Anner, M. (2008). Meeting the Challenges of Industrial Restructuring: Labor Reform and Enforcement in Latin America. *Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Summer, 2008), pp. 33-65.*

Ashenlelter, O. (1971). The Effect of Unionization on Wages in the Public Sector: The Case of Fire Fighters. *ILR Review, Volume 24, Issue 2, pages 191-202.*

Bandyopadhyay, S. & Bandyopadhyay, S. C. (2001). Efficient bargaining, welfare, and strategic export policy. *The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development,* 10(2): 133-149.

Bradley, D., Kim, I., Tian, X. (2017). Do Unions Affect Innovation?. *Management Science,* 63(7):2251-2271.

Bronstein, A. (n.d.). National Labour Law Profile: Republic of Argentina. *International Labour Organization.* Retrieved from: http://www.ilo.org/ifpdial/information-resources/national-labour-law-profiles/WCMS_158890/lang--en/index.htm

Bryson, A., Barth, E. & Dale-Olsen, H. (2013). The Effects of Organizational Change on Worker Well-being and the Moderating Role of Trade Unions. *ILR Review,* 66(4), July 2013.

Cassoni, A., Labadie, G. J., & Fachola, G. (2002). The Economic Effects of Unions in Latin America: Their Impact on Wages and the Economic Performance of Firms in Uruguay. *Inter-American Development Bank,* Research Network Working Paper #R-466.

Chang, J. & Hung, H. (2016). Trade Unions, Unemployment, Economic Growth, and Income Inequality. *Macroeconomic Dynamics, 20, 2016, 404-428.*

CountryStudies.us. (n.d.). Mexico – Organized Labor. *CountryStudies.us.* Retrieved from: http://countrystudies.us/mexico/87.htm

CountryStudies.us. (n.d.). Peru – Organized Labor. *CountryStudies.us.* Retrieved from: http://countrystudies.us/peru/88.htm

Ewing, K.D. (2005). The Function of Trade Unions. *Industrial Law Journal, Vol. 34, No. 1.*

Fairris, D. & Levine, E. (2004). Declining union density in Mexico, 1984-2000. *Monthly Labor Review,* September 2004.

Fichtenbaum, R. & Olson, P. (2002). The Impact of Unionization on Health Insurance Benefits. *Journal of Economic Issues,* Vol. XXXVI, No. 2, June 2002.

Flavin, P., Pacek, A. C., & Radcliff, B. (2010). Labor Unions and Life Satisfaction: Evidence from New Data. *Social Indicators Research,* (2010) 98:435-449.

Flavin, P. & Shufeldt, G. (2016). Labor Union Membership and Life Satisfaction in the United States. *Labor Studies Journal,* 2016, Vol. 41(2): 171-184.

Gonzalez, C. S., Medwid, B., & Trajtemberg, D. (2009). Union Membership in Argentina. A Theoretical and Methodological Debate. *Subsecretaría de Programación Técnica y Estudios Laborales.* Retrieved from: http://www.ilera-directory.org/15thworldcongress/files/papers/Track_2/Thur_W5_SENEN%20GONZALEZ.pdf

Gottschalk, P. & Smeeding, T. M. (1997). Cross-National Comparisons of Earnings and Income Inequality. *Journal of Economic Literature,* Vol. XXXV (June 1997), pp. 633-687.

Grajeda, J. (2014). A look at labor unions in Mexico. *The Tecma Group of Companies.* Retrieved from: https://www.tecma.com/labor-unions-in-mexico/

Haile, G., Bryson, A., & White, M. (2015). Spillover effects of unionization on non-members' wellbeing. *Labour Economics,* 35 (2015), 108-122.

Hara, H. & Kawaguchi, D. (2008). The Union Wage Effect in Japan. *A Journal of Economy and Society.* 47.

Herzer, D. (2016). Unions and Income Inequality: A Heterogeneous Panel Co-integration and Causality Analysis. *Labour,* 30(3), 318-346, (2016).

Heywood, J. S. (1993). Efficient Labour Bargains, Unemployment and Non-Union Wages: A Two Sector Model. *Australian Economic Papers,* Volume 32, Issue 61, December 1993, Pages 214-230.

Hipp, L. & Kolins Givan, R. (2015). What Do Unions Do? A Cross-National Reexamination of the Relationship between Unionization and Job Satisfaction. *Social Forces,* 94(1): 349-377.

Hirsch, B. T., & Link, A. N. (1984). Unions, Productivity, and Productivity Growth. *Journal of Labor Research,* Volume V, No. 1, Winter, 1984.

Holcombe, R. G. & Gwartney, J. D. (2010). Unions, Economic Freedom, and Growth. *Cato Journal,* Vol. 30, No. 1 (Winter 2010).

Irmen, A. & Wigger, B.U. (2003). Trade Union Objectives and Economic Growth. *FinanzArchiv / Public Finance Analysis, Vol. 59, No. 1 (2002/2003), pp. 49-67.*

Ji, L., Chang, J., & Huang, C. (2016). Unionization, Market Structure, and Economic Growth. *Southern Economic Journal,* 2016, 82(3), 935-951.

Johnson, H. G., & Mieszkowski, P. (1970). The Effects of Unionization on the Distribution of Income: A General Equilibrium Approach. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics,* Vol. 84, No. 4 (Nov., 1970), pp. 539-561.

Katz, H. C. (1993). The Decentralization of Collective Bargaining: A Literature Review and Comparative Analysis. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review,* Vol. 47, No. 1 (October 1993).

Kuder, D. (2015). Impact of Institutional Factors on Economic Growth in the United States in the Years 1979-2007. *Oeconomia Copernicana,* 6(1), 137-159.

Lee, L. (1978). Unionism and Wage Rates: A Simultaneous Equations Model with Qualitative and Limited Dependent Variables. *International Economic Review,* Vol. 19, No. 2 (June 1978), pp. 415-433.

Long, R. J. (1993). The Effect of Unionization on Employment Growth of Canadian Companies. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review,* Vol. 46, No. 4 (July 1993).

Magnani, E. & Prentice, D. (2010). Outsourcing and Unionization: A Tale of Misallocated (Resistance) Resources. *Economic Inquiry,* Vol. 48, No. 2, April 2010, 460-482.

Marshall, A. (2000). Labor Market Regulation, Wages and Workers' behavior – Latin America in the 1990s. *Prepared for delivery at the 2000 meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Hyatt Regency Miami, March 16-18, 2000.*

McCallum, J. & Blais, A. (1987). Government, special interest groups, and economic growth. *Public Choice,* 54, 3-18 (1987).

McGuire, J. W. (1999). Labor Union Strength and Human Development in East Asia and Latin America. *Studies in Comparative International Development/Winter 1999.*

Menenez-Filho, N., Zylberstajn, H., Chahad, J. P., & Pazello, E. (2002). Unions and the Economic Performance of Brazilian Establishments. *Inter-American Development Bank,* Research Network Working Paper #R-464.

Mukherjee, A. & Pennings, E. (2005) Unionization Structure, Licensing, and Innovation. Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 05-109/4.

Mukherjee, A. & Pennings, E. (2011) Unionization Structure, licensing, and innovation. International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 29, Issue 2, March 2011, pages 232-241.

Ortiz-Ospina, E., & Roser, M. (2017). Happiness and Life Satisfaction. *Our World In Data.* Retrieved from: https://ourworldindata.org/happiness-and-life-satisfaction/

Pencavel, J. H. (1991). *Labor Markets under Trade Unionism: Employment, Wages, and Hours.* Cambridge: Blackwell.

Peru Country Commercial Guide. (2017). Peru – Labor. *Export.gov.* Retrieved from: https://www.export.gov/article?id=Peru-Labor-Policies-Practices

Public Data. (2017a). Inflation – consumer prices. *World Development Indicators – Google Public Data Explorer.* 2014. Retrieved from: https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=sp_pop_totl&idim=country:MEX:CAN:BRA&hl=en&dl=en#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=ny_gdp_defl_kd_zg&fdim_y=inflation_type:1&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=region&idim=country:MEX:ARG:PER&ifdim=region&tstart=720590400000&tend=1130817600000&hl=en_US&dl=en&ind=false

Public Data. (2017b). Population growth rate. *World Development Indicators – Google Public Data Explorer.* 2014. Retrieved from: https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=sp_pop_totl&idim=country:PER:ECU:BOL&hl=en&dl=en#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=sp_pop_grow&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=region&idim=country:PER:ARG:MEX&ifdim=region&tstart=657172800000&tend=1130558400000&hl=en_US&dl=en&ind=false

Public Data. (2017c). GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 international $). *World Development Indicators – Google Public Data Explorer.* 2014. Retrieved from: https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=sp_pop_totl&idim=country:MEX:CAN:BRA&hl=en&dl=en#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=ny_gdp_pcap_pp_kd&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=region&idim=country:PER:ARG:MEX&idim=region:LCN&ifdim=region&tstart=658126800000&tend=1131512400000&hl=en_US&dl=en&ind=false

Public Data. (2017d). Employment – Services. *World Development Indicators – Google Public Data Explorer.* 2014. Retrieved from: https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=sp_pop_totl&idim=country:MEX:CAN:BRA&hl=en&dl=en#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=employment&fdim_y=gdp_production_component:4&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim

=region&idim=country:MEX:ARG:PER&ifdim=region&tstart=657867600000&tend=1131249600000&hl=en_US&dl=en&ind=false

Public Data. (2017e). Employment – Industry. *World Development Indicators – Google Public Data Explorer.* 2014. Retrieved from: https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=sp_pop_totl&idim=country:MEX:CAN:BRA&hl=en&dl=en#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=employment&fdim_y=gdp_production_component:2&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=region&idim=country:MEX:ARG:PER&ifdim=region&tstart=658040400000&tend=1131426000000&hl=en_US&dl=en&ind=false

Public Data. (2017f). Employment – Agriculture. *World Development Indicators – Google Public Data Explorer.* 2014. Retrieved from: https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=sp_pop_totl&idim=country:MEX:CAN:BRA&hl=en&dl=en#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=employment&fdim_y=gdp_production_component:1&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=region&idim=country:MEX:ARG:PER&ifdim=region&tstart=657867600000&tend=1131249600000&hl=en_US&dl=en&ind=false

Public Data. (2017g). Unemployment. *World Development Indicators – Google Public Data Explorer.* 2014. Retrieved from: https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=sp_pop_totl&idim=country:MEX:CAN:BRA&hl=en&dl=en#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=unemployment&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=region&idim=country:MEX:ARG:PER&idim=region:LCN&ifdim=region&tstart=690958800000&tend=1132808400000&hl=en_US&dl=en&ind=false

Public Data. (2017h). Life expectancy. *World Development Indicators – Google Public Data Explorer.* 2014. Retrieved from: https://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=sp_pop_totl&idim=country:MEX:CAN:BRA&hl=en&dl=en#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=sp_dyn_le00_in&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=region&idim=country:MEX:ARG:PER&idim=region:LCN&ifdim=region&tstart=658126800000&tend=1131512400000&hl=en_US&dl=en&ind=false

Reyes, J. A., & Sawyer, W. C. (2016). *Latin American Economic Development, Second Edition.* New York, NY: Routledge.

Rios-Avila, F. (2014). Unions and Economic Performance in Developing Countries: Case Studies from Latin America. *Levy Economics Institute of Bard College.*

Rios, F. (2013). Essays on Unions, Wages and Performance: Evidence from Latin America. *Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2013.*

Saavedra, J. & Torero, M. (2002). Union Density Changes and Union Effects on Firm Performance in Peru. *Inter-American Development Bank,* Research Network Working Paper #R-465.

Schultz, T. P. & Mwabu, G. (1998). Labor Unions and the Distribution of Wages and Employment in South Africa. *ILR Review,* Vol. 51, No. 4 (July 1998), pp. 680-703.

TheGlobalEconomy.com. (2017a). Argentina: Natural resources income. *TheGlobalEconomy.com.* Retrieved from: http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Argentina/Natural_resources_income/

TheGlobalEconomy.com. (2017b). Mexico: Natural resources income. *TheGlobalEconomy.com.* Retrieved from: http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Mexico/Natural_resources_income/

TheGlobalEconomy.com. (2017c). Peru: Natural resources income. *TheGlobalEconomy.com.* Retrieved from: http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/Peru/Natural_resources_income/

World Bank. (2017a). DataBank: Poverty and Equity. *The World Bank.* Retrieved from: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=poverty-and-equity-database

World Bank. (2017b). Patent applications, residents. *The World Bank.* Retrieved from: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IP.PAT.RESD?end=2005&locations=PE-MX-AR&start=1990

World Bank. (2018). Total natural resource rents (% of GDP). *The World Bank*. Retrieved from: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS?end=2005&locations=AR-MX-PE&start=1990

Giacomo Mattei is an Advocacy Intern at ADHRB. He is a political science and history double-major at the University of Tampa and will graduate in December with his Bachelor's. He wishes to work with international organization's dealing with human rights or refugees before returning to graduate school for international relations. He hopes that his time with ADHRB will help him fine-tune his interests and successfully network with others in the field of International Relations here in DC.

Gender Quotas as Strategy: Exploring the Relationship Among International Perceptions of Democracy, Transnational Influence, and Female Representation in Sub-Saharan Africa

Paige Hill, Temple University, Philadelphia, United States of America

Abstract

Do countries that adopt parliamentary gender quotas do so as strategy in response to global pressure to improve the international perception of their democratic progress? Rwanda's 2000 constitution called for a quota, and since then there has been a trend across Sub-Saharan Africa to "fast-track" women's legislative representation. There has been a significant amount of literature on the use of quotas as signaling devices by autocratic regimes to indicate democratic progress. I argue that there is a gap in the scholarship on whether or not strategic gender quotas are efficient tools in achieving the regime's intentions of appearing more democratic by the international community. I explore this relationship through both a case study of Rwanda as an extreme sample case, and descriptive analyses of certain data across countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Freedom House Freedom Scores. Using statistical test methods and comparing sample groups of countries that have and have not adopted quotas, I find evidence to substantiate prevailing theories of signaling. Countries that adopted quotas had higher percentages of women in parliament, ranked higher for female representation, and saw their Freedom Scores improve more over time, compared to the countries that did not have quotas. Further findings are assessed.

Keyword: Gender Quotas, Sub-Saharan Africa, Democratization, International Aid, Comparative Politics, Rwanda, Elections

Introduction

Although many democratizing programs include gender equality as an aim, the countries with the highest female representation in parliament are often not characterized as free. At the same time, countries with the most robust democratic aid programs consistently rank low for female representation. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union, Rwanda is the country with the highest rate of female representation in its legislative bodies. It has also received a significant amount of democratic aid and attention from the United States. Rwanda's 2000 constitution called for Equality of Results Quotas, and since there has been a rush across the continent to "fast-track" women's legislative representation. Even so, according to the most recent Freedom House Reports, Rwanda earns a score of six, designating it as not free and autocratic. Rwanda continues to receive large amounts of democratic aid. At the same time, many free countries such as the U.S. or Botswana rank extremely low for female representation and do not have gender quotas. Evidently, equal gender representation is not a foolproof measure of democracy, and there has been a significant amount of literature on the use of quotas as a "signaling" device by autocratic regimes to indicate democratic process. The signaling effect is when autocratic or partially democratic regimes pass gender quota legislation in an effort to appeal to transnational influence and improve their reputation, incentivized by democratic aid and assistance (Bush 2011, Edgell 2017, Hughes et al. 2017, 339). I argue that there is a gap in the scholarship on whether or not theories of gender quotas as alternative strategy are efficient tools in achieving the regime's intended goals of appearing more democratic by the international community.

Do countries that adopt gender quotas as strategy in response to global pressure and economic incentives improve international perception of democratic progress? I aim to answer this question through both a case study of Rwanda, as well as descriptive analyses of certain data across countries including: the percentage of women in parliament, Freedom House Scores, and the presence and nature of gender quotas. I selected Rwanda because of its role as the country with the highest female parliamentary representation. Additionally, they adopted quotas relatively early, in 2000. This allows room for substantial analysis over time. Rwanda can also be thought of as the extreme case because of its unusual gender equality despite its consistently autocratic regime. For these reasons, Rwanda may give insight to the signaling effect.

There may be many factors impacting increased perception of democracy over time, such as conflict, economic agreements, or changes in perceptions of election legitimacy. Given this project's scope and timeframe, I will attempt to establish correlation between quotas and subsequent improvement in Freedom Scores, with recommendations for future research design to establish causation and statistical significance. I will also provide a more in-depth review of the prevailing literature in the field and background on the global pressure and gender equality.

If prevailing theories of signaling are correct, then countries adopt quotas in the interest of appearing more egalitarian and legitimate in the hopes of receiving more aid. As a result, these countries will improve in their international reputation as evidenced by an increase in their Freedom Score. Such quotas may be symbolic in nature, and do little to change women's short-term status and access to government. As will be seen in the case of Rwanda, these quotas may still have long-term impacts that challenge greater sociological norms. Overall, the worldwide trend of gender quotas since the 1990s may mark a significant increase in female political power. I aim to explore the relationship between gender quotas and Freedom Scores; if adopting quotas truly acts as a signaling device, then the presence of legislative gender quotas will have a statistically significant impact on Freedom Scores.

Background and Literature Review

Gender Quotas

Women in government are the subject of many debates and discussions in both academia and public discourse. Even though women make up half of all voters, workers, and the general population, the worldwide average for the number of women in federal legislative bodies is barely above 20% (Hughes et al. 2017, 332). In many countries, there is a paucity of female political candidates in campaigns in addition to several barriers in place to dissuade female involvement in every aspect of the political process, especially in legislative bodies. Even countries that are seen as highly democratic and equitable score low for the number of female lawmakers: the United States for example, hovers around 20% for both houses of the legislative body (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2017).

Some countries have decided to institute gender quotas for their legislative bodies to increase the number of women holding office at the national level. Electoral gender quotas are designed specifically for the purpose of helping women as an underrepresented gender overcome cultural and political obstacles to public office, and often set a specific number or percentage as a threshold, minimum requirement (Hughes et al. 2017, 333). These electoral quotas generally come in three forms: **reserved seats** for women in a parliament; **legislative quotas** in which parties are obliged to nominate a certain percentage of women; and **voluntary party quotas**, when political parties voluntarily agree to nominate a specific number of women (Bush 2011, 105). Legislative quotas, which are sometimes referred to as legal or candidate quotas, do not necessarily guarantee that women will be elected whereas reserved seats ensure women obtain a specific number of seats (Hughes et al. 2017, 333). Voluntary party quotas are self-imposed by political parties and are therefore not legally enforceable. There appears to be a correlation between democracy and what type of quotas countries adopt. For example, less democratic countries adopt reserved seats and legislative quotas more often than more established democracies (Bush 2011, 109). Many established democracies do not adopt gender quotas at all, while many of the world's most autocratic regimes do.

Scholars generally agree that quotas for women are one of the most significant political advancements in recent times because they 'fast-track' women into government in places where they might not have been able to enter the political arena otherwise (Hughes et al. 2015, 387; Tripp & Kang 2008). In fact, this fast-track approach with electoral quotas has replaced the 'incremental' approach in which the system waits for cultural, political, and socioeconomic developments over time to increase the amount of women in office, especially in developing democracies (Bauer & Burnet 2013, 103). The dramatic increase in scholarship on this topic since the 1990s reflects its growing importance in not only political science, but economic, policy, international affairs, and women's studies as well (Hughes et al. 2017, 333).

Gender quotas have both domestic and international implications, warranting a close study of the circumstances surrounding their adoption. Further, there seems to be an inconsistency in which countries adopt quotas and which are deemed democratic. The global diffusion of quotas has impacted developing democracies the most (Bush 2011, 103). These countries are also often the recipients of international and United States aid and assistance. Since one of the aims of US aid is to promote democracy, and since a major tenet of democracy is civil rights and representation for all, it is worth examining the relationship between quota adoption and democracy.

Regime Types

Categorizing government by regime type can sometimes result in contested definitions. For purposes of this analysis, notions of regime type are posited in political scientist Larry Diamond's developmental theory of democracy. His seminal work, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation,* centers democracy as a developmental phenomenon such that all regimes, even new and established democracies "can become even more democratic" (Diamond 1999, 18). According to his work, there is a distinction between electoral democracy, in which regimes have barebones electoral systems and elections, and fully-fledged liberal democracies (Diamond 1999, 10). The latter, which are often referred to as **established democracies,** enjoy certain aspects such as free, fair and contested elections, support for civil society, and protections for civil liberties (Diamond 1999, 11-12). As such, **developing democracies***,* which he also refers to as midrange or pseudodemocracies, are characterized as being at some point on this developmental spectrum, sometimes in such a way that "multiparty electoral competition [often] masks…the reality of authoritarian domination" (Diamond, 15). This paper is rooted in this distinction between developing and established democracies, and their further distinction from autocratic and authoritarian regimes that lack electoral systems.

One way to measure where countries are on this supposed democracy spectrum is the Freedom House survey and score reports, which Diamond qualifies as the "best empirical indicator of liberal democracy" (Diamond, 12). The Freedom in the World (2017) report utilized a methodology that assigned countries' scores in effort to label them as 'Free', 'Partly Free' and 'Not Free', which roughly correlates with Diamond's theory of developmental democracy. (Freedom in the World 2017: Methodology, 2017).

Transnational Influence

Female representation in government is internationally understood as a signal of democratic progress because it shows that the country is taking legislative steps to provide further equality in their society. Gender quotas can ensure this representation. In effect, they align with global liberalization efforts to promote democracy, and gender quota policies are often linked with economic development goals (Edgell 2017, 1104). Developing democracies and countries that receive aid are likely to pay attention to global democratic norms. According to world polity theories, international inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have goals that overlap into a ‘script’ that they expect states to follow (Hughes et al. 2015, 357). These organizations work together in what Sarah Bush has coined as the **democracy establishment**, which she defines as the group of professional organizations that create and “implement democracy-assistance programs” (Bush 2015, 10). The democracy establishment has expectations for how they want countries to act: gender equality is one of these expectations. Foreign aid and democracy assistance come in many forms. Aid specifically designated toward women’s representation is aimed at improving their political participation and includes political training for female candidates in order to build “the capacity of female elected officials and civil servants” (Bush 2015, 237). When countries give aid for specific purposes, it follows that they expect the money to be used for that purpose and that they should see improvement in that particular area. Gender quotas help fulfill this expectation of gender equality by dramatically increasing numerical representation of women in elected offices.

There is a significant amount of literature aimed at exploring the relationship between international influence and the adoption of gender quotas. Melanie Hughes, Mona Lena Krook, and Pamela Paxton (2015), confirm that countries feel pressure to conform to international standards of gender equality. The most recent annual review of gender quota literature affirms this consensus that transnational forces influence quota implementation in developing countries (Hughes et al. 2017). IGOs such as the World Bank, the United Nations, and the Inter-Parliamentary Union actively promote the adoption of gender quotas, and many aid programs are designed specifically for women's empowerment and democratization (Edgell 2017, 1104). As explored in a *Foreign Policy* article, "equitable representation of women in politics and government is an ideal promoted by every development organization and to which every Western government aspires" (Foust & Haring 2012). Consequently, international influence is an important factor in which determines whether a country adopts legislative quotas. It has been proven that countries are receptive to international expectations and respond to economic incentives. They also respond to how other countries perceive their democratizing efforts.

Gender Quota as Strategy

The mere presence of women in government does not correlate with actual political participation or rights (Foust & Haring 2012). So then why do so many developing democracies adopt quotas, and why are they lauded for this superficial progress? Scholars believe it has something to do with perceptions of democracy, foreign aid, and liberal norms. Two such examples are Susan Bush's "International Politics and the Spread of Quotas for Women in Legislatures" (2011) and Amanda Egdell's "Foreign Aid, Democracy, and Gender Quota Laws" (2017). Bush theorizes two causal pathways for quota adoption in developing democracies (2011). One is through direct involvement in the constitutional or legal process, and the second is by indirectly influencing countries with the incentive of more democratic aid (Bush 2011). These countries adopt gender quotas as the result of actual interference from an outside actor, or they voluntarily adopt them as they perceive benefits for the regime. This means that developing democracies respond to pressure and incentives to appear more democratic. Bush argues that these incentives, such as more democratic aid or a better international reputation, are central to the "global diffusion of quotas" (Bush 2011, 104).

The Edgell article explores two casual mechanisms between foreign aid and quotas: one mechanism is that states may adopt quotas as a way to ensure future aid and to signal gender equality, and another mechanism explores whether or not aid aimed at female empowerment is enough to influence the introduction of gender quotas (Edgell 2017). If countries are able to improve their international reputation, such as by improving their IGO and NGO democracy scores, they may receive more aid, engage in more favorable trade deals and economic agreements, or have a higher chance at securing influential allies or sponsors.

Both articles find sufficient evidence for the so-called signaling effect, or the phenomenon of pressure from international norms of gender equality influencing quota adoption. Adoption of quotas may be a purposeful, strategic move by governments. Edgell's research corroborates the theory that countries that are dependent on foreign aid are likely to signal the country's "commitment to international norms" (Edgell 2017, 1105) of democratic standards such as gender equality by adopting legislative quotas (Edgell 2017, 1105). However, these quotas can improve the status of women on paper without actually changing structural power dynamics, and she argues that this policy adoption is strategic in nature (Edgell 2017, 1106). The literature in the field agrees that countries adopt quotas as the result of transnational influence. If countries do in fact adopt quotas as part of a strategy, it should follow that their strategy should be marked successful by some measure. If governments in developing democracies adopt quotas as a strategy to improve their international reputations, we might expect see their reputations improve after quota adoption. This project attempts to illustrate this relationship.

Africa's Developing Democracies and Quotas

The scholarship surrounding legislative gender quotas is particularly fascinated with African countries, especially since the country with the highest percentage of female representation is

Rwanda. Prior to quotas, women in Sub-Sharan Africa were elected via women's wings of political parties, which had the effect of leaving them "marginalized and alienated from the policy formation process" (Paxton & Hughes 2007, 237) and they were often pressured by the parties to reinforce traditional roles and policy choices (Paxton & Hughes 2007, 237). Now, many countries in Africa lead in the number of women in parliament, even though the region is characterized as the world's most politically volatile (Muriaas et al. 2013, 89). Even though numeric representation has increased, there are many questions surrounding their political agency in these cultural contexts. Has their status really improved, or are they subjugated by the system as before?

Fast-tracking and the diffusion of quotas has been so rapid that the number of women legislators in Africa tripled between 1990 and 2010 (Hughes & Tripp 2015, 1513). In recent years, the fast-track trend can especially be seen in countries that are undemocratic or weak states (Burnet 2008; Bauer & Burnet 2013; Hughes & Tripp 2015). Several case studies in the region suggest that these polices may actually undermine democracy or be used by the ruling party to consolidate power or bargain for more democratic aid (Muriaas et al. 2013; Bauer & Burnet 2013). As such, there may be evidence in Africa's post-conflict transitions for the use of quota as strategy. Since African countries have been the target of much of the recent scholarship and are fairly young democracies, I will limit the selection of cases to analyze countries from this region.

Additionally, an in-depth study of Rwanda will show that female representation does not equate to democracy or true female equality. The mere numerical presence of women in government under these fast-track approaches do little to increase women's political and civil rights (Muriaas et al. 2013, 90). In Rwanda specifically, scholars have found that more women in government has not led to more democratization in the short-term but that there may be more opportunities for women in the long-term due to shifting civic society and more incremental approach changes (Burnet 2008, 361; Bauer & Burnet 2013, 109). These paradoxes give further evidence of the signaling effect because they demonstrate that the governments have little real interest in improving women's statuses beyond giving them seats in parliaments.

Quantitative Analysis: Democracy Scores Over Time

Hypothesis, Variables and Case Selection

I aim to explore the relationship between gender quotas and perceptions of democracy such that countries that adopt legislative gender quotas do so as strategy to improve their international reputations. If prevailing theories of signaling are correct, then countries adopt quotas in the interests of appearing more egalitarian. The countries' international reputations may in fact improve after adoption, as may be demonstrated by better Freedom Scores. In other words, if adopting quotas truly acts as a signaling device, then the independent variable of a legislative gender quota has a statistically significant impact on democracy score, the dependent variable.

For case selection, I compiled a list of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa using the United States Department of State's Bureau of African Affairs' official list. This large case observational analysis includes non-random assignment of the treatment. The Bureau recognizes 47 sovereign countries, 23 of which have adopted gender quotas. Since I situate my discussion in the context of neoliberal foreign aid policies, I use this list because it legitimizes regimes from the US perspective and identifies US foreign aid recipients. Eritrea, one of the countries that adopted a gender quota, did so in 2005, but has yet to actually hold elections, and women have therefore not been elected to any office under a quota (Quota Project). Consequently, the test group, the group of countries that have adopted quotas, is 22. The control group, or countries that have not adopted quotas, is 24.

The control group consists of: Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Zambia. The test group, countries that have adopted quotas, are: Angola, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Congo (DRC), Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

Data and Methods

To collect data on these countries, I referred to the Inter-Parliamentary Union's updated data on the percentages of women in parliaments across 193 countries as of September 2017. This online database ranks the countries in order from most female representation to least in both upper and lower houses of legislature, if applicable. To determine whether or not a country had adopted a gender quota, I referred to The Quota Project. This web site distinguishes between three types of gender quotas used in politics: reserved seats (constitutional and/or legislative); legal candidate quotas (constitutional and/or legislative); and political party quotas (voluntary). Similar to Edgell's design method, I only include legally mandated quotas as sufficient, and I exclude countries that only have voluntary party quotas because these are not legally or constitutionally ensured (Edgell 2017, 1107). According to The Quota Project, these are categories one and two quotas. To code, I use a binary variable where the presence of a quota equals 1, and absence of a quota equals 0.

To measure perceptions of democracy, I use Freedom House Score Reports for Political Rights (PR) Scores. This is an ordinal scale of 1 through 7, 1 being most free and 7 least free. In order to make the scale and graphs more intuitive, I relied on Edgell's rescaling approach to make more democratic values at the high end of the range so that 7 to 1 is rescaled as 0 to 6. Although the

Freedom Scores are not an all-encompassing measure of democracy, they are, as seen in Edgell's work, a "crucial measure of perceived level of democracy that policymakers frequently use to evaluate states' compliance with liberal norms" (Edgell 2017, 1109; Freedom House "Our History"). For purposes of measuring perception of democratization, these scores provide an adequate observation of international norms and expectations. An improvement in Freedom Score indicates that the international community agrees that they have seen democratic progress in some aspect. The PR Scores refer to factors of free and fair elections, representation, corruption and opposition (Freedom in the World 2017: Methodology). According to Freedom House methodology, a country's PR score can be assigned by how well minority groups are represented in the government (see Table 1 and Table 2). Since I am particularly interested in the issue of gender representation as it relates to democracy, I used changes in PR Scores to measure perceptions of democracy.

I then compared political rights scores for each country over time. For countries that did adopt gender quotas, I recorded the year of adoption and then found their PR scores for the year prior to adoption (t-1), the year of adoption (t=0), one year out (t+1), and five years out (t+5). I did the same for countries that did not adopt quotas, the control group.

Since these countries did not adopt quotas, I used the average year of adoption from the test group as the base year (t=0), which was 2007. In cases where data for five years out was unavailable because countries adopted a quota too recently, I used figures from the most recent report in 2017. For cases with multiple instances of quota adoption, or ones that reformed their quota after time, I used the first year they passed the substantial threshold and adopted a category 1 or 2 quota as the base year. This was the case with Tanzania, Rwanda, and Uganda. Tanzania adopted a quota in 1995, but did not receive Freedom Scores until 1999 so that is the year I used for t-1. The same was the case with Uganda.

Lastly, I compared the samples using a t-test to determine whether or not the differences in results were statistically significant enough to support a relationship between democracy score and quota adoption, thus supporting evidence for the signaling effect theory.

Country	Inverted 0-6 Scale	Freedom Score; year before adoption (PR)	Freedom Score; year of adoption (PR)	Change in PR -1-0	Freedom Score, +1 years after adoption (PR)	Change in PR 0-1	Freedom Score, +5 years after adoption (PR)	Change in PR 0-5	Freedom Score 2017 (PR)
Sub-saharan Africa									
Benin		5	5		5		5		5
Bostwana		5	5		5		4		4
Cameroon		1	1		1		1		1
Central African Republic		2	2		2		2		0
Chad		1	1		0		0		0
Comoros		3	4		3		4		4
Cote d'Ivoire		1	0		0		1		3
Equatorial Guinea		0	0		0		0		0
Gabon		1	1		1		1		1
Gambia		2	2		2		1		1
Ghana		6	6		6		6		6
Guinea Bissau		4	3		3		3		2
Liberia		3	4		4		4		4
Madagascar		4	3		3		1		4
Malawi		3	3		3		4		4
Mali		5	5		5		5		2
Mauritis		6	6		6		6		6
Mozambique		4	4		4		3		3
Namibia		5	5		5		5		5
Nigeria		3	3		3		3		4
Sao Tome and Principe		5	5		5		5		5
Sierra Leone		3	3		4		4		4
South Africa		6	5		5		5		5
Zambia		3	4		4		4		3
		3.375	3.3333333		3.29166667		3.208333333		3.166666667

Table 1: Control Group Data on the Inverted Scale, 0 Least Free, 6 Most Free

Country	Freedom Score; year before adoption (PR)	Freedom Score; year of adoption (PR)	Change in PR -1-0	Freedom Score, +1 years after adoption (PR)	Change in PR 0-1	Freedom Score, +5 years after adoption (PR)	Change in PR 0-5	Freedom Score 2017 (PR)
Sub-saharan Africa								
Angola	1	1		1		1		1
Burkina Faso	2	4		2		2		3
Burundi	2	2		4		3		0
Cabo Verde	6	6		6		6		6
Congo (DRC)	1	1		1		1		0
Republic of Congo	2	1		1		1		0
Dijbouti	3	3		3		2		1
Guinea	0	0		2		2		2
Kenya	3	3		3		3		3
Lesotho	4	4		4		4		4
Mauritania	1	1		1		1		1
Niger	2			3		4		3
Rwanda	0	0		1		1		1
Senegal	4	4		5		5		5
Somalia	0	0		0		0		0
South Sudan		1		1		0		0
Sudan	0	0		0		0		0
Swaziland	0	0		0		0		0
Tanzania	3			3		3		4
Togo	2	2		3		3		3
Uganda	2			1		2		1
Zimbabwe	1	1		2		2		2
	1.85714286	1.789473684		2.13636364		2.09090909		1.818181818

Table 2: Test Group Data on the Inverted Scale, 0 Least Free, 6 Most Free

Findings and Results

The first finding is that countries with quotas did have more numerical female representation and higher global rankings for women in parliament. In the control group women held an average of 17.4% of the seats in lower houses of legislatures, for an average worldwide ranking at #119. For comparison, the United States is at about 20% and ranks at #101. This means that countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that do not have quotas are on par with the US, and in some cases perform better. The test group had an average of 25.6% seats for women, roughly 8 percentage points higher than the control group, and the average ranking was #76. At this level there is evidence to support that gender quotas lead to higher numerical representation for women.

Secondly, countries that adopted quotas saw their PR scores improve compared to the control group. This relationship is represented in the bar graph below, Figure 1:



Figure 1: Political rights scores before and after the adoption of quotas, compared to countries that did not adopt quotas. The control group has higher scores in general, but the test group saw their scores improve compared to the countries without quotas.

Looking at averages for the control group on the inverted 0-6 (least free-more free) PR scale, the figures for T-1:T0, T0:T+1, T0:T+5, were: 3.375, 3.333, 3.292, and 3.208. This means that over the span of six years, countries in sub-Saharan Africa that did not have gender quotas, on average, saw their political rights scores become less democratic. On the other hand, for countries that adopted quotas, the figures were 1.857, 1.789, 2.136, and 2.0909. This means that countries with quotas were immediately perceived to be democratizing following the adoption of quotas, and then saw their scores slowly rise some time later. This is best represented in the line graph (Figure 2). Countries without quotas either saw no improvement in their scores or saw their scores worsen. Countries that did not adopt quotas had higher Freedom Scores in general, with the average score a little over a 3, while countries with quotas hovered just below a 2.



Figure 2: Countries that adopted quotas saw an immediate improvement in Scores (t=0:t+1). Countries without quotas saw their scores slowly decrease over time, but had better scores to begin with.

Lastly, I conducted a t-test, a comparison of average calculation, to see if these changes held any statistical significance. Using a confidence variable of 90% with a degree of freedom of 44, the threshold figure was 1.684. My calculations resulted in a t-test figure of 1.265, which is below the threshold for statistical significance. This means that quota adoption alone is not substantial enough to explain the differences in PR score with great confidence. Although the results do not confirm the initial hypothesis with certainty, there is a trend in evidence to suggest that the variables are somewhat related.

Based on an interpretation of the graph and numbers, we can see that countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa region were overall seen as becoming less democratic in the last two decades. For countries that adopted quotas, that trend seemed to pause or reverse in the time immediately following the adoption of a legislative quota. Further, the countries that had adopted quotas had worse Freedom Scores, which suggests that they were possibly looking to improve their scores more immediately than the control group countries. This would substantiate the signaling effect. Perhaps they wanted a quick way to appear more democratic; the adoption of a quota could have been this mechanism to signal progress without actual societal change.

Changes in democracy score can be explained by a myriad of other possibly contradictory or compounding factors such as the quality of elections, economic freedom, freedom of the press, civil liberties, and other democratic markers. Freedom Scores generally do not vary much from year to year because the methodology includes such complex factors (Freedom House: Methodology). There needs to be substantial change to move a score beyond a category threshold. The fact that the test group experienced some variance immediately following the adoption of a quota indicates that it might have had an impact on the countries' international reputations. Although this initial research is not conclusive, there is some evidence in the data trends to substantiate the signaling effect.

Qualitative Analysis: Case Study of Rwanda

Case Selection and Historical Background

In order to explore the possible practice and impact of the signaling effect, I will examine Rwanda's experience with quotas, their international reception, and the effect of women's mobilization within the country. Rwanda represents an extreme case because it exemplifies an extreme or unusual value of a variable, in this case gender representation, relative to the distribution of Political Rights Freedom Scores. Rwanda, the only country in the world to have a female majority in a legislature, utilizes a constitutional gender quota with both reserved seats and voluntary party quotas (Bauer & Burnet 2013, 103). It also stands out as a post-conflict and newly developing democracy that has had many autocratic setbacks.

Evidence suggests that post-conflict countries recovering from civil war are more likely to draft new constitutions, with room for radical policies, such as gender quotas (Hughes & Tripp 2015, 1517). This is exactly the case with Rwanda. The country suffered a horrendous civil war and genocide in 1994, and although some women were involved as "perpetrators and accomplices," women account for only about 2% of the victims and suspects (Paxton & Hughes 2007, 175). This left a major power vacuum that was filled by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), which is still the ruling party today. It also left a populous that was disproportionately composed of women. In 2000, with amendments in 2003, the RPA adopted a new constitution that included a 30% gender quota in "all decision-making bodies" (The Quota Project: Rwanda). Although this quota adoption seems independent of transitional influence and perhaps more concerned with domestic matters, there are still aspects of its history that may support the signaling theory.

One central tenet of the signaling theory is that the more dependent a country is on foreign aid, the more likely they are to signal democratic progress with the adoption of a quota (Bush 2011, 104). Rwanda is a major recipient of United States democracy assistance. In 2003, the year they adopted the quota, they received $46 million in US dollars; the amount received has since steadily increased, reaching an all-time high in 2015 with USAID funds at $169 million and a total of $247 million across all US agencies (USAID: Rwanda, 2017). Although aid has increased over time, even adjusting for inflation, Rwanda's Freedom Scores have not improved. Even though Rwanda ranks number one in the world for female representation in parliament, it is stationed in a highly political volatile region and received an overall Freedom Score of a 1 in 2017 on the inverted 0-6 scale. In 2017 they scored only 8 points out of a possible 40 for political rights regarding the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and the function of the government (Freedom in the World 2017: Rwanda, 2017). Simply put, aid has increased while democracy has not. With the help of the quotas, female representation has increased. Evidence from both Bush (2011) and Edgell (2017) corroborate that this paradoxical relationship and strategic policy choice may be understood as signaling.

Rwanda's International Reputation

Even though they are lauded for growth in women's representation, international perception of democratization in Rwanda has not improved. Since the post-genocide regime transition from 1994-2003, the RPA has become increasingly authoritarian (Bauer & Burnet 2013, 105). They have had increasingly less democratic, and less free and fair elections since its 2003 constitution. In its most recent elections in 2017, the ruling party candidate and sitting President since 1994, Paul Kagame, won re-election with over 98% of the vote, a dismal number by democratic standards (BBC, 2017). Despite its autocratic trends, possibly corrupt elections, and susceptibility to political and civil strife, Rwanda is praised as a beacon for gender equality because of this numerical representation. Just this summer, the BBC reported that President Kagame called the election "just a formality" (BBC 2017) in the same exact article they called him a "champion for women's rights" (BBC, 2017). He is simultaneously seen as an increasingly autocratic ruler with little respect for a grounding democratic practice, a free and fair presidential election, and an advocate for women because of the high numeric representation of women in the parliament.

This paradox is not uncommon. In 2008, Jennie Burnet conducted ethnographic research to explore the impact of the gender-balance in Rwanda on policies and women empowerment. She found that:

> "Beyond an ideological commitment to promoting women's rights, the RPF's pro-woman policies gain a great deal of support for the RPF regime…in the international community…" and that international delegates "overlook the regime's authoritarianism and human rights abuses… [and] diplomats often respond with an attitude of 'at least, it's not genocide' and then enumerate RPF success, such as promoting women's rights" (Burnet 2008, 371).

The ideology behind gender quotas helps Rwanda demonstrate its commitment to the democracy establishment, especially because they have backed up this policy with actual increases of women in elected office. This has been met with praise from the international community, and warrants excuses for their non-democratic behavior. The strategy has been so effective that President Kagame hosted an international conference 'Gender, Nation Building: The Role of Parliaments' in the capital city of Kigali in 2007, and was awarded the African Gender Award in the same year (Burnet 2008, 369-370). Rwanda is seen as exhibit number one for gender representation. The numbers are so impressive that donors are still willing to give aid despite poor improvements in most other aspects of political rights. The representation is satisfactory enough that IGOs and NGOs turn a blind eye to the regressing political systems and regime behavior. Rwanda has successfully positioned itself through the use of these gender quota policies. The signaling theory suggests that this is a strategic move.

The Effect of the Gender Quota

As a result of increasing authoritarianism, female political participation represents a paradox in the short term: as their participation has increased, women's ability to influence policy making has decreased (Burnet 2008, 361). Women hold more seats but less power over time as the regime resorts back to undemocratic electoral processes. As seen in this case, more women in government does not increase democracy (Bauer & Burnet 2013). This has been seen in many other countries in the region as well. In Africa, particularly, women's presence in government may be "meaningless" because the government structures are so weak (Creevey 2006). Representation does not go far if a democratic structure is unstable in its foundation. Not much can be done to achieve real policy change if the processes are broken. According to Burnet, the quota in Rwanda has not led to "egalitarian notions of citizenship" (Burnet 2008, 363), and may be just a mere symbol meant to impress donors of foreign aid (Burnet 2008, 363). This directly substantiates the signaling theory.

A survey of research suggests that numeric representation does little to actually empower, embolden, and enfranchise women (Muriaas et al. 2013, 90). Women in office does not equate to empowerment on the ground, in a way that the incremental approach may work, for example. Further, quotas in non-democratic countries can be used to "obtain women's votes, to create new patronage networks, or to cultivate national legitimacy on a world stage" (Tripp & Kang 2008, 355, 366). These policies can be used for purposes directly contradictory to their *de jure* intentions. They can even assist the ruling party by providing access to the female voter demographic and by adding seats to the party in a proportional representation legislature (Edgell 2017, 1116). Quotas have the potential strengthen the ruling regime domestically, and improve international perceptions if utilized under the "guise of democratization" (Burnet 2008, 363). This guise is the exact focus of the signaling theory. They provide an easy way to demonstrate progress because they satiate the democracy establishment's expectation for improved political participation and representation, even if they do not change the regime structure or actually increase democratic practices. Elected officials who are women are tokenized to achieve this end.

All of this is not to say that women are passive in the political process. In fact, in the long term, the increased participation of women due to a quota could prepare the path for their meaningful participation in a genuine democracy. Consider that women who hold office in developing countries due to quotas perform on par with their male peers (Franceschet et al. 2012). Once in office, women do have some agency in the legislative process. There is evidence to show that quotas have significantly and positively impacted women's participation (Tripp & Kang, 2008). Even if quotas are not able to reach their full potential, the aid and reputation associated with them can be beneficial to domestic civil society.

In Rwanda, women have seen significant impact from aid targeted at women's empowerment and organization, and this aid and assistance on the ground has emboldened women's civil society organizations (Burnet 2008, 374). The notion that increased civil society activity increases the likelihood of democratization is generally agreed upon. Burnet critiques Rwanda's approach to civil society and finds many flaws in the relationship between the women in government and women in the organizations, but she also agrees that more women in government has shifted cultural perceptions of what women are capable of (Burnet 2008, 382). In effect, this has "opened the doors to greater individual freedom for women in other aspects of their lives" and increased the "numbers of women with leadership and government experience" (Burnet 2008, 382, 385). These shifts, though incremental, have the potential to impact societal change at the local level. Women in office may inspire younger women to run or become politically involved.

Women returning home to their communities from the federal political scene bring back their skills that in turn can bolster civil society and local government. Empowerment of women is always a good idea. Even if patriarchal norms and autocratic regimes attempt to further their own agendas at the expense of elected women, female politicians are not docile nor sedentary. As seen in Rwanda, gender quotas may arise for a myriad of compounding factors, and their implications are vast.

Conclusion

As seen in both the quantitative and qualitative analyses, there is a relationship between international perceptions of democracy and gender quotas in developing democracies. Gender equality and representation are aims of democratizing efforts, and some countries fast-track women's representation through quotas in response to these international pressures. They are also incentivized by democracy aid and assistance, and the potential to improve their reputations, which is reinforced by the democracy establishment. This phenomenon is particularly true in post-conflict countries and developing democracies in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Firstly, further research should incorporate more intersectionality theories. Gender and ethnicity intersect continuously, and according to Lori Handrahan's research, scholarship on democratization often ignores compounding aspects of identity such as race. Her research aims to prove that a factor of democracy assistance failure has been the "marginalization of gender that has obscured the significance of ethnicity" (Handrahan 2002, 7). In other words, we cannot have stable democracies without the inclusion of women and the recognition of ethnicity. Perhaps the adverse effect of gender quota as strategy by regimes can be explained by US failure to incorporate women of color. I recommend that scholars researching quota policies in Africa consider these theories and incorporate critiques from a critical race theory lens in order to approachably understand the impact of gender polices.

The initial trends in my observations of Freedom House Scores over time lend evidence to the signaling effect theory. If countries adopt quotas as a strategic move, then they should expect to see some return in the form of aid or better democracy. The data confirms that there may be a correlation between quota adoption and subsequent improvements in the international community's perception of democracy in that country. One aspect that is hard to untangle is whether or not these countries are actually becoming more democratic, or if it is only the perception of democracy that is changing. As such, additional measures of democracy would improve the data. It would also be valuable to mark changes in scores every year, and to measure if there were any changes in democratic aid. The research design would benefit from greater attention to compounding and omitted variables to alleviate endogeneity problems.

In terms of the case study, the analysis of Rwanda's interaction with gender quotas lends insight to the overall question of how gender quotas impact perceptions of democracies. Women's numerical representation improved, while other markers of democracy regressed and Freedom Scores only slightly improved. At the same time, Rwanda has been continually lauded as a champion for women, even though women on the ground may not see a short-term improvement in their status. In the long-term, fast-tracked gender quotas may help change societal contexts over time, and empower women and communities. Further research on the impact of quotas, both domestically and geopolitically, would help actors in developing democracies, the democracy establishment, and women's movements, disentangle the intent, purpose, and effect of these policies.

References

Bauer, Gretchen, and Jennie Burnet. 2013. "Gender Quotas, Democracy, and Women's Representation in Africa: Some Insights from Democratic Botswana and Autocratic Rwanda." *Women's Studies International Forum* 41, (June): 103-112.

BBC World News: Africa. 2017. "Rwanda Election: President Paul Kagame Wins by Landslide." *The British Broadcasting Corporation,* August 5, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-40822530

Burnet, Jennie E. 2008. "Gender Balance and the Meanings of Women in Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda." *African Affairs* 107, no. 428 (May): 361–386.

Bush, Sarah Sunn. 2011."International Politics and the Spread of Quotas for Women in Legislatures." *International Organization* 65, no. 1 (Winter): 103–137.

--------. 2015. *The Taming of Democracy Assistance: Why Democracy Promotion Does Not Confront Dictators.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Creevey, Lucy. 2006. "Senegal: Contending with Religious Constraints." in *Women in African Parliaments,* edited by Bauer & Britton, 151-170. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation.* Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Edgell, Amanda. 2017. "Foreign Aid, Democracy, and Gender Quota Laws." *Democratization* 24, no. 6, (October): 1103-1141.

Freedom House. 2017. "Freedom in the World 2017 Scores." https://Freedomhouse.org/report/fiw-2017-table-country-Scores

--------. n.d. "Our History." https://Freedomhouse.org/content/our-history

--------. 2017. "Freedom in the World 2017: Methodology." https://Freedomhouse.org/report/methodology-Freedom-world-2017

--------. 2017. "Freedom in the World 2017: Rwanda Country Report." https://Freedomhouse.org/report/Freedom-world/2017/rwanda

Foust, Joshua and Melinda Haring. 2012. "Who Cares How Many Women Are in Parliament?" *ForeignPolicy.com,* June 25, 2012. http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/06/25/who-cares-how-many-women-are-in-parliament/#

Franceschet, Susan, Mona Lena. Krook, and Jennifer M. Piscopo. 2012. *The Impact of Gender Quotas*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Handrahan, Lori. 2002. *Gendering Ethnicity: Implications for Democracy Assistance.* New York, Routledge.

Hughes, Melanie M., Mona Lena Krook, and Pamela Paxton. 2015. “Transnational Women’s Activism and the Global Diffusion of Gender Quotas.” *International Studies Quarterly* 59, (2015): 357-372.

--------. 2017. “Gender Quotas for Legislatures and Corporate Boards.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 43, (May): 331–352.

Hughes, Melanie M. and Aili Mari Tripp. 2015. “Civil War and Trajectories of Change in Women’s Political Representation in Africa, 1985-2010.” *Social Forces* 93, no. 4 (June): 1513-1540.

Inter-Parliamentary Union. 2017. “Women in National Parliaments.” Last updated September 1, 2017. http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm

Muriaas, Tønnessen, and Wang. 2013. "Exploring the Relationship between Democratization and Quota Policies in Africa." *Women's Studies International Forum* 41 (June): 89-93.

Paxton, Pamela and Melanie M. Hughes. 2007. *Women, Politics and Power: A Global Perspective.* California: Pine Forge Press, Sage Publications, Inc.

The Quota Project. 2015. “The Quota Database.” Last updated 2015. http://www.quotaproject.org

--------. 2014. “The Quota Database: Rwanda.” Last updated 2014. http://www.quotaproject.org/country/rwanda

Tripp, A.M. and Kang, A. 2008. “The Global Impact of Quotas: On the Fast Track to Increased Female Legislative Representation.” *Comparative Political Studies* 41: 228-361.

United States Department of State Bureau of African Affairs. 2017. “African Affairs: Countries and Other Areas.” https://www.state.gov/p/af/ci/

USAID. 2017. “US Foreign Aid by Country: Rwanda.” https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/RWA?measure=Obligations&fiscal_year=2015&implementing_agency_id=1

Paige Hill is a senior studying Political Science with a minor in History at Temple University in Philadelphia, PA. She currently serves as the Co-President of the Delta Rho Chapter of Pi Sigma Alpha, the national political science honor society, and as the Vice President of External Affairs for Temple Student Government. She has previously presented her research on Italian immigrant identity at the Temple Global Conference following a semester abroad in Rome, Italy. Other conference appearances include the Pi Sigma Alpha Undergraduate Conference, and the Greater Philadelphia Women's Studies Consortium Student Conference. She recently completed an internship with the United States Department of State, and hopes to pursue a career in the foreign service.

Children Are Left Behind: An Analysis of Special Needs Education Policy in the United States since *No Child Left Behind*

Roksolana M. McVicar, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to explore the impacts of centralized education policy in the United States on special education. The policies that will be examined within the article are federal education policies enacted from the Bush administration's No Child Left Behind Act, 2001; to those enacted during the Obama administration; and finally those under consideration by President Trump. By examining the research done on the practical implications of the education policy, it is demonstrated that the key policy initiatives have been better trained teachers, better access to the classroom, and funding necessary to allow students with special needs to succeed. This demonstrates that the policies that have been enacted in the last decade fall short of the practical implications discussed by education policy researchers such as Sindelar et al., Poetter et al., and Kirby.

Keywords: No Child Left Behind Act, Every Student Succeeds Act, Special Education, Race for the Top.

Introduction

Within the United States, education policy has long been a topic of debate and discussion within the political parties and the governmental institutions. It has become a political issue, with just one example in recent years being President Bush's "No Child Left Behind Act, 2001" (NCLB). However, one area of discussion that is not always at the forefront of this debate is that of special education, and how the general education policies impact these children with special needs. It is important to see what influence NCLB and the policies that were adopted after it have had upon special education; in turn providing a method of understanding the effectiveness of the policies themselves. By conducting this analysis, it will become clear that while the policy changes have delivered some form of benefit to the special needs population, the policies implemented post-NCLB are not meeting the needs of the students who require special needs education, nor the needs of their parents. Additionally, this analysis also provides an opportunity to explore whether or not a nation-wide education policy can be adopted; thereby seeing if centralization of important policy-making decisions, such as education, is possible in a political climate that is distrustful of centralization. This analysis will be conducted by examining the policies related to the "No Child Left Behind Act" during the Bush administration, the studies of the impact of those policies during the Obama administration, and finally the proposition that then Presidential Candidate Trump gave to "eliminate the Department of Education," and what he sees as being implemented instead. In turn, this will provide possible areas of consideration for the current and future administrations upon areas of improvement, and where to best focus the attention of policy-makers.

Prior to the beginning of the analysis, the author deems that it is important to provide a disclaimer in the instances of some word choice. While the lexicon of ways to address children and adults with special needs has evolved in the modern day, there are still titles and names of historical importance that are used for reference purposes in direct citations from certain pieces of legislation.

These descriptors reflect the views of the people of those times and do not at all reflect the views of the author.

Historical Context of General and Special Education policies

In order to understand the current policy situation for Special Needs education, it is important to first understand the history of policies that came before No Child Left Behind. The Special Needs Education movement owes a lot to the Civil Rights movement, particularly to the court decision from *Brown vs. Board of Educatio*n in 1954, where the courts decided that "in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place". This use of the Protection of the 14th Amendment in order to assure the "equal protection" of all people in the United States opened the door for special needs education activists to have a legal precedent in order to ensure the inclusion of children with disabilities within the classroom (Spring, 2014). The equivalent case for disability rights advocacy came with the decision handed down after the *Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children (PARC) v. the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania*, which used the argumentation in *Brown* to demonstrate that the rights of Special Needs children and their access to the classroom has in many ways mirrored the segregation of African Americans (Spring, 2014). The courts ruled in favour of PARC, stating that the government is obligated to provide special needs students with access to "a free, public program of education and training appropriate to the child's capacity" (1972). Despite this favourable ruling, due to the variety of court cases in play at the time, advocacy groups also turned to Congress to ensure that the creation of some form of policy would occur quickly to enshrine Special Education rights within the framework of the American School System (Brown & Cooper, 2011). In 1973, the Education for Handicapped Children Act (EHCA) was passed, which deemed that children with disabilities would be allowed to have "access to the public education system regardless of the severity of the disability in the least restrictive environment" (Brown & Cooper, 2011). This policy evolved into the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act

(IDEA) in 1990, which was a policy created along six tenants that worked towards the complete inclusion of children with disabilities into the classroom with free range of access and with the adequate supports needed - no matter the disability. This would be done, unlike the EHCA, via Individual Education Plans, or IEPs, that would provide the teachers in the classroom with a tool in order to grant each student an equitable access to the class and the subject matter within it. The IEPs would serve as roadmaps without having to have a different case scenario for every type of disability case imaginable. In order to ensure compliance to IDEA, the Federal Government would be the one implementing a system of checks and balances (Section 1402, IDEA, 1994), thus creating a more centralized approach to education. However, it became clear that this type of Federal oversight, while possible in theory, did not transmit well into practice. As described by Kramarczuk, Voulgarides, and Tefera "actual enforcement and subsequent sanctions [for violating the tenants of IDEA] are minimal from federal and state agencies…" (p.163); hence making many advocacy groups believe that not enough is being done to actually provide support for children with special needs. As the Office of Special Needs Education is part of the Department of Education, it is comprehensible that there are simply not enough personnel to be able to keep track of all possible problems at one time. Despite the concerns the public has had with the Act, IDEA still continues to be the leading piece of policy in the United States that protects education rights for students with disabilities. The policy is renewed every few years, with the latest iterations occurring in 2008, and then in 2016 under the Obama administration, which still goes by the title of IDEA due to it simply expanding upon some areas of policy control that had not been touched upon in the previous versions of the legislation (Kirby, 2017). In essence, IDEA and the few amendments to the Americans with Disabilities Act (enacted 1990, amendments occurred in 2008) represent the few pieces of legislation in the United States that protect the needs of this particular minority group, and are the historical backdrop for the further developments within Special Education Policy reform.

Concerning education policy in general, the important piece of legislation that was passed is the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA). This legislation is the groundwork for Federal Elementary and Secondary Education Policy in the United States, and its reauthorizations have given root for the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) of the Bush administration and the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) of the Obama administration. The purpose of the ESEA was the first attempt by the Federal Government of the United States to "strengthen and improve educational quality and educational opportunities in the Nation's elementary and secondary schools." (Statement of purpose, 1965). This 32-page act only mentions the "handicapped" twice, and both are in the context of providing children with disabilities the technology necessary in order to access the classroom (Sec. 503 (10)). This demonstrates the historical model used to address the needs of Students with Special Needs (SWSNs), a model that to a degree continues to affect special education to this day. This model works under the assumption that "disability is an inherent flaw within a person…used for justification for legislative decisions….that favours placement in special education as a means to remedy the area of weakness" (Kirby, 2017). This model has led to many students spending their time in resource rooms and not within the actual classroom. Consequentially, this places a precedent within the way teachers in the classroom view special needs students, making them believe that entry into the classroom is a "privilege" and not a right (Kirby, 2017). This stereotype may seem historically expected in the 1960s, however the study that found these types of beliefs in teachers was conducted in 2013, meaning that since the inception of the ESEA and IDEA, there may be formal policy that has been enacted, but there is still work to be done in terms of social training for teachers within the school system. As such, with each change that has been made to the ESEA, more specific information has been added in order to work towards equitable access to education, as opposed to just "improving" educational quality and opportunities, at least in theory.

The Bush Administration and *No Child Left Behind*

Perhaps the largest educational policy movement within the last few administrations has been the *No Child Left Behind Act*, which was a bipartisan piece of legislation enacted in 2002 during the early Bush administration in an effort to ameliorate the standing of the United States within International Education Standards. Within the NCLB, the focus shifted to the creation of a national education policy that would establish national standards and curricula that would mean all children in the United States, regardless of background, would receive the same form of education (Sec. 1001, 2002). The legislation's purpose was two-fold in order to achieve this goal: on the one hand, standardized forms of assessment would be used to verify that the students are being educated as expected and to flag trouble students, troubled schools, or teachers; on the other hand, the legislation would offer incentives to school administrators, teachers, and school boards whose students achieved high scores on standardized tests, ergo providing a method of evaluating teachers and schools. In theory, this would be a system which would provide schools who are doing well with extra resources to continue delivering the same standard of education, while also allowing schools with less funds an opportunity to receive more by having students do well on the assessments. However, as the years have gone by since the passing of NCLB, what sounded like a good system on paper has fallen short of reaching the goals it has placed on a practical level. This is due to a variety of factors, such as the standardized tests not being accessible to all students. Additionally, teachers' feelings of pressure are resulting due to the knowledge that they are being evaluated, making them more likely to simply "teach the test" (Poetter, 2006). This is especially true for SWSNs, who are explicitly mentioned within the policy, and yet suffer the consequences of being excluded despite the appearance of the contrary.

It is important to look at the provisions within NCLB in order to understand where exactly the legislation falls short of securing the support that SWSNs need. Specifically, it is necessary to analyze the NCLB provision that the students are entitled to receive in terms of supports, and how this is practically achieved within the society; thus demonstrating the impact that policy has in actuality. One such area is student assessment and standardized testing, which is a method of measuring the abilities of students nationally in order to ascertain if they are learning at the established level required for their age and grade. Additionally, certain scholars hold the belief that standardized testing can pressure teachers, students, and the system to perform better, as they are aware of some form of consequence if they do not perform well (Smyth, 2008). However, this type of attitude towards standardized testing misses the implications that there are certain groups of students who are not able to gain access to the tests, given that there may be physical or psychological reasons that stop them from doing so. This goes fundamentally against IDEA, which says that education for students must be done within "the least restrictive environment" (Brown & Cooper, 2011). The No Child Left Behind Act does recognize that there are some forms of existing barriers. For example, there is a provision in Section 6111.2.G that discusses that it is the responsibility of each state to use a portion of the education funding in order to provide for the inclusiveness of children with disabilities and other minorities within the assessment space (2001). Despite this article in the Act, as shown within a study in Ohio, "test scores have shown….that students from marginalized and minority groups are not passing the tests at the same rate as white, middle-class students." (Haerr, 2006). This study demonstrates a disconnect between policy and application.

Not being able to write the standardized tests poses a greater problem for the students than the lack of data might to the government. Without passing certain tests a student is incapable of receiving their GED (general educational credential), thus barring them from many jobs as well as moving on to post-secondary education (Rubin, 2016). This is discriminatory, and demonstrates that although the NCLB policy may be trying to create a policy of inclusion and provide for a place of learning, it is still a vehicle of discrimination and, in fact, infringes on the rights of the SWSNs on the grounds of the Amendments created under the Americans with Disabilities Amended Act of 2008 (ADAA) which contains a clause concerning students in educational settings (Rubin, 2016). This is why, due to the negative effects of standardized tests, some states have begun to allow SWSNs to graduate with a "special education diploma" with the intent to allow the student to at least be recognized for having graduated from high school in the first place (Rubin, 2016). However, this special diploma is not recognized in most post-secondary institutions, and therefore, again discriminates against SWSNs as not having truly completed the GED. Therefore, this demonstrates a very concrete area within which the NCLB did not provide adequately for the needs of students who require special education. This area is the implementation of assessments that are not created for the purpose of inclusivity from the get go, despite that NCLB, IDEA, and ADAA all legislating for the ability for students to be included within the education system of the United States.

As mentioned previously, teachers are finding it extremely difficult to comply with the NCLB in relation to standardized testing as well, mostly due to the "overemphasis on testing results" which creates an "unbalanced curriculum," and that the "test emphasis affects students negatively, and it manifests itself in physical, psychological, or emotional symptoms." (Smyth, 2008). This is something that is applicable in both classrooms with typically developing children, as well as in special needs education. The NCLB has many points of policy in place in order to facilitate the funding and recruitment of qualified educators in order to ensure that students are receiving the best. Yet many schools complain of a lack of funding even with these provisions set out within the NCLB, which places a strain upon the resources that exist within schools. School administrators find it difficult to provide adequate support within the classroom, which includes having well-trained special education teachers. This places schools in a precarious position, for they "contend that it is nearly impossible for schools with special needs populations to stay in compliance with the federal legislation…. [as the federal government] does not adequately fund the demand [for special education teachers]" (Smyth, 2008). Ergo, the students who need supports the most, such as SWSNs, are the ones who suffer the consequences of an inadequately enforced policy. Darling-Hammond describes this concept as the 'diversity penalty', where it is the schools who are serving the minority and marginalized populations such as students with special needs, who stand to lose the funding first due to them simply not being able to meet the standards set by the NCLB (2007).

Now this is not to say that there were no efforts made to rectify the situation. 2003 saw over 105 million U.S. dollars go to funding alternative programs to becoming teachers such as Troops to Teachers, Transition to Teachers, and the American Board for Certification of Teacher Excellence test-only routes in order to combat the teacher shortage (Sindelar, McCray, Kiely & Kamman, 2015). These routes are created upon the guidelines outlined within the NCLB, which provides "subject experts" a quick way to end up in the field while also working towards receiving their teaching accreditation (Sindelar et al., 2015). However, the data from a survey in 2007 conducted by Corbett et al. indicated that 63% of the individuals were actually making more money as teachers than they had been in their previous careers, and few making the career change from "more lucrative or prestigious positions" (quoted from Sindelar et al., 2015). Ergo, it seems the incentives to gain true "subject experts" did not work in getting them to change their careers towards teaching, as had been the hopes of the NCLB. In fact, as Sinderlar et al. further points out, often times the individuals becoming teachers through these alternative routes had "no other options" and, were seen as less effective in comparison with their traditional route counterparts

(2015). This points towards the fact that SWSNs are not receiving the qualified teachers that they need, though according to Sindelar et al., the shortage for special education teachers appears to be relatively stable with small shifts in the downward direction (2015). Hopefully this will allow for more teachers join the workforce as fully qualified special education teachers who are then able to provide support to SWSNs, as the No Child Left Behind policy legacy continues to influence students to this day.

Teachers are impacted by the way they teach curriculum, with more emphasis on passing the test than learning content, which for certain conditions, is not possible to do. Consequentially, teachers, schools, and SWSNs are then negatively impacted in terms of salary and funding. Additional policy moves created by States to supplement the GED are not completely thought through either as many post-secondary institutions do not recognize these types of degrees. Ergo, even without studies at the time, the effects of NCLB were felt within special education as practical needs were not met and even, arguably, exclusionary practices were enacted through standardized testing.

The Obama Administration and *Every Student Succeeds Act*

As the effects of NCLB began to truly be seen and studied during the beginning of the Obama administration, there were high hopes from the education community that there would be policy changes observed when President Obama took office. These hopes seem to be justified to a degree, as demonstrated within the 2013 report to Congress from the Department of Education concerning the implementation of IDEA. Within Exhibit 36 of the report, the chart demonstrates that between 2001-02 through to 2010-11, the percentage of students with special needs aged 14-21 graduating with a regular high school diploma (i.e. GED) was increasing, while the rate of students with special needs dropping out of school was decreasing (Report, 2013). This is encouraging, given that these numbers would seem to imply that the policies are achieving some form of results within Special Education. While these trends as a whole are positive, there are areas for concern once the results are broken down into specific subcategories of special needs. The highest graduating subgroup is that of individuals with *visual impairments* (Department of Education, 2013); a physical condition that has, arguably, had significant resources and attention devoted to it throughout the years. By contrast, the subcategory with the lowest amount of graduates is the students with *emotional disturbances* (Department of Education, 2013), which are part of a group of illnesses called "invisible illnesses"; as such, harder to treat, these illnesses have not been taken seriously until fairly recently. Furthermore, students with emotional disturbances are also the ones with the highest rate of dropouts, despite the number of dropouts decreasing from 61% in 2001 to 37% in 2010 (Department of Education, 2013). This points towards an element of reality that policy-makers do not see: that of assisting the visibly disabled before the invisibly.

As a piece of legislation, IDEA as well as NCLB and the later reauthorization under Obama as the Every Child Succeeds Act (ESSA, 2015), are all written in broad strokes as to be vague enough for a large umbrella of conditions to qualify for an IEP and assisted learning. However, this can be argued to be too vague, where specific subgroups, who are harder to treat and have less support, are overlooked in favour of individuals with more physical needs; ones that only require adapting the environment in specific ways. As the author of this paper can attest from working in programs with special needs children in Canada, it is much more difficult to adapt the environment to the needs of the child when the triggers that can cause stress reactions from the students are not always in evidence, except for obvious emotional reactions post-triggering event. This type of situation no doubt can also occur within a classroom in the United States, which would push teachers to be more apprehensive toward SWSNs, as well as feel a diminished confidence towards instructing them. This sentiment is echoed within a study conducted in 2011 by Ohan et al., who found that the teachers and teaching students participating in their study to have increased "negative expectations" and therefore "more negative emotions and decreased participants' confidence in their ability to instruct…" when dealing with a child labeled with ADHD. This brings the argument that there still exists a significant bias in terms of disorders that are more neuro-biological or psychological in nature, to the point that even with training, teachers still react negatively to the students.

The fact that this type of attitude is present as late as 2011 points towards a more specific problem: that although the U.S. Department of Education was able to report in 2013 that the amount of fully certified instructors for SWSNs was over 97% in most disability subgroups, this does not mean that the teachers are receiving the appropriate training to help themselves and avoid stereotyping their students. Coupling this with the pressure of having their pay tied to how well students perform on standardized tests makes it even worse. While then-candidate Obama campaigned on a platform that spoke towards lowering the amount of standardized tests a student would be subjected to throughout the course of their education, it seems that in fact, the amount only grew; to the point where even comedians began to notice. As discussed within an episode of *Last Week Tonight* with host John Oliver, "between benchmarks, diagnostics, pre and mock tests… a total average of 113 different ones [standardized tests] by graduation…" (original quote from PIX 11 news show, 2:48-3:03, 2015). This amount of test taking is staggering, and as already mentioned, the amount of negative side effects associated with too many standardized tests would further increase. This becomes especially evident, when, as Oliver points out, even official test instructions contain information as to "what to do if a student vomits on his or her test booklet." (originally quoted from the Ohio Department of Education Achievement Assessments instructions, 3:28-3:32, 2015). This type of testing anxiety is not conducive to a healthy learning environment, especially when factoring in SWSNs, who are already at a disadvantage when the test is not completely accessible to begin with. This demonstrates how policy implications have a negative effect on the actuality of the education of SWSNs. The increase of standardized tests can arguably be linked to the collective policy initiative created under the Obama administration, called "Race for the Top" (RTT).

The policies that were created under "Race for the Top" demonstrate a furthering of federalization within the education system by incentivizing States to adopt the national curriculum template. This was done in the form of a competition, where applying States needed to demonstrate plans that would "develop and adopt common core standards…longitudinal data systems….provide high-quality pathways for aspiring teachers," and others, to name a few categories (Howell & Magazinnik, 2017). In turn, successful states would receive financial rewards if they implemented policies in a way that was to the federal government's standards, with winning states in each phase of the competition gaining up to $700 million USD in funding (Howell & Magazinnik, 2017). One of the elements of RTT that was encouraged during the process was to increase charter schools, in the hopes that these schools would provide greater opportunities for minority and marginalized groups such as SWSNs (Finley, 2015). Charter schools are defined as schools that have signed contracts with the state, or charters, in order to allow for more regulatory freedom away from the traditional public school system, while theoretically, being held accountable through the charters (Rhim, Ahearn and Lange, 2007). These schools have for a long time been viewed as an attractive alternative to parents with children with special needs because these schools could "use their newfound flexibility to meet the needs of at risk students…." (Cooper, Fusarelli, & Randall, p.2004). However, this turns out not to be the case, where in a survey done in Texas, it was found that the number of SWSNs enrolled in charter schools was actually lower than the State average (Cooper et al., 2004). Furthermore, as argued within the study conducted by Rhim, et al. "while all of the charter statutes contain provisions regarding anti-discrimination…the lack of specificity regarding special education is arguably problematic…"

(2007). For as the study shows, out of the 41 states who have charter statutes, only 5 of them had some form of explicit accountability for special education (2007). It becomes clear that the Obama administration's policy that encourages the creation of more charter schools is not truly protecting SWSNs, for the majority of States do not have charter schools who comply to the standards set forth in IDEA.

Therefore it becomes clear that the policies created during the Obama era have, for the most part, continued to place stress upon the school systems and the teachers who are trying to provide an education for students, with or without special needs. The movement towards more Charter schools places more pressure on parents in order to determine if these schools will in fact comply with IDEA in order to ensure their children are as included as possible. With more students transferring out of the special education classroom and into the regular classroom, it shows that the federal government is working towards moving its national education policies away from a medical model of dealing with SWSNs and more so towards an environmental and social model of inclusion. However, teachers, who may have an easier time accessing the system due to the policies set out in NCLB and then later in ESSA, are not necessarily trained in how to avoid the stereotypes of certain medical conditions and how to feel confident in working with children with particular conditions. It becomes clear that the changes from the over 600 page NCLB to the over 1,000 page ESSA have not been very successful in reality in terms of assisting SWSNs. As the Obama administration came to an end, the election of President Trump does not necessarily promote confidence in any policy amelioration.

The Trump Administration and current Education policy movement

With the election of President Donald Trump, a lot of policy areas have come into question, with education policy being no exception to this rule. On March 27, 2017 Congress passed public law 115-13, or the joint congressional disapproval for the submission of a rule in 2016 concerning State accountability within the context of the Elementary and Secondary School Act of 1965 (amended to the ESSA). Before the passing of Public Law 115-13, the Department of Education had gone through a "freeze" of movement within its programs "pending review"; thus placing programs that could benefit special needs students and schools in need of funding to administer already existing programs in jeopardy. This forced school administrators to wait for the Congress and Senate to decide which portions would remain within the Every Students Succeeds Act, in order to allow for the implementation of policy plans. The portion that finally was disapproved was the provision concerning Consolidated State Plans, which stipulated that "a State educational agency that submits a consolidated State plan…shall not be required to submit separate State plans or applications…" (sec.8302 (2)). Therefore, this would present a more streamlined application process for the Department of Education, as well as provide states with a more facilitated process of asking for funding without having each separate educational entity submitting duplicate information for consideration. This would have allowed for easier oversight on the part of the Department of Education, which given that this is the only method that provides for some form of accountability between the states and the federal government, is an important consideration. However, due to the congressional disapproval within Public Law 115-13, this portion of the ESSA became null and void, leaving a policy void as the States must now follow the old method of submission of State plans. On March 13, 2017, Education Secretary Betsy DeVos wrote a policy letter to State School Officers stating that the department "planned to develop a revised consolidated State plan template that would require…information… 'absolutely necessary' for consideration of such a plan…" The Secretary then continues to reassure that this new plan template will provide "flexibility" while "also maintaining essential protections for subgroups of students, including…students with disabilities…" Despite these assurances, this new policy raises a concern of whether the determination of "Absolutely necessary" will provide enough of a description in order to satisfy the requirements of accountability to the Federal Government that was promised within the policies that came before the ESSA. This is especially concerning for Special Needs Educators and SWSNs, for whom the only positive of policies such as NCLB have been the assurance of federal oversight, as minimal as it may actually be in practice. It can be argued that Public Law 115-13 is failing minority groups due to it not focusing on correcting the real issue - the lack of communication between the federal government, states, education agencies, and education providers.

This can be seen within the ESSA under the description in Section 8304, which discusses how the only need the Department of Education requires from the states is to “have on file with the Secretary a single set of assurances, applicable to each program for which the plan is submitted…” (ESSA 2016). This is cause of concern for special needs education and other minority groups, for while the assurances are important, it becomes clear that these assurances can be used without the knowledge of all stakeholders involved, as these assurances are coming simply from education agencies, not teachers and service providers. Therefore, this Section of the ESSA is in fact arguably a place of concern for special needs education programs and policies, for it denies the voice of teachers, students, parents and all who are working on the ground to ensure compliance with IDEA and other acts that provide for the right to access education equitably for minorities. The current administration has had the opportunity to provide for a more inclusive method of assuring compliance within the education system in a centralized way with the federal government, and yet have chosen to leave a crucial area of accountability to be disseminated by the States and educational agencies. This again weakens any form of federal oversight that could be of benefit for SWSNs, and instead continues the nominal protection that the Acts provide. The Department of Education needs to open up more direct lines of communication with the people on the ground in special education in order to assure that practical considerations are included within theoretical policy, that the practical demands are truly met, and that legislative rights are also met.

This level of oversight is of course only possible if the Department of Education exists, which is of particular concern during the current administration. As this administration is still fairly new, not many policies have yet been passed. It is important to turn to other sources of information to gain insight as to what the President is thinking to do with education policy. This must be done in a way that can be referenced in a manner that is physically inalterable, which is to say not the President's many tweets on social media, but more so within his books, particularly the one that he wrote during the Presidential campaign. In his book *Great Again: How to Fix Our Crippled America*, then candidate Donald Trump discussed how he believed that "…the Department of Education should just be eliminated… If we don't eliminate it completely, we certainly need to cut its power and reach"(2015). This proposition can be interpreted as moving away from the centralization model that has existed since the 70s, to a model where the states return to being the primary controllers of education programs. While this may not seem like a negative move, it does pose problems in terms of federal government policy such as IDEA, which requires federal oversight in order to work. If Trump is seriously contemplating the dissolution of the Department, this poses a great concern for SWSNs and other minorities who depend on the federal programs and oversight in order to maintain some form of access to the education system. In fact, the President goes on further to state "it's [the Education Department] a disaster." (2015). However, the proposed solutions that are offered within the book do not seem to be anything new. Trump says that "we have to get tougher" (2015) yet the school system already places a distinct amount of pressure on students due to standardized testing, not to mention this hurts students with special needs, who are already under pressure simply due to being alive. Trump goes on further to discuss "schools competing for students" is the approach he believes most effective in "forcing schools to get better or close…" (2015). Yet schools are already closing or considered to be failing simply because they are working with minority populations such as students with special needs, thus lacking funding. This model would continue to perpetuate an already unequal system, where rich public schools get as much as $30,000 USD per student, while the poorest receive around $3,000 (Darling-Hammond, 2007). Finally, the other point that Trump raises within his book is the concept of paying teachers by merit, and not by seniority, in order to “attract the best people to the profession” (2015). Again, the proposal is something that already exists within the education system, hence why the teachers feel pressured for their students to pass the tests that are administered - as this is the way that their “merit” is based. As already discussed, these forms of policy initiatives under NCLB and the Obama-era Race for the Top and others are discriminatory and detrimental to minority and marginalized children such as Students with Disabilities, who are in need of professionals who see to their development, not only in order to ensure that they are paid.

Discussion and Conclusion: Implications of Policy on the Future of Special Education

The assessment of policies in the United States Education System may seem bleak, but that does not mean there are no efforts being made on a local level in order to advocate for change. As discussed by Bushweller, schools are advocating for increased use of education technology within the testing system (2014), which will in turn, allow for students with special needs to gain access to their personalized accommodations. Yet even this positive development is limited by lack of funding, thus continuing to block equitable access for SWSNs into the classroom. Even groups such as civil rights organizations for standards and accountability, as discussed within a study done by Rhodes, shows that advocacy groups are also not entirely capable of achieving all of the changes that they deem necessary in order to provide the equitable access that children deserve (2011). This can be seen echoed within the frustration of many parents, teachers, health care and education experts who see many disparities between the proposed goals of the laws and the actual practical implications. It would be worth considering a further study upon these lines, with concrete expert suggestions as to what can be done moving forward.

It is clear that the United States Education system is trying to work towards creating an inclusive and equitable experience for all students, especially those with Special Needs. However, it is also evident that the policies created in the years following and including the No Child Left Behind Act have not done well in resolving the actual problems on the ground. Instead, these policies have created an atmosphere of tension for parents, students, teachers, administrators and other education specialists as they struggle to work with increased standardized testing, a centralized program approval system, a shortage of qualified educators, and competition between public and charter schools. These are just a few of the areas where special needs students are directly impacted, and as such making it more difficult for children to actually receive the education they require; on top of that, if they do manage to get some form of diploma once they graduate, if it is not the General Education Diploma, their chances of continuing into higher education or being hired will not be as high. While IDEA and the Americans with Disabilities Act both exist to provide the legislative protection for individuals with disabilities, they are not always able to provide for every instance that is encountered within the United States education system, despite being considered “institutions within the American School system” (Brown & Cooper, 2011) . The fact that these policies are already in trouble is particularly concerning given that the current President has expressed his strong lack of faith towards federal intervention within the education system, and has expressed his opinion that the Department of Education is a federal institution that could be gotten rid of. Whether or not this will be enacted in official policy remains to be seen; yet this places accountability that exists in the education system concerning the precepts of IDEA for inclusive education for SWSNs at risk. Additionally, it seems to be clear that the reforms the current Congress has already passed are ones that do not focus on the real issues of lack of communication to those really affected by legislation, the staggering amount of standardized tests, and the true equity of all programs within the country.

It becomes evident that while the policies since No Child Left Behind have been attempting to provide more inclusion for students with special needs, as well as to move away from a "medical" approach to a more "social" one, the policies today still leave much to be desired and are falling short of what they are supposed to achieve. It seems that there is a big opportunity for the current administration to create some meaningful changes within education policy that will better reflect the needs of students with special needs. If the current administration makes the choice to step in and listen to the concerns of educators that discuss how the policies that have existed in the past only work to a certain degree, and do not fully promote equity within the school system, then there is a possibility for policies such as IDEA to become more than just a pillar of the American School System, but an actual force of change.

References

Brown et al. v. Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, KAN., et al.,74 S.Ct. 686, 692 (1955)

Brown, C.A., & Cooper, B.S. (2011). Education Equity Policy since 1950 in Mitchell, D.E, Crowson, R.L, & Shipps, D. (Eds). *Shaping Education Policy: Power and Process.* (p. 143-164). New York: Taylor & Francis.

Bushweller, K., (2014). Digital Advances, Common Core Fuel New Testing Approaches; Technology and policy developments prompt a rethinking of assessment. *Education Week, 33 (25),* 7.

Cooper, B. S., Fusarelli, L. D., & Randall, E. V. (2004). *Better policies, better schools theories and applications*. Boston: Pearson.

Darling-Hammond, L. (2007). Race, inequality and educational accountability: the irony of 'No Child Left Behind'. *Race Ethnicity and Education,10*(3), 245-260. doi: 10.1080/13613320701503207

DeVos, B. (2017, March 13). Letter to Chief State School Officers. Retrieved from Key Policy Letters Signed by the Education Secretary or Deputy Secretary

Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Public Law 89 -10. (1965).

Every Student Succeeds Act. Public Law 115-64 as amended from *Public Law 89-10.* (2016).

Finley, B. (2015). Growing Charter School Segregation and the Need for Integration in Light of Obama's Race to the Top Program. *San Diego Law Review*, *52*(4), 933-949.

Howell, W. G., & Magazinnik, A. (2017). Presidential Prescriptions for State Policy: Obamas Race to the Top Initiative. *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management,36*(3), 502-531. doi:10.1002/pam.21986

Joint House Resolution 57 for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the Department of Education relating to accountability and State plans under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Public Law 115-13. (2017)

Kirby, M. (2016). Implicit Assumptions in Special Education Policy: Promoting Full Inclusion for Students with Learning Disabilities. *Child & Youth Care Forum,46*(2), 175-191. doi: 10.1007/s10566-016-9382-x

No Child Left Behind Act. Public Law 107-110. (2002).

Ohan, J. L., Visser, T. A., Strain, M. C., & Allen, L. (2011). Teachers and education students perceptions of and reactions to children with and without the diagnostic label "ADHD". *Journal of School Psychology,49*(1), 81-105. doi:10.1016/j.jsp.2010.10.001

Oliver, J. (2015, May 03). Retrieved December 21, 2017, from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J6lyURyVz7k

P.A.R.C. v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 334 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. PA 1972).

Poetter, T. S., Wegwert, J. C., & Haerr, C. (2006). *No child left behind and the illusion of reform: critical essays by educators*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.

Rhim, L. M., Ahearn, E. M., & Lange, C. M. (2007). Charter School Statutes and Special Education: Policy answers or Policy Ambiguity?. *The Journal of Special Education, 41*(1), 50-63. doi:10.1177/00224669070410010401

Rhodes, J. (2011). Progressive Policy Making in a Conservative Age? Civil Rights and the Politics of Federal Education Standards, Testing, and Accountability. *Prespectives on Politics,* 9(3), 519-544. doi:10.1017/S1537592711002738

Rubin, J. (2016). Georgia's Policies Regarding High School Special Education Diplomas: Are Too Many Children Left Behind?. *Georgia State University Law Review*, *32*(3), 755-785.

Sindelar, Paul T., et al. (2015). "The impact of no child left behind on special education teacher supply and the preparation of the workforce." *Advances in Learning and Behavioral Disabilities Personnel Preparation*, pp. 89–123., doi:10.1016/s0735-004x(08)00004-9.

Smyth, T. S. (2008). Who Is No Child Left Behind Leaving Behind? *The Clearing House: A Journal of Educational Strategies, Issues and Ideas,81*(3), 133-137. doi:10.3200/tchs.81.3.133-137

Spring, J. H. (2014). *The American school, a global context: from the Puritans to the Obama administration*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Trump, D. (2015). *Great again: how to fix our crippled America*(2nd ed.). New York: Threshold Editions.

U.S. Department of Education, Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services, Office of Special Education Programs, 35th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2013, Washington, D.C. 2014.

Roksolana McVicar is a Bachelor's student at the University of Ottawa in the Honours Program of Political Science with a Minor in Linguistics. Her research areas include policy and how it relates to disability rights, comparative politics, the language of policy and how it relates to understanding, and the sociological impacts of policy. She hopes to continue into her Masters in a program that allows her to combine all of these interests.

Almost a Paradox: Healthcare, Neoliberalism, and the "Risk Society" in Russia 1992-2000

Daniel Shtein[1], **Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada**

Abstract

This paper examines the healthcare situation in Russia during the neoliberal rule of Boris Yeltsin from 1992-2000 using Ulrich Beck's (1992) theory of the "risk society". I explore the privatisation of state-funded healthcare in Russia during that time, along with the corresponding detrimental effects on the population's well-being. It is found that Russian society became politically lethargic as living conditions worsened despite the extreme unpopularity of both healthcare policy and Yeltsin himself, lacking even Beck's expected "solidarity motivated from anxiety" (Beck, 1992, p. 49). Individual risk management possibilities became sought after to the detriment of most other concerns, and Yeltsin was able to remain in power through elections by providing said possibilities despite his poor policymaking. I conclude that the extreme mutual distrust inherent in the risk society helped enable Yeltsin's authoritarian tendencies, and favored neoliberal social policy approaches for their ability to provide increased perceived risk management possibilities.

Keywords: Healthcare, Social policy, Risk society, Neoliberalism, Authoritarianism

[1] The author would like to warmly acknowledge the assistance of Dr. Nathan Gibbard in the technical editing and proofreading of this article.

Introduction

This paper aims to examine the Russian healthcare system in the immediate post-Soviet era, from 1992 to 2000, using Ulrich Beck's (1992) idea of the "risk society"[2] (p. 27-28, 33-34, 44-46). The idea of the "risk society" is that in the new modernity, a great lack of trust prevails with regards to traditionally respected institutions such as the government, scientific and professional communities (p. 51-84), and economic planning. There are no beneficent forces left in society to look after anyone's interests but their own, and people's idea of risk becomes transformed in a highly individualistic and self-sufficient direction (as cited in Dean, 2012, p. 119-120). Beck defines risk as a "systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization" (Beck, 1992, p. 21). He emphasizes risk as a "not-yet-event" (p. 33) that is characterized by a "*potential element* ... in this sense ... risks essentially express a *future* component" (original italics) (p. 33), a fear of *perceived possible* future damages. Individuals then rationally seek to minimize what they perceive as risks, which "...even as conjectures, as threats to the future, as prognoses ... have and develop a practical relevance" (p. 34). The nature of the risk society entails a preferred form of government, a liberal state in which the government's role is partially to mitigate risk, but primarily to enable this individual risk management (Dean, 2012, p. 120).

In Russia, the immediate post-Soviet era was marked by economic "shock therapy", a rapid and wide-ranging privatisation program, which spread to almost all sectors of the

[2] Ulrich Beck has in more recent years revised his views on the risk society, notably in his 2002 article "The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited" published in the journal *Theory, Culture & Society* (volume 19, issue 4, pp. 39-55), and more recently in his 2009 book *World at Risk*. However, given that the vision of the risk society as laid out in his 1992 book *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* remains the most widely referenced variant, this paper will refer exclusively to the risk society as laid out in Beck's 1992 text.

(previously planned) economy (Hedlund, 1999, p. 247-8). This resulted in plummeting living conditions, and the failure of the previously robust welfare state to meet the needs of ordinary Russians. This paper will examine why, despite the extreme rapidity in the collapse of quality of life and the deteriorating public health situation, and rather than coordinated resistance to change the government policy, Russians instead became politically lethargic and apathetic – unlike Beck's vision of a citizenry united in a weaker but nonetheless potent "solidarity motivated from anxiety" (Beck, 1992, p. 49). I contend that the Russian case is far from being an aberration from the risk society model. Rather, a critical level of collective mutual distrust was reached and the society truly became a risk society. That same mistrust of each party and movement causes a sufficiently severe political paralysis among enough ordinary people, effectively preventing them from taking meaningful action against government policy. I argue that a government which allowed a greater degree of perceived individual risk management despite extreme popular distrust was preferable to any option that carried with it the possibility of risk management reduction. This paper will begin by examining the context of Russian politics of the time, followed by a discussion of the healthcare crisis proper. Then, various possible explanations for the lack of reaction from the people in the risk society will be analyzed, after which the paper will conclude by examining the ramifications of the crisis on social policy.

Background

Before discussion can begin on the Russian healthcare system and the crisis it faced, it is necessary to properly understand the context in which the Russian welfare state in general operated during the Yeltsin years of 1992-2000. It is important to note two key features about the Russian political climate. First, Russia is a federal state with four major kinds of substate units, exemplified by two significant levels of autonomy. One level contains republics and autonomous regions, which have elected substate representatives, local political parties, and a degree of both legislative and economic autonomy determined by treaty with the federal government (Kahn, 2004, p. 167). Yet republics make up only a small minority of both the population and territory, so this paper is written primarily as regards to the other level of autonomy, "regular" (non-autonomous) regions and federal cities (large cities that function as regions). Regions have governors that can be appointed by the central government in Moscow and have less legislative autonomy; however, the key difference is that they do have economic autonomy and budgetary negotiations do occur between the regional and municipal level. These negotiations, forcing a competition for control of government funds, were a factor in determining the trajectory of healthcare financing in Russia.

The second key feature is the authoritarian nature of the federal government after the 1993 presidential coup. In that year, the parliament attempted to impeach the president, who in return dissolved it by military force, instated rule by decree, and changed the constitution (Pihoya, 2002, p. 341-352). Thus little in the way of legislative opposition was truly active in the period here examined, setting the welfare system at the mercy of government policy. With these twin tendencies of federalism and authoritarianism in mind, we may now discuss the healthcare crisis proper. The president of Russia from its inception on 1 January, 1992 until 31 December, 1999 was neoliberal economic reformer Boris Yeltsin. It was into the bleak conditions of economic shock therapy into which he thrust the Russian welfare state almost immediately after independence: inflation, privatisation, and a continuous increase in poverty among ordinary Russians (Kagarlitsky, 2002, p. 133-136). For the past near-century, the USSR (and therefore Russia) had operated on a system of fully subsidised universal healthcare, covering all citizens (albeit, with some privileges for industrial workers and the party elite) and considered by the

OECD (2001) a "major achievement of central planning in the Soviet era" (p. 95). Yet neither the healthcare system, nor the rest of the Russian welfare state, were immune to the same forces of neoliberalism and privatisation as the rest of the economy.

Healthcare Privatisation and Problems in Russia

Even before the collapse of the USSR, from 1988 to 1991, New Public Management-type (hereafter NPM) marketization experiments in the Leningrad and Samara districts were attempted. The experiments had mixed but generally positive results on a local level (OECD, 2001, p. 96). Subjected to the wildly fluctuating forces of the post-Soviet transition mentioned above, though, the healthcare system was not capable of withstanding the crisis well. In real terms, at the start of 1992, public health expenditure in Russia was in fact 10% higher what it had been in 1990; this situation did not last, being replaced by a fast and steady decline in real public health spending to just 67% of what it had been by 1999 (World Bank, 2008, p. 12). This heavy defunding did not bode well for a system still highly inefficient and tax-funded, especially as a severe 20% cut occurred early in the crisis in 1993 (p. 12). To make up for this loss, the state created regional insurance entities called Compulsory Medical Insurance Funds (hereafter CMI) which would cover all residents of that region, paid for by a 3.6% payroll contribution from employers (OECD, 2001, p. 97). Most of this money went to healthcare under regional jurisdiction, but Russia's federal system required budgetary negotiations between regional and local levels.

Unfortunately, poor planning and restricted funding severely reduced the prospects of success for this reform. These CMIs often ended up being the only medical insurance provider in a local area, creating inefficient monopolies (p. 98). This problem was further compounded by federally required regional-municipal funding negotiations. Each of Russia's regions were extremely hesitant to let any health funding be transferred to other jurisdictions, choosing instead to use available money to prop up the healthcare that was under their control. Only a third of healthcare funds at most was under the control of CMIs, as a result of the aforementioned regional-municipal budgetary hoarding (Sheiman, 1997, p. 68). Consequently, with only minimal funding injections, CMIs went bankrupt and arrears in these funds alone mounted to 0.1% of national GDP (OECD, 2001, p. 100). Nor were net healthcare costs falling as would be expected due to increased private market competition, since the focus of discussion in the government remained healthcare financing, while the structure of the healthcare system proper still remained very inefficient. Indeed, the OECD noted that despite the Leningrad and Samara New Public Management experiments in healthcare mentioned earlier, there had been a total failure to extend the experiment to the wider system, contributing to the inefficiency (p.104). A system of bribes emerged in which patients were expected to pay doctors out-of-pocket in order to cover the costs of medical care, pharmaceuticals, surgery, and even surgery materials, with those who could not pay being forced to wait – or not receive medical care at all (Sheiman, 1997, p. 68).

Such was the situation of the healthcare system by the end of Yeltsin's reign, and effects of this haphazard liberalization on the population were harrowing. At the time of the collapse of the USSR, the average life expectancy in Russia was 70.13 years; in just two years of neoliberal rule it had fallen to below 64. (Abramova & Abramov, 2007, p. 193-194). There was a sudden spread of infectious diseases as hygiene standards in healthcare facilities were neglected, and a shortage of drugs had a pronounced negative effect. By 1998 almost half of patients were reporting having been admitted on the basis of informal bribes rather than through formal wait-lists (up from 15% in 1994), with many patients being prescribed drugs whose unsubsidised costs were unaffordable (Brainerd & Cutler, 2005, p. 114). As a result, of those living in poverty in 1997, more than half abstained from the purchase of prescription drugs, 42.8% from dental care, and a third from laboratory tests (OECD, 2001, p. 35). Nor was this phenomenon completely eliminated as income increased, as for those with an income of 4 times the subsistence level, still 20% abstained from purchasing prescribed drugs. Given the very high poverty rates at the time, having steadily climbed to 26.3% by 1999, the state-provided healthcare system struggled in providing for those who could not pay (p. 34).

This issue was not ignored, and indeed, the aftermath of shock privatisation resulted in vast emigration from the country. Further, due to the propensity of males to infectious diseases and alcoholism in that decade, the male demographic was disproportionately affected in terms of mortality (Bennett et al, 1998, p. 1923-1924). In fact, the demographic cost in person-years lived due to the healthcare crisis was "...an order of magnitude greater than the corresponding figure for US casualties in the Vietnam War" (p. 1921). This issue has in part contributed in a steady population decline for Russia ever since 1992. Indeed, much of the support for the moribund Communist Party in the 1996 presidential election came from a resentment against poor living conditions (Kagarlitsky, 2002, p. 178-179). There can be no doubt as to the fact that the health issue was crucial at the time.

Further, Yeltsin attacked the welfare state in what was arguably the most unpopular way possible. Different avenues are available for a government to take while dismantling a welfare state. Rice & Prince (1993) lay out three kinds of methods of welfare state retrenchment which neoliberal governments can employ: programmatic, the use of up-front budget cuts and abolition of programs, which for its straightforwardness is also the least popular method; systemic, the alteration of the "broader political environment", including the use of PR, changing the context of welfare policy itself, and aiming for future welfare cutbacks; and paradigmatic, the reduction of support for the very principles underlying social policy development (for example, abandoning full employment as an economic goal), which by virtue of its more hidden nature is the least unpopular (p. 116-124). The Yeltsin government's approach to healthcare was not quite a paradigmatic retrenchment, as Yeltsin himself in 1992 overtly announced that any future healthcare changes must continue guaranteed coverage of all citizens (OECD, 2001, p. 100). Nor was it a systemic retrenchment, as despite the attempted conversion of the healthcare system from tax-funded to employer-funded, it has already been mentioned that NPM practices were not implemented country-wide. The approach Yeltsin took was one of programmatic retrenchment, with direct heavy funding cuts. It should also be noted that the 3.6% financing contribution for CMIs was no new burden on employers, as the 3.6% contribution replaced an equivalent contribution to old age pensions (Sheiman, 1997, p. 69), and so should not be interpreted as a compromise or mollification of unrest.

From the actions Yeltsin and his government took, it was clear that popularity was not a great concern. In favor of Yeltsin's austere policy choices, economic arguments such as the grievous inefficiency and anti-competitive nature of the centrally planned system, the artificially depressed prices, oversupply of professionals, quotas, and the stagnant economy could be pointed out. It is not possible to pin all the blame on health policy either, as shortages across the whole economy, skyrocketing inflation, and declining GDP all played a role in the misery of 1990s Russia. Both social and economic issues doubtless played their role in causing disillusionment with and increasing distrust of the government. However, the 1992 New Russia Barometer survey confirms that dissatisfaction with the government was greatest in the area of social services: only 13% believed that the government adequately "provides social services" (Mishler et al., 2011, p. 36), with belief in the government being "good for the economy" marginally greater at 16% (p. 36). Even if the disastrous humanitarian situation could not have been foreseen in 1992, the very fact that parliament felt they had enough popular support to attempt to impeach Yeltsin would have sent an undeniable signal as to the unpopularity of his policies.

The Presidential Elections of 1996

Already mentioned in passing, the 1996 presidential election shows in practice just how much Yeltsin was able to ignore his unpopularity. It was a competition between the apparently despised Yeltsin, whose approval rating surveys gave him an average of 2.8 out of 10 at the time (Mishler et al., 2011, p. 42), and the then-popular (if only for his opposition to Yeltsin) leader of the Communist Party, Gennady Zyuganov. However, Zyuganov ended up losing by a margin of 13.5% (Sel'tzer & Toporkov, 2008, p. 45). There is little doubt that the election was not quite fair, as Yeltsin used his control of the media to slander his opponent and deny him TV airtime, the election procedures themselves were suspect, and the country's oligarchs backed Yeltsin (Fish, 2005, p. 51-75). Indeed, anecdotal evidence for electoral fraud continued to come forward years later, as in 2012 even the then-Russian-president Dmitri Medvedev (referring to the 1996 election) said, "there is hardly any doubt who won [that race]. It was not Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin" (Shuster, 2012, para. 6).

To dismiss the election as entirely fraudulent, however, would be to overlook the implications of its aftermath. No massive riots, strikes or generally large shows of discontent occurred, so clearly there must have been some support for Yeltsin and recognition of the election's legitimacy. Indeed, many were surprised at the unexpectedly strong showing for Yeltsin. Zyuganov complained of "half-starved old women" voting for Yeltsin (Kagarlitsky, 2002, p. 180), and the Communist Party leadership admitted "it seems improbable but it's true ...

the majority of veterans supported [Yeltsin]" (Kagarlitsky, p. 180). "This is almost a paradox", wrote a liberal newspaper, "many of the people who have received [from Yeltsin] only a worsening of their position ... are supporting Yeltsin" (Kagarlitsky, p. 180). We have already established the suffering and humiliation faced by ordinary Russians due to the healthcare crisis, and these reactions are not ones suggesting that the people were somehow ignorant of the situation's severity. Perhaps not necessarily a majority, but a very sizeable number were quite willing to accept or endorse the continuation of the hated Yeltsin's reign. And lest the reader be optimistic that Yeltsin's popularity rose or that he managed to salvage the crisis afterwards, Yeltsin's average approval rating would by 1999 fall further to a record low of 1.8 out of 10 (Mishler et al., 2011, p. 42).

Russia and the Risk Society

This state of affairs brings us to the paradox of the risk society in Russia. How did Yeltsin feel sufficiently confident to take, and then continue, this course of action in spite of the suffering and consequent unpopularity it brought with it? It is certainly true that the neoliberal state enabled individual risk management by orders of magnitude more than the Soviet dictatorship. It is also true that corruption was rife and distrust of the state was high. In the risk society, and amidst the distrust of the system following the government's debacles in all areas, the countrywide discontent should have led to an expression of popular outrage larger than merely turning up for the 1996 presidential election. Still, the Yeltsin government did not come under any remotely serious extra-constitutional attack after the 1993 coup. The state was authoritarian, and in its misguided policies only increased the risks faced by the people rather than reducing them. It didn't *have* to be Yeltsin – there were many neoliberal oligarchs in Russia to choose from. What more was necessary for Russians to at least to place that authority in the hands of someone better trusted, a trustworthy government then reversing the trust-crisis dilemma of the new modernity?

Was it that they were simply too demoralised and mutually distrustful to take any action to the effect of eliminating the risk society by placing trusted politicians/institutions in power? Sedov (2007) argues that the popular response to the failure of the government was not a decrease in trust of politics in general, but rather an increase for a desire for a strongman-type politician to put things in order. Sedov points out that surveys of the early 2000s showed that half of Russians believed in some form that the executive should in effect be dictatorial (2007, p. 55). In 1999, Stalin was seen by 35% of Russians a “symbol of state order and grandeur that had been lost” (p. 51), up from 12% before the start of the crisis, in 1989. This does not mean they wanted a literal return to Stalinism, but that a strongman interventionist stand-in for “Stalin” was the solution, rather than the mass action and protest that had taken place against Yeltsin in 1993.

Certainly, belief in a strongman being necessary for Russia may explain why Russians were not particularly angry with Yeltsin for his authoritarianism, but their quality of life had fallen and they knew it. Yet the alternative, Zyuganov, was an unknown quantity. Despite his insistence on moderate change, few knew exactly how far Zyuganov would go in his promised reforms of the situation, and he was not seen as a decisive, strong personality (Kagarlitsky, 2002, p. 178-179). By virtue of the disastrous Yeltsin experience creating a situation where nearly any other course seemed favorable, reform could have meant anything from subsidy increases to a total reversal of privatisation. For this reason, despite the chaos of the preceding four years, Yeltsin stood out as the one constant, the one predictable figure, a strong personality who had at the very least kept the country from political disintegration. This basic element of stability arising from Yeltsin merely occupying the presidential post provided predictability and decreased perceived possible future damages, and hence allowed for a level of individual risk management possibilities. A Zyuganov victory would have meant the removal of this last constant, along with still more chaos in the risk management equation.

The desire for a strongman, then, should not be interpreted as a simple desire to "go back" to a mystical "golden age" of the Soviet Union's planned economy. Had that been the case, either Zyuganov would have won outright or at the least there would have been enough unrest in the immediate aftermath to make the uneasy Yeltsin deploy a heavier police presence. Neither of the two happened bar a one-time peaceful march held by opposition parties in Moscow. Russians had *acquiesced* to the risk society, and now valued risk management possibilities in a way they had not done previously. In a study asking Russians whether they had "adapted to the changes ... in the country during the past ten years" (Mishler, 2011, p. 106), 52% said they had already adapted to the new climate in 1999, up from 29% before (p. 106). Even the most intolerable living situation was clearly preferable to losing that sense of stability offered by the oligarchic regime, who on their part were clearly content to let the situation continue.

If the Russian population did indeed acquiesce, then electoral patterns seem to confirm risk society behaviour as well. Reitan's (2003) study noted a significant and positive correlation between public health and voter turnout in Russia during the 1990s healthcare crisis, with the notable exception of the 1996 presidential election (p. 60-64). As public health decreased, so too did voter turnout (p. 63-64). According to statistical data from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, there was a gradual but continuous decline in presidential election turnout from 74.7% during the 1991 presidential elections to 64.4% in 2004 (IDEA, 2018a). This trend was not limited to the duration of the healthcare crisis proper, remaining unbroken until the 2008 presidential elections, but returned again in the 2012 presidential elections. While the nuances of that election are beyond the scope of this article, it is worth considering the fact that 2008 saw a nearly 69.7% turnout (IDEA, 2018a) with an overwhelming victory for establishment candidate Dmitri Medvedev (who replaced Putin after the latter had concluded a maximum of two consecutive terms in office), which at first may seem contrary to the association of decreased trust and decreased political participation. However, faced again with a possible decrease in risk management possibilities after the loss of a predictable and stable candidate in Vladimir Putin, it is very much within the risk society paradigm that people would retrench around the closest option to that candidate, attempting to preserve the risk management status quo.

Parliamentary elections faced a similar trend. Given the weakness of the legislature following the 1993 presidential coup, it is to be expected that parliamentary elections would face lower turnouts than presidential ones in those instances where they were conducted independently of presidential elections, as was the case seven times between 1991 and 2018. Again, the trend was one of declining turnout until there was a serious perceived possibility for a change in leadership, (and so risk management possibilities) such as around the 1996 election, or around Putin's absence in the 2008 election. The parliamentary elections in 1995, just prior to the 1996 presidential election saw a turnout of 64.7%, which gradually and continuously declined to 55.7% by the 2003 parliamentary elections; this was followed by a resurgence to 63.7% turnout in 2007, just prior to the Medvedev victory in the 2008 presidential election, but which again gradually and continuously declined to a record low of 47.9% by the 2016 parliamentary elections (IDEA, 2018b). This behaviour of general political passivity, accompanied by periodic risk-averting activity in defense of the stable, familiar, and "safe", would also help to explain the anomaly noted by Reitan; an unexpectedly high turnout of 69.4%

for the 1996 election (IDEA, 2018a) despite the poor state of public health may well have resulted from a rally around the safe and predictable establishment candidate.

What of civil societies, unions, or the like? Certainly, mass action is capable of forcing changes in government policy. There were a number of civic organisations in name at least, from liberal groups such as *Yabloko* (“Apple”), “Democratic Russia”, or “People’s Home” to the nationalist-communist groups like “Great Power”, or “Peace and Unity” (Buck, 2007, p. 655). None of these were happy with Yeltsin’s government. Unions existed and minor strikes did occur, but no concerted front was created nor did coordinated general strikes take place. The first major strike to force sizeable concessions from the government after the 1996 elections occurred only in 1998, when Russia was on the verge of bankruptcy, and the strike proper did not extend beyond miners’ unions (Kagarlitsky, 2002, p. 185-186). Gill and Marwick (2000) explain this phenomenon by noting that unions were seriously weakened by privatisation and subject to harassment, while workers already facing massive wage arrears were hesitant to resist for fear of layoffs (p. 226-230). Lacking the ability to realize their political discontent by means of strikes and overt protest, it seems natural that this discontent would be reflected in the secrecy of the voting booth. Indeed, Richter’s (2006) study showed that support for Yeltsin on the eve of the 1996 elections among workers “in public or private enterprises and institutions” (p. 135) was 65% for those not owed arrears, and fell to 49% among those who were owed (p. 143-144). However, Richter concludes that the result was an increase in votes against *both* Yeltsin and Zyuganov, and that turnout was unaffected by wage arrears (p. 144). He estimates that wage arrears and household poverty cost Yeltsin 4% of the votes among the entire population (p. 133, 140), but this percentage would still be less than a third of his 13.5% lead over Zyuganov in the elections (Sel’tzer & Toporkov, 2008, p. 45).

This is consistent with the conclusion that a very sizeable portion (if not the majority) of people simply did not trust anyone to return them to a time when they could afford essential medicines – that is, if they even wanted a return. Even with the human cost as high as it was, the lack of trust that led to the creation of the risk society in Russia could not be won back by other groups or movements. Indeed, these social movements themselves are often, in the risk society, considered self-serving or under the thumb of a malicious agenda and therefore untrustworthy (Dean, 2012, p. 120).

Conclusion

Despite atrocious and continuously worsening health conditions then, ordinary Russians were either politically paralysed by lack of trust, or simply co-opted into the risk society's individual risk management paradigm, having "adapted" to the changes in the country. No matter what opposed Yeltsin, be it parliament, opposition parties, social movements, or even ordinary voters, the risk was simply far too great that the replacement of Yeltsin would lead to reduced individual risk management possibilities. This paper, then, lends itself to the conclusion that the risk society is in itself a situation nigh-impossible to escape. Trust lost, especially in so rapid a change as happened in 1992 Russia, is not easily regained. The risk society is also self-sustaining, as once a society is immersed in an atmosphere of collective distrust, even well-intentioned movements or seemingly obvious policy decisions may end up being avoided. Indeed, it is then not at all surprising that citizens did not rise up to demand greater risk management possibilities, because they believed any other course of action held a potential for reducing those possibilities. If Beck's "solidarity motivated from anxiety" was reinterpreted not as a cohesive force motivating citizens to band together to attempt a return to a more trustworthy social order, but rather as a force driving citizens to band together to preserve the current risk management status quo for fear of possible risk management reductions, it may very much help to explain the political choices of Russians in the 1990s.

The ramifications of this for social policy are also concerning. In a situation where a strongly individualistic and distrustful atmosphere – the risk society – prevails, it will be very difficult to change this attitude, however poor conditions may become. Once in the risk society, the paradigmatic retrenchment of welfare has already been completed. No matter the brazenness of opposition, if no one is to be trusted, why then trust the people trying to preserve more comprehensive social policy? Are they not as compromised as everyone else, and even then, who should one choose between two crooks: one of whom "steals" slightly more in taxation or another who "steals" slightly less? It truly is almost a paradox, but concerning any social policy but the most residual, the risk society does seem to be an implacable enemy.

References

Abramov, A. B. & Abramova Yu. A. (2007). *Noveishaia istoria Rossii*: *1991-2006* [Newest history of Russia: 1991-2006]. (Moscow: Moscow Government Industrial University).

Beck, U. (1992). *Risk society: Towards a new modernity.* (Sage Publications, Trans.). London: Sage Publications. (Original work published 1986)

Beck, U. (2002). The terrorist threat: World risk society revisited. *Theory, Culture, & Society 19(4).* Retrieved from http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0263276402019004003

Beck, U. (2009). *World at risk* (2nd English ed.). (Cronin, C., Trans.). Cambridge: Polity.

Bennett N. G., Bloom, D. E., & Ivanov, S. F. (1998). Demographic implications of the Russian mortality crisis. *World Development, 26(11).* Retrieved from https://journals.scholarsportal.info/details/0305750x/v26i0011/1921_diotrmc.xml

Brainerd, E. & Cutler, D. M. (2005). Autopsy on an empire: Understanding mortality in Russia and the former Soviet Union. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 19. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4134995?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

Buck, A. D. (2007). Elite networks and worldviews during the Yel'tsin years. *Europe-Asia Studies, 59(4)*. Retrieved from https://journals.scholarsportal.info/pdf/09668136/v59i0004/643_enawdtyy.xml

Central Intelligence Agency. (1993). *Economic survey of Russia: 1992*. (FOIA Document Number 0000292328). Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/0000292328

Dean, H. (2012). *Social policy (2nd ed.).* (Cambridge: Polity Press).

Fish, M. S. (2005). *Democracy derailed in Russia: The failure of open politics*. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ryerson/detail.action?docID=244422

Gill, G., & Marwick, R. (2000). *Russia's stillborn democracy? From Gorbachev to Yeltsin.* (Oxford University Press). Retrieved from http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199240418.001.0001/acprof-9780199240418

Hedlund, S. (1999). *Russia's "market" economy: A bad case of predatory capitalism*. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ryerson/reader.action?docID=167301#

International Institute for Democracy and International Assistance (IDEA). (2018a). Voter turnout: Russian Federation - Presidential [Data set]. Available from https://www.idea.int/data-tools/question-countries-view/522/254/ctr

International Institute for Democracy and International Assistance (IDEA). (2018b). Voter turnout: Russian Federation - Parliamentary [Data set]. Available from https://www.idea.int/data-tools/question-countries-view/521/254/ctr

Kagarlitsky, B. (2002). *Russia under Yeltsin and Putin: Neo-liberal autocracy*. (London: Pluto Press).

Mishler, W., Munro, N., & Rose, R. (2011). *Popular support for an undemocratic regime: The changing views of Russians*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OPEC). (2001). *The social crisis in the Russian Federation*. Paris: Duskin, E., Dmitriev, M., Zavisic, S., Hristoskov, J., Misikhina, S., & Mirianashvili, I.

Pihoya, R. G. (2002). *Prezident i sovety: Politiko konstitutsionii krizis 1993* [President and soviets: the political-constitutional crisis of 1993]. Retrieved from http://ecsocman.hse.ru/data/175/680/1219/042.PIKHOYA.pdf

Reitan, T. C. (2003). Too sick to vote? Public health and voter turnout in Russia during the 1990s. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 36(1)*, 49-68. Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0967067X02000582

Rice, J. J. & Prince, M. J. (2013). *Changing politics of Canadian social policy*. (2nd ed.) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press)

Richter, K. (2006). Wage arrears and economic voting in Russia. *American Political Science Review, 100(1)*. Retrieved from https://journals.scholarsportal.info/details/00030554/v100i0001/133_waaevir.xml

Sedov, L. A. (2007). Traditional features of Russian political culture in their current perspective (Braithwaite, K., Trans.). *Russian Social Science Review, 48(6)*. Retrieved from https://journals.scholarsportal.info/pdf/10611428/v48i0006/47_tforpcitcp.xml

Sel'tzer, D. G. & Toporkov, S. S. (2008). Prezidentskiye vybory v Rossii (1991-2008 g.): "Tambovskii sluchai" [Presidential elections in Russia (1991-2008): "The case of Tambov"]. *Rossiiskoye Elektoral'noye Obozreniye, 1*, 42-52. Retrieved from http://www.vibory.ru/analyt/REO-2/seltset-toporkov.pdf

Sheiman, I. (1997). *From Beveridge to Bismarck: Health finance in the Russian Federation*. Paper presented at the International Conference on Innovations in Health Care Financing, Washington DC (pp. 65-76). Washington DC: World Bank.

Shuster, S. (2012, February 24). Rewriting Russian history: Did Boris Yeltsin steal the 1996 presidential election?. *TIME*. Retrieved from http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2107565,00.html

World Bank. (2008). Public spending in Russia for health care: Issues and options. Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECAREGTOPHEANUT/Resources/PublicSpendingInRussiaforHealthCare.pdf

Daniel Shtein is a political science student at Ryerson University working on a Bachelor of Arts undergraduate degree in the Ryerson Politics and Governance program at the time of publication. His academic interests include the recent history and contemporary politics of the Russian Federation, along with developments in other states on and around the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Almost a Paradox: Healthcare, Neoliberalism, and the "Risk Society" in Russia 1992-2000

Daniel Shtein[1], **Ryerson University, Toronto, Canada**

Abstract

This paper examines the healthcare situation in Russia during the neoliberal rule of Boris Yeltsin from 1992-2000 using Ulrich Beck's (1992) theory of the "risk society". I explore the privatisation of state-funded healthcare in Russia during that time, along with the corresponding detrimental effects on the population's well-being. It is found that Russian society became politically lethargic as living conditions worsened despite the extreme unpopularity of both healthcare policy and Yeltsin himself, lacking even Beck's expected "solidarity motivated from anxiety" (Beck, 1992, p. 49). Individual risk management possibilities became sought after to the detriment of most other concerns, and Yeltsin was able to remain in power through elections by providing said possibilities despite his poor policymaking. I conclude that the extreme mutual distrust inherent in the risk society helped enable Yeltsin's authoritarian tendencies, and favored neoliberal social policy approaches for their ability to provide increased perceived risk management possibilities.

Keywords: Healthcare, Social policy, Risk society, Neoliberalism, Authoritarianism

---

[1] The author would like to warmly acknowledge the assistance of Dr. Nathan Gibbard in the technical editing and proofreading of this article.

Introduction

This paper aims to examine the Russian healthcare system in the immediate post-Soviet era, from 1992 to 2000, using Ulrich Beck's (1992) idea of the "risk society"[2] (p. 27-28, 33-34, 44-46). The idea of the "risk society" is that in the new modernity, a great lack of trust prevails with regards to traditionally respected institutions such as the government, scientific and professional communities (p. 51-84), and economic planning. There are no beneficent forces left in society to look after anyone's interests but their own, and people's idea of risk becomes transformed in a highly individualistic and self-sufficient direction (as cited in Dean, 2012, p. 119-120). Beck defines risk as a "systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization" (Beck, 1992, p. 21). He emphasizes risk as a "not-yet-event" (p. 33) that is characterized by a "*potential element* ... in this sense ... risks essentially express a *future* component" (original italics) (p. 33), a fear of *perceived possible* future damages. Individuals then rationally seek to minimize what they perceive as risks, which "...even as conjectures, as threats to the future, as prognoses ... have and develop a practical relevance" (p. 34). The nature of the risk society entails a preferred form of government, a liberal state in which the government's role is partially to mitigate risk, but primarily to enable this individual risk management (Dean, 2012, p. 120).

In Russia, the immediate post-Soviet era was marked by economic "shock therapy", a rapid and wide-ranging privatisation program, which spread to almost all sectors of the

---

[2] Ulrich Beck has in more recent years revised his views on the risk society, notably in his 2002 article "The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited" published in the journal *Theory, Culture & Society* (volume 19, issue 4, pp. 39-55), and more recently in his 2009 book *World at Risk*. However, given that the vision of the risk society as laid out in his 1992 book *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* remains the most widely referenced variant, this paper will refer exclusively to the risk society as laid out in Beck's 1992 text.

(previously planned) economy (Hedlund, 1999, p. 247-8). This resulted in plummeting living conditions, and the failure of the previously robust welfare state to meet the needs of ordinary Russians. This paper will examine why, despite the extreme rapidity in the collapse of quality of life and the deteriorating public health situation, and rather than coordinated resistance to change the government policy, Russians instead became politically lethargic and apathetic – unlike Beck's vision of a citizenry united in a weaker but nonetheless potent "solidarity motivated from anxiety" (Beck, 1992, p. 49). I contend that the Russian case is far from being an aberration from the risk society model. Rather, a critical level of collective mutual distrust was reached and the society truly became a risk society. That same mistrust of each party and movement causes a sufficiently severe political paralysis among enough ordinary people, effectively preventing them from taking meaningful action against government policy. I argue that a government which allowed a greater degree of perceived individual risk management despite extreme popular distrust was preferable to any option that carried with it the possibility of risk management reduction. This paper will begin by examining the context of Russian politics of the time, followed by a discussion of the healthcare crisis proper. Then, various possible explanations for the lack of reaction from the people in the risk society will be analyzed, after which the paper will conclude by examining the ramifications of the crisis on social policy.

Background

Before discussion can begin on the Russian healthcare system and the crisis it faced, it is necessary to properly understand the context in which the Russian welfare state in general operated during the Yeltsin years of 1992-2000. It is important to note two key features about the Russian political climate. First, Russia is a federal state with four major kinds of substate units, exemplified by two significant levels of autonomy. One level contains republics and autonomous regions, which have elected substate representatives, local political parties, and a degree of both legislative and economic autonomy determined by treaty with the federal government (Kahn, 2004, p. 167). Yet republics make up only a small minority of both the population and territory, so this paper is written primarily as regards to the other level of autonomy, “regular” (non-autonomous) regions and federal cities (large cities that function as regions). Regions have governors that can be appointed by the central government in Moscow and have less legislative autonomy; however, the key difference is that they do have economic autonomy and budgetary negotiations do occur between the regional and municipal level. These negotiations, forcing a competition for control of government funds, were a factor in determining the trajectory of healthcare financing in Russia.

The second key feature is the authoritarian nature of the federal government after the 1993 presidential coup. In that year, the parliament attempted to impeach the president, who in return dissolved it by military force, instated rule by decree, and changed the constitution (Pihoya, 2002, p. 341-352). Thus little in the way of legislative opposition was truly active in the period here examined, setting the welfare system at the mercy of government policy. With these twin tendencies of federalism and authoritarianism in mind, we may now discuss the healthcare crisis proper. The president of Russia from its inception on 1 January, 1992 until 31 December, 1999 was neoliberal economic reformer Boris Yeltsin. It was into the bleak conditions of economic shock therapy into which he thrust the Russian welfare state almost immediately after independence: inflation, privatisation, and a continuous increase in poverty among ordinary Russians (Kagarlitsky, 2002, p. 133-136). For the past near-century, the USSR (and therefore Russia) had operated on a system of fully subsidised universal healthcare, covering all citizens (albeit, with some privileges for industrial workers and the party elite) and considered by the

OECD (2001) a “major achievement of central planning in the Soviet era” (p. 95). Yet neither the healthcare system, nor the rest of the Russian welfare state, were immune to the same forces of neoliberalism and privatisation as the rest of the economy.

Healthcare Privatisation and Problems in Russia

Even before the collapse of the USSR, from 1988 to 1991, New Public Management-type (hereafter NPM) marketization experiments in the Leningrad and Samara districts were attempted. The experiments had mixed but generally positive results on a local level (OECD, 2001, p. 96). Subjected to the wildly fluctuating forces of the post-Soviet transition mentioned above, though, the healthcare system was not capable of withstanding the crisis well. In real terms, at the start of 1992, public health expenditure in Russia was in fact 10% higher what it had been in 1990; this situation did not last, being replaced by a fast and steady decline in real public health spending to just 67% of what it had been by 1999 (World Bank, 2008, p. 12). This heavy defunding did not bode well for a system still highly inefficient and tax-funded, especially as a severe 20% cut occurred early in the crisis in 1993 (p. 12). To make up for this loss, the state created regional insurance entities called Compulsory Medical Insurance Funds (hereafter CMI) which would cover all residents of that region, paid for by a 3.6% payroll contribution from employers (OECD, 2001, p. 97). Most of this money went to healthcare under regional jurisdiction, but Russia’s federal system required budgetary negotiations between regional and local levels.

Unfortunately, poor planning and restricted funding severely reduced the prospects of success for this reform. These CMIs often ended up being the only medical insurance provider in a local area, creating inefficient monopolies (p. 98). This problem was further compounded by federally required regional-municipal funding negotiations. Each of Russia’s regions were extremely hesitant to let any health funding be transferred to other jurisdictions, choosing instead to use available money to prop up the healthcare that was under their control. Only a third of healthcare funds at most was under the control of CMIs, as a result of the aforementioned regional-municipal budgetary hoarding (Sheiman, 1997, p. 68). Consequently, with only minimal funding injections, CMIs went bankrupt and arrears in these funds alone mounted to 0.1% of national GDP (OECD, 2001, p. 100). Nor were net healthcare costs falling as would be expected due to increased private market competition, since the focus of discussion in the government remained healthcare financing, while the structure of the healthcare system proper still remained very inefficient. Indeed, the OECD noted that despite the Leningrad and Samara New Public Management experiments in healthcare mentioned earlier, there had been a total failure to extend the experiment to the wider system, contributing to the inefficiency (p.104). A system of bribes emerged in which patients were expected to pay doctors out-of-pocket in order to cover the costs of medical care, pharmaceuticals, surgery, and even surgery materials, with those who could not pay being forced to wait – or not receive medical care at all (Sheiman, 1997, p. 68).

Such was the situation of the healthcare system by the end of Yeltsin's reign, and effects of this haphazard liberalization on the population were harrowing. At the time of the collapse of the USSR, the average life expectancy in Russia was 70.13 years; in just two years of neoliberal rule it had fallen to below 64. (Abramova & Abramov, 2007, p. 193-194). There was a sudden spread of infectious diseases as hygiene standards in healthcare facilities were neglected, and a shortage of drugs had a pronounced negative effect. By 1998 almost half of patients were reporting having been admitted on the basis of informal bribes rather than through formal wait-lists (up from 15% in 1994), with many patients being prescribed drugs whose unsubsidised costs were unaffordable (Brainerd & Cutler, 2005, p. 114). As a result, of those living in poverty in 1997, more than half abstained from the purchase of prescription drugs, 42.8% from dental care, and a third from laboratory tests (OECD, 2001, p. 35). Nor was this phenomenon completely eliminated as income increased, as for those with an income of 4 times the subsistence level, still 20% abstained from purchasing prescribed drugs. Given the very high poverty rates at the time, having steadily climbed to 26.3% by 1999, the state-provided healthcare system struggled in providing for those who could not pay (p. 34).

This issue was not ignored, and indeed, the aftermath of shock privatisation resulted in vast emigration from the country. Further, due to the propensity of males to infectious diseases and alcoholism in that decade, the male demographic was disproportionately affected in terms of mortality (Bennett et al, 1998, p. 1923-1924). In fact, the demographic cost in person-years lived due to the healthcare crisis was "...an order of magnitude greater than the corresponding figure for US casualties in the Vietnam War" (p. 1921). This issue has in part contributed in a steady population decline for Russia ever since 1992. Indeed, much of the support for the moribund Communist Party in the 1996 presidential election came from a resentment against poor living conditions (Kagarlitsky, 2002, p. 178-179). There can be no doubt as to the fact that the health issue was crucial at the time.

Further, Yeltsin attacked the welfare state in what was arguably the most unpopular way possible. Different avenues are available for a government to take while dismantling a welfare state. Rice & Prince (1993) lay out three kinds of methods of welfare state retrenchment which neoliberal governments can employ: programmatic, the use of up-front budget cuts and abolition of programs, which for its straightforwardness is also the least popular method; systemic, the alteration of the "broader political environment", including the use of PR, changing the context of welfare policy itself, and aiming for future welfare cutbacks; and paradigmatic, the reduction of support for the very principles underlying social policy development (for example, abandoning full employment as an economic goal), which by virtue of its more hidden nature is the least unpopular (p. 116-124). The Yeltsin government's approach to healthcare was not quite a paradigmatic retrenchment, as Yeltsin himself in 1992 overtly announced that any future healthcare changes must continue guaranteed coverage of all citizens (OECD, 2001, p. 100). Nor was it a systemic retrenchment, as despite the attempted conversion of the healthcare system from tax-funded to employer-funded, it has already been mentioned that NPM practices were not implemented country-wide. The approach Yeltsin took was one of programmatic retrenchment, with direct heavy funding cuts. It should also be noted that the 3.6% financing contribution for CMIs was no new burden on employers, as the 3.6% contribution replaced an equivalent contribution to old age pensions (Sheiman, 1997, p. 69), and so should not be interpreted as a compromise or mollification of unrest.

From the actions Yeltsin and his government took, it was clear that popularity was not a great concern. In favor of Yeltsin's austere policy choices, economic arguments such as the grievous inefficiency and anti-competitive nature of the centrally planned system, the artificially depressed prices, oversupply of professionals, quotas, and the stagnant economy could be pointed out. It is not possible to pin all the blame on health policy either, as shortages across the whole economy, skyrocketing inflation, and declining GDP all played a role in the misery of 1990s Russia. Both social and economic issues doubtless played their role in causing disillusionment with and increasing distrust of the government. However, the 1992 New Russia Barometer survey confirms that dissatisfaction with the government was greatest in the area of social services: only 13% believed that the government adequately "provides social services" (Mishler et al., 2011, p. 36), with belief in the government being "good for the economy" marginally greater at 16% (p. 36). Even if the disastrous humanitarian situation could not have been foreseen in 1992, the very fact that parliament felt they had enough popular support to attempt to impeach Yeltsin would have sent an undeniable signal as to the unpopularity of his policies.

The Presidential Elections of 1996

Already mentioned in passing, the 1996 presidential election shows in practice just how much Yeltsin was able to ignore his unpopularity. It was a competition between the apparently despised Yeltsin, whose approval rating surveys gave him an average of 2.8 out of 10 at the time (Mishler et al., 2011, p. 42), and the then-popular (if only for his opposition to Yeltsin) leader of the Communist Party, Gennady Zyuganov. However, Zyuganov ended up losing by a margin of 13.5% (Sel'tzer & Toporkov, 2008, p. 45). There is little doubt that the election was not quite fair, as Yeltsin used his control of the media to slander his opponent and deny him TV airtime, the election procedures themselves were suspect, and the country's oligarchs backed Yeltsin (Fish, 2005, p. 51-75). Indeed, anecdotal evidence for electoral fraud continued to come forward years later, as in 2012 even the then-Russian-president Dmitri Medvedev (referring to the 1996 election) said, "there is hardly any doubt who won [that race]. It was not Boris Nikolaevich Yeltsin" (Shuster, 2012, para. 6).

To dismiss the election as entirely fraudulent, however, would be to overlook the implications of its aftermath. No massive riots, strikes or generally large shows of discontent occurred, so clearly there must have been some support for Yeltsin and recognition of the election's legitimacy. Indeed, many were surprised at the unexpectedly strong showing for Yeltsin. Zyuganov complained of "half-starved old women" voting for Yeltsin (Kagarlitsky, 2002, p. 180), and the Communist Party leadership admitted "it seems improbable but it's true ...

the majority of veterans supported [Yeltsin]" (Kagarlitsky, p. 180). "This is almost a paradox", wrote a liberal newspaper, "many of the people who have received [from Yeltsin] only a worsening of their position ... are supporting Yeltsin" (Kagarlitsky, p. 180). We have already established the suffering and humiliation faced by ordinary Russians due to the healthcare crisis, and these reactions are not ones suggesting that the people were somehow ignorant of the situation's severity. Perhaps not necessarily a majority, but a very sizeable number were quite willing to accept or endorse the continuation of the hated Yeltsin's reign. And lest the reader be optimistic that Yeltsin's popularity rose or that he managed to salvage the crisis afterwards, Yeltsin's average approval rating would by 1999 fall further to a record low of 1.8 out of 10 (Mishler et al., 2011, p. 42).

Russia and the Risk Society

This state of affairs brings us to the paradox of the risk society in Russia. How did Yeltsin feel sufficiently confident to take, and then continue, this course of action in spite of the suffering and consequent unpopularity it brought with it? It is certainly true that the neoliberal state enabled individual risk management by orders of magnitude more than the Soviet dictatorship. It is also true that corruption was rife and distrust of the state was high. In the risk society, and amidst the distrust of the system following the government's debacles in all areas, the countrywide discontent should have led to an expression of popular outrage larger than merely turning up for the 1996 presidential election. Still, the Yeltsin government did not come under any remotely serious extra-constitutional attack after the 1993 coup. The state was authoritarian, and in its misguided policies only increased the risks faced by the people rather than reducing them. It didn't *have* to be Yeltsin – there were many neoliberal oligarchs in Russia to choose from. What more was necessary for Russians to at least to place that authority in the hands of someone better trusted, a trustworthy government then reversing the trust-crisis dilemma of the new modernity?

Was it that they were simply too demoralised and mutually distrustful to take any action to the effect of eliminating the risk society by placing trusted politicians/institutions in power? Sedov (2007) argues that the popular response to the failure of the government was not a decrease in trust of politics in general, but rather an increase for a desire for a strongman-type politician to put things in order. Sedov points out that surveys of the early 2000s showed that half of Russians believed in some form that the executive should in effect be dictatorial (2007, p. 55). In 1999, Stalin was seen by 35% of Russians a "symbol of state order and grandeur that had been lost" (p. 51), up from 12% before the start of the crisis, in 1989. This does not mean they wanted a literal return to Stalinism, but that a strongman interventionist stand-in for "Stalin" was the solution, rather than the mass action and protest that had taken place against Yeltsin in 1993.

Certainly, belief in a strongman being necessary for Russia may explain why Russians were not particularly angry with Yeltsin for his authoritarianism, but their quality of life had fallen and they knew it. Yet the alternative, Zyuganov, was an unknown quantity. Despite his insistence on moderate change, few knew exactly how far Zyuganov would go in his promised reforms of the situation, and he was not seen as a decisive, strong personality (Kagarlitsky, 2002, p. 178-179). By virtue of the disastrous Yeltsin experience creating a situation where nearly any other course seemed favorable, reform could have meant anything from subsidy increases to a total reversal of privatisation. For this reason, despite the chaos of the preceding four years, Yeltsin stood out as the one constant, the one predictable figure, a strong personality who had at the very least kept the country from political disintegration. This basic element of stability arising from Yeltsin merely occupying the presidential post provided predictability and decreased perceived possible future damages, and hence allowed for a level of individual risk management possibilities. A Zyuganov victory would have meant the removal of this last constant, along with still more chaos in the risk management equation.

The desire for a strongman, then, should not be interpreted as a simple desire to "go back" to a mystical "golden age" of the Soviet Union's planned economy. Had that been the case, either Zyuganov would have won outright or at the least there would have been enough unrest in the immediate aftermath to make the uneasy Yeltsin deploy a heavier police presence. Neither of the two happened bar a one-time peaceful march held by opposition parties in Moscow. Russians had *acquiesced* to the risk society, and now valued risk management possibilities in a way they had not done previously. In a study asking Russians whether they had "adapted to the changes ... in the country during the past ten years" (Mishler, 2011, p. 106), 52% said they had already adapted to the new climate in 1999, up from 29% before (p. 106). Even the most intolerable living situation was clearly preferable to losing that sense of stability offered by the oligarchic regime, who on their part were clearly content to let the situation continue.

If the Russian population did indeed acquiesce, then electoral patterns seem to confirm risk society behaviour as well. Reitan's (2003) study noted a significant and positive correlation between public health and voter turnout in Russia during the 1990s healthcare crisis, with the notable exception of the 1996 presidential election (p. 60-64). As public health decreased, so too did voter turnout (p. 63-64). According to statistical data from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, there was a gradual but continuous decline in presidential election turnout from 74.7% during the 1991 presidential elections to 64.4% in 2004 (IDEA, 2018a). This trend was not limited to the duration of the healthcare crisis proper, remaining unbroken until the 2008 presidential elections, but returned again in the 2012 presidential elections. While the nuances of that election are beyond the scope of this article, it is worth considering the fact that 2008 saw a nearly 69.7% turnout (IDEA, 2018a) with an overwhelming victory for establishment candidate Dmitri Medvedev (who replaced Putin after the latter had concluded a maximum of two consecutive terms in office), which at first may seem contrary to the association of decreased trust and decreased political participation. However, faced again with a possible decrease in risk management possibilities after the loss of a predictable and stable candidate in Vladimir Putin, it is very much within the risk society paradigm that people would retrench around the closest option to that candidate, attempting to preserve the risk management status quo.

Parliamentary elections faced a similar trend. Given the weakness of the legislature following the 1993 presidential coup, it is to be expected that parliamentary elections would face lower turnouts than presidential ones in those instances where they were conducted independently of presidential elections, as was the case seven times between 1991 and 2018. Again, the trend was one of declining turnout until there was a serious perceived possibility for a change in leadership, (and so risk management possibilities) such as around the 1996 election, or around Putin's absence in the 2008 election. The parliamentary elections in 1995, just prior to the 1996 presidential election saw a turnout of 64.7%, which gradually and continuously declined to 55.7% by the 2003 parliamentary elections; this was followed by a resurgence to 63.7% turnout in 2007, just prior to the Medvedev victory in the 2008 presidential election, but which again gradually and continuously declined to a record low of 47.9% by the 2016 parliamentary elections (IDEA, 2018b). This behaviour of general political passivity, accompanied by periodic risk-averting activity in defense of the stable, familiar, and "safe", would also help to explain the anomaly noted by Reitan; an unexpectedly high turnout of 69.4%

for the 1996 election (IDEA, 2018a) despite the poor state of public health may well have resulted from a rally around the safe and predictable establishment candidate.

What of civil societies, unions, or the like? Certainly, mass action is capable of forcing changes in government policy. There were a number of civic organisations in name at least, from liberal groups such as *Yabloko* ("Apple"), "Democratic Russia", or "People's Home" to the nationalist-communist groups like "Great Power", or "Peace and Unity" (Buck, 2007, p. 655). None of these were happy with Yeltsin's government. Unions existed and minor strikes did occur, but no concerted front was created nor did coordinated general strikes take place. The first major strike to force sizeable concessions from the government after the 1996 elections occurred only in 1998, when Russia was on the verge of bankruptcy, and the strike proper did not extend beyond miners' unions (Kagarlitsky, 2002, p. 185-186). Gill and Marwick (2000) explain this phenomenon by noting that unions were seriously weakened by privatisation and subject to harassment, while workers already facing massive wage arrears were hesitant to resist for fear of layoffs (p. 226-230). Lacking the ability to realize their political discontent by means of strikes and overt protest, it seems natural that this discontent would be reflected in the secrecy of the voting booth. Indeed, Richter's (2006) study showed that support for Yeltsin on the eve of the 1996 elections among workers "in public or private enterprises and institutions" (p. 135) was 65% for those not owed arrears, and fell to 49% among those who were owed (p. 143-144). However, Richter concludes that the result was an increase in votes against *both* Yeltsin and Zyuganov, and that turnout was unaffected by wage arrears (p. 144). He estimates that wage arrears and household poverty cost Yeltsin 4% of the votes among the entire population (p. 133, 140), but this percentage would still be less than a third of his 13.5% lead over Zyuganov in the elections (Sel'tzer & Toporkov, 2008, p. 45).

This is consistent with the conclusion that a very sizeable portion (if not the majority) of people simply did not trust anyone to return them to a time when they could afford essential medicines – that is, if they even wanted a return. Even with the human cost as high as it was, the lack of trust that led to the creation of the risk society in Russia could not be won back by other groups or movements. Indeed, these social movements themselves are often, in the risk society, considered self-serving or under the thumb of a malicious agenda and therefore untrustworthy (Dean, 2012, p. 120).

Conclusion

Despite atrocious and continuously worsening health conditions then, ordinary Russians were either politically paralysed by lack of trust, or simply co-opted into the risk society's individual risk management paradigm, having "adapted" to the changes in the country. No matter what opposed Yeltsin, be it parliament, opposition parties, social movements, or even ordinary voters, the risk was simply far too great that the replacement of Yeltsin would lead to reduced individual risk management possibilities. This paper, then, lends itself to the conclusion that the risk society is in itself a situation nigh-impossible to escape. Trust lost, especially in so rapid a change as happened in 1992 Russia, is not easily regained. The risk society is also self-sustaining, as once a society is immersed in an atmosphere of collective distrust, even well-intentioned movements or seemingly obvious policy decisions may end up being avoided. Indeed, it is then not at all surprising that citizens did not rise up to demand greater risk management possibilities, because they believed any other course of action held a potential for reducing those possibilities. If Beck's "solidarity motivated from anxiety" was reinterpreted not as a cohesive force motivating citizens to band together to attempt a return to a more trustworthy social order, but rather as a force driving citizens to band together to preserve the current risk management status quo for fear of possible risk management reductions, it may very much help to explain the political choices of Russians in the 1990s.

The ramifications of this for social policy are also concerning. In a situation where a strongly individualistic and distrustful atmosphere – the risk society – prevails, it will be very difficult to change this attitude, however poor conditions may become. Once in the risk society, the paradigmatic retrenchment of welfare has already been completed. No matter the brazenness of opposition, if no one is to be trusted, why then trust the people trying to preserve more comprehensive social policy? Are they not as compromised as everyone else, and even then, who should one choose between two crooks: one of whom "steals" slightly more in taxation or another who "steals" slightly less? It truly is almost a paradox, but concerning any social policy but the most residual, the risk society does seem to be an implacable enemy.

References

Abramov, A. B. & Abramova Yu. A. (2007). *Noveishaia istoria Rossii*: *1991-2006* [Newest history of Russia: 1991-2006]. (Moscow: Moscow Government Industrial University).

Beck, U. (1992). *Risk society: Towards a new modernity.* (Sage Publications, Trans.). London: Sage Publications. (Original work published 1986)

Beck, U. (2002). The terrorist threat: World risk society revisited. *Theory, Culture, & Society 19(4).* Retrieved from http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0263276402019004003

Beck, U. (2009). *World at risk* (2nd English ed.). (Cronin, C., Trans.). Cambridge: Polity.

Bennett N. G., Bloom, D. E., & Ivanov, S. F. (1998). Demographic implications of the Russian mortality crisis. *World Development, 26(11).* Retrieved from https://journals.scholarsportal.info/details/0305750x/v26i0011/1921_diotrmc.xml

Brainerd, E. & Cutler, D. M. (2005). Autopsy on an empire: Understanding mortality in Russia and the former Soviet Union. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 19. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/4134995?pq-origsite=summon&seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

Buck, A. D. (2007). Elite networks and worldviews during the Yel'tsin years. *Europe-Asia Studies, 59(4)*. Retrieved from https://journals.scholarsportal.info/pdf/09668136/v59i0004/643_enawdtyy.xml

Central Intelligence Agency. (1993). *Economic survey of Russia: 1992*. (FOIA Document Number 0000292328). Retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/0000292328

Dean, H. (2012). *Social policy (2nd ed.).* (Cambridge: Polity Press).

Fish, M. S. (2005). *Democracy derailed in Russia: The failure of open politics*. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ryerson/detail.action?docID=244422

Gill, G., & Marwick, R. (2000). *Russia's stillborn democracy? From Gorbachev to Yeltsin.* (Oxford University Press). Retrieved from http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0199240418.001.0001/acprof-9780199240418

Hedlund, S. (1999). *Russia's "market" economy: A bad case of predatory capitalism*. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ryerson/reader.action?docID=167301#

International Institute for Democracy and International Assistance (IDEA). (2018a). Voter turnout: Russian Federation - Presidential [Data set]. Available from https://www.idea.int/data-tools/question-countries-view/522/254/ctr

International Institute for Democracy and International Assistance (IDEA). (2018b). Voter turnout: Russian Federation - Parliamentary [Data set]. Available from https://www.idea.int/data-tools/question-countries-view/521/254/ctr

Kagarlitsky, B. (2002). *Russia under Yeltsin and Putin: Neo-liberal autocracy*. (London: Pluto Press).

Mishler, W., Munro, N., & Rose, R. (2011). *Popular support for an undemocratic regime: The changing views of Russians*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OPEC). (2001). *The social crisis in the Russian Federation*. Paris: Duskin, E., Dmitriev, M., Zavisic, S., Hristoskov, J., Misikhina, S., & Mirianashvili, I.

Pihoya, R. G. (2002). *Prezident i sovety: Politiko konstitutsionii krizis 1993* [President and soviets: the political-constitutional crisis of 1993]. Retrieved from http://ecsocman.hse.ru/data/175/680/1219/042.PIKHOYA.pdf

Reitan, T. C. (2003). Too sick to vote? Public health and voter turnout in Russia during the 1990s. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 36(1)*, 49-68. Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0967067X02000582

Rice, J. J. & Prince, M. J. (2013). *Changing politics of Canadian social policy*. (2nd ed.) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press)

Richter, K. (2006). Wage arrears and economic voting in Russia. *American Political Science Review, 100(1)*. Retrieved from https://journals.scholarsportal.info/details/00030554/v100i0001/133_waaevir.xml

Sedov, L. A. (2007). Traditional features of Russian political culture in their current perspective (Braithwaite, K., Trans.). *Russian Social Science Review, 48(6)*. Retrieved from https://journals.scholarsportal.info/pdf/10611428/v48i0006/47_tforpcitcp.xml

Sel'tzer, D. G. & Toporkov, S. S. (2008). Prezidentskiye vybory v Rossii (1991-2008 g.): "Tambovskii sluchai" [Presidential elections in Russia (1991-2008): "The case of Tambov"]. *Rossiiskoye Elektoral'noye Obozreniye, 1*, 42-52. Retrieved from http://www.vibory.ru/analyt/REO-2/seltset-toporkov.pdf

Sheiman, I. (1997). *From Beveridge to Bismarck: Health finance in the Russian Federation*. Paper presented at the International Conference on Innovations in Health Care Financing, Washington DC (pp. 65-76). Washington DC: World Bank.

Shuster, S. (2012, February 24). Rewriting Russian history: Did Boris Yeltsin steal the 1996 presidential election?. *TIME*. Retrieved from http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2107565,00.html

World Bank. (2008). Public spending in Russia for health care: Issues and options. Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTECAREGTOPHEANUT/Resources/PublicSpendingInRussiaforHealthCare.pdf

Daniel Shtein is a political science student at Ryerson University working on a Bachelor of Arts undergraduate degree in the Ryerson Politics and Governance program at the time of publication. His academic interests include the recent history and contemporary politics of the Russian Federation, along with developments in other states on and around the territory of the former Soviet Union.

La terre promise : Le rôle de l'Église catholique dans le nationalisme catalan et québécois

Grace Angkasa, Université d'Ottawa, Ottawa, Ontario

Résumé

L'émergence récente d'un mouvement indépendantiste catalan a renouvelé l'intérêt dans le nationalisme de certains groupes, surtout celui des Québécois. Bien que le nationalisme catalan et québécois divergent dans plusieurs aspects, le rôle fondamental de l'Église dans leur création et leur propagation reste un point commun notable. Cet article répond à la question, « Quel rôle a joué l'Église catholique dans le nationalisme catalan et québécois ? », en examinant le rôle de l'Église dans la société catalane et québécoise, les mouvements nationalistes qui proviennent de l'Église, et la relation entre l'Église et les mouvements nationalistes non religieux. Nous décrivons les différences et les similarités entre les deux cas et nous expliquons comment l'Église catalane a réussi à revitaliser le nationalisme catalan tandis que l'Église québécoise a perdu son rôle dominant dans le nationalisme québécois face aux changements laïcisants de la Révolution tranquille.

Mots-clefs: Catalogne, Laïcité, Nationalisme, Religion, Québec, Indépendantisme

Introduction

La crise politique actuelle en Catalogne causée par la mise en place inattendue d'un référendum d'indépendance (1er octobre 2017) a suscité un intérêt renouvelé pour les mouvements d'autodétermination régionaux à travers le monde. Parmi eux, on compte le mouvement indépendantiste écossais ranimé après l'annonce du Brexit, le fort régionalisme qui existe au Pays basque et le nationalisme québécois au Canada. Pour cette dissertation, nous étudierons le nationalisme tel qu'il s'est développé dans ces deux derniers cas, soit de la Catalogne et du Québec -- et afin d'être plus précis, nous les analyserons en fonction du rôle de l'Église catholique. Ainsi, la problématique de cette dissertation sera « Quel rôle a joué l'Église catholique dans le nationalisme catalan et québécois? » Après un bref survol des évènements en Catalogne qui ont inspiré cette dissertation, nous répondrons à cette question en trois parties. Dans la première partie, nous examinerons le rôle changeant de l'Église dans la société québécoise et catalane, surtout pendant le turbulent XXe siècle. La deuxième partie traitera des mouvements nationalistes qui émergent de l'Église catholique. Enfin, la troisième partie étudiera la relation entre l'Église et d'autres mouvements nationalistes non religieux.

La réémergence récente du mouvement nationaliste catalan

Le 1er octobre 2017, 2,2 millions de Catalans à travers la région ont voté dans un référendum pour déterminer leur indépendance de l'Espagne. Le référendum, établi par le Parlement catalan et jugé illégal par le gouvernement espagnol, a lieu au sein d'une situation de chaos. Des manifestations pour et contre l'indépendance se sont éclatées à Barcelona et d'autres villes espagnoles, tandis que la police nationale – déployés pour arrêter le référendum – ont affronté les Catalans lors des luttes violentes. Le résultat du référendum semblait définitif : avec un taux de participation de 42.3%, presque 90% des votants ont voté pour l'indépendance (« Catalans “win right to break with Spain” », 2017, 2 octobre). Quelques semaines plus tard, le Parlement catalan a voté en faveur d’une déclaration d’indépendance. La réponse du gouvernement espagnol était prompte et sévère avec la dissolution du Parlement et du Cabinet catalan, le licenciement du président catalan Carles Puigdemont et l’emprisonnement d’un autre chef des séparatistes, Jordi Sànchez (« Catalonia government dissolved by Spain after declaring split - CNN », 2017, 28 octobre). Malgré les mesures qui a pris le gouvernement national afin d’empêcher le pouvoir des séparatistes, une récente élection provinciale en décembre a résulté en une majorité pour des partis indépendantistes (« What’s Next for Catalonia? », 2018, 16 mars). Le gouvernement de Puigdemont expulsé a aussi promis de continuer la lutte pour l’indépendance (Bowcott & Jones, 2018, 2 mars). Bien que le soutien populaire pour l’indépendance ait diminué depuis l’octobre dernier (Ríos, Piñol, & País, 2018, 23 février), le pouvoir considérable des partis indépendantistes – malgré la forte opposition du gouvernement espagnol – est un signe de la vitalité du nationalisme catalan.

Le rôle changeant de l’Église dans la société

Avant la Révolution tranquille des années 1960, l’Église catholique au Québec était un pilier de la société, dominant surtout dans les domaines de l’éducation, de la santé, et des services sociaux (Seljak, 1996, p. 109-24). L’Église fondait des hôpitaux, gérait des écoles, et fournissait de la nourriture et de l’hébergement pour les pauvres. L’Église a aussi maintenu un véritable monopole sur la moralité, où toutes les règles de comportement font référence aux préceptes et aux enseignements catholiques (Courcy, 1988, p. 109-33).

Qu’est-ce qui peut expliquer la dominance de l’Église au Québec jusqu’au début des années 1960? Nous pouvons trouver des indices dans l’origine de l’histoire de la province. Lorsque les Français ont perdu aux Anglais sur les Plaines d’Abraham, la France a donné contrôle de sa colonie au Canada à la Grande-Bretagne. Durant cette période de transition, la majorité des nobles et militaires français – les anciens pouvoirs de la colonie – sont retournés à la France. Toutefois, les clercs et prêtres se sont restés en grand nombre et donc, l'Église catholique est devenue la seule institution qui pouvait maintenir l'identité française de la colonie. Le départ de ces nobles et militaires a agrandi le rôle de l'Église en la rendant plus chère aux yeux des colons québécois comme le dernier vestige de leur passé français (Courcy, 1988, p.113-114).

Pourtant, les changements sociaux et politiques bouleversants de la Révolution tranquille à partir des années 1960 ont renversé le pouvoir de l'Église. Sous le gouvernement libéral de Jean Lesage, l'éducation, la santé, et la majorité des services sociaux historiquement gérés par l'Église étaient transférés à la juridiction provinciale. De plus, l'autorité morale de l'Église sur des enjeux tels le divorce, la famille et l'avortement était contestée par la laïcisation de la politique sociale et les changements dans les valeurs des Québécois d'une nature plus conservatrice et traditionnelle à une nature plus libérale de gauche. Ce rejet des enseignements de l'Église eut des résultats concrets : le nombre de mariages déclina massivement – de 100 individus mariés pour 1000 non-mariés en 1954 à 37.4 en 1994 (Krull, 2003; Trovato, 2003, p. 199), et le pourcentage de Québécois catholiques qui assistaient à la messe hebdomadaire tomba de 88% en 1958 à un maigre 29% en 1991 (Seljak, 1996). Au fur et à mesure que les institutions de services sociaux devinrent publiques et que les valeurs promues par l'Église perdirent l'acceptation de la société québécoise, le rôle de cet acteur-clé devint plus et plus contraint.

Avant l'imposition du régime franquiste en 1939, l'Église en Catalogne était très faible comparée à l'Église Québécoise. Elle avait souffert plusieurs vagues de mouvements fortement anticléricaux, notamment le mouvement républicain qui est apparu en Barcelone à la fin du XIXe siècle et qui fut la source des émeutes et discours contre l'Église. L'Église avait encore de l'influence dans les communautés rurales, mais son pouvoir ailleurs était limité au début du XXe siècle à cause de la croissance du républicanisme dans les centres urbains et le succès de leur parti, la *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*, dans le gouvernement catalan. En fait, certains membres de l'Église avaient peur de la disparition complète du catholicisme en Catalogne. Comme a déclaré le prêtre Canon Carles Cardó: "Any decades more of abstention and in our Catalonia, Catholicism would be nothing more than a memory" (Dowling, 2006, p. 83-100). La situation est devenue désastreuse avec l'éclat d'une guerre civile en Espagne en 1936. Suscitée par les républicains de gauche contre le gouvernement nationaliste de l'aile gauche, la guerre a causé les meurtres de plus de 2000 des membres d'ordres religieux et la destruction de 4000 bâtiments religieux en Catalogne (Dowling, 2012, p. 594-610).

Les partisans républicains, étant responsables pour la majorité de la violence, ce fut avec joie que l'Église catalane accueillit la défaite républicaine et l'ascension du régime franquiste en 1939. Le régime Franquiste planifiait utiliser l'Église espagnole comme un instrument de contrôle, de par son appui pour les politiques conservatrices et traditionnelles de son régime. À cette fin, le gouvernement donna à l'Église des privilèges, dont le monopole sur l'enseignement de la doctrine religieuse et la moralité et le droit de publier des livres et articles sans être sujette la censure imposée à presque tout le pays (Dowling, 2012, p. 594-610). Le régime donna également à l'Église le contrôle des écoles où l'enseignement des idées catholiques était obligatoire (Amago, 2010; Jerez Farrán, 2010; p. 112). Sous le régime franquiste, l'Église catalane obtint un pouvoir de domination sociale qu'elle n'avait jamais eue auparavant.

Ainsi nous avons vu que les situations en Catalogne et au Québec étaient opposées. D'une part, bien que pouvoir de l'Église dans la société catalane eut été affaibli par de forts sentiments anticléricaux, le nouveau régime franquiste lui donna grande influence lors de son ascension au pouvoir en 1939 (Requena, 2014; Stanek, 2014). De l'autre, bien que depuis la création de la province, l'Église québécoise était l'une des institutions les plus influentes dans la société (Courcy, 1988), la force laïcisante de la Révolution tranquille dans les années 1960 a diminué considérablement son pouvoir (Seljak, 1996). Cette position changeante de l'Église en société peut nous aider à mieux comprendre son influence politique et sa promotion d'une forme particulière de nationalisme québécois et catalan ancré dans des valeurs religieuses.

Les mouvements nationalistes qui émanent de l'Église

Le rôle influent de l'Église dans la société québécoise lui a permis de déployer son propre type de nationalisme -- l'ultramontanisme, une idéologie ancrée dans la croyance de la supériorité de l'autorité de l'Église catholique dirigée par le Pape par rapport au pouvoir de l'État (Zubrzycki, 2016, p. 54-55). L'ultramontanisme de l'Église québécoise était très conservateur et basé sur trois idées principales : la philosophie de *la survivance,* l'antiétatisme, et la prééminence de la communauté rurale paroissiale au-dessus du centre urbain (Bélanger, 2000). *La survivance* est une philosophie qui suppose une lutte constante contre l'influence corrompue des anglophones protestants que les Québécois avaient survécu grâce à leur foi. *La survivance* était liée à l'Église puisque celle-ci s'est établie comme le gardien principal de la culture québécoise – une culture que l'Église envisageait comme étant caractérisée par son identité en tant que nation catholique, bénie par Dieu au sein d'un pays protestant païen (Bélanger, 2000). Le nationalisme de l'Église québécoise était aussi caractérisé par une résistance au pouvoir de l'État. Au cœur de l'allongement du pouvoir de gouvernement était un désir de l'Église de garder son monopole dans les domaines sociaux et éducationnels au Québec. L'Église croyait que l'agrandissement de l'État –dans la mesure où le gouvernement était dominé par les anglophones protestants qui ne seraient jamais en mesure de comprendre les besoins spéciaux de la nation québécoise – éroderait la culture québécoise (Bélanger, 2000). Enfin, l'Église a fait la promotion du mode de vie rural comme étant vertueux et un aspect incontournable de l'identité québécoise. Celle-ci considérait les communautés urbaines comme étant inférieures de par leur tendance à séparer les gens de leurs familles et de la terre et à introduire des influences multiculturelles et multilingues corrompues. Les paroisses rurales, s'articulaient autour d'une église centrale et composées de grandes familles, étaient perçus par l'Église comme des bastions d'une identité québécoise traditionnelle et étaient donc, favorisées par celle-ci (Bélanger, 2000). L'ultramontanisme était la forme dominante de nationalisme québécois de 1860 à 1960, juste avant les changements laïques de la Révolution tranquille (Bélanger, 2000).

À cause de son impopularité et de son rôle limité dans la société catalane, l'Église n'avait pas une grande influence sur le nationalisme Catalan, cependant, cette situation a changé de façon drastique pendant la période franquiste. Le gouvernement de Franco était particulièrement répressif en Catalogne, notamment avec son interdiction de l'utilisation de la langue catalane et sa censure des médias (Dowling, 2012, p. 597). Au sein d'une Catalogne affaiblie sous ces répressions, l'autonomie que le gouvernement a donnée à l'Église devint très importante pour le nationalisme. Jusqu'aux années 1960, l'Église était la seule institution qui pouvait utiliser la langue catalane (Dowling, 2012, p. 598). L'Église est devint aussi la source de plusieurs initiatives visant à revitaliser la culture catalane. La renaissance de la tradition catalane catholique d'*escoltisme* — a joué un rôle clé en formant une identité catalane parmi les jeunes (Dowling, 2012, p. 599). En effet, celle-ci a permis aux jeunes d'étudier la langue catalane et de participer à des excursions dans la campagne pour mieux apprécier le paysage catalan. L'Église a aussi influencé l'association *Òmnium Cultural*, qui visait à promouvoir la culture catalane. Bien qu'*Òmnium* ne fut pas une association catholique, la majorité de ses membres étaient catholiques, et ses initiatives avaient une tendance catholique. Par exemple, *Òmnium* s'est battu pour la préservation de deux pratiques avec des racines catholiques : la *sardana*, une danse traditionnelle, et l'*excursionisisme,* une tradition en randonnée (Dowling, 2012, p. 603-604). Les efforts de l'Église pour préserver les traditions catalanes ont achevé deux choses : la préservation de la culture catalane et l'addition d'une dimension catholique au nationalisme catalan.

Le type de nationalisme promu par les Églises catalane et québécoise était visait à conserver la langue et la culture d'une minorité au sein du pays. L'ultramontanisme et le catalanisme catholique voulaient, avant tout, préserver leurs cultures face aux influences assimilatrices dans le cas de Québec, et face à une interdiction complète dans le cas de la Catalogne. Cependant, ces deux nationalismes sont nés dans les contextes différents. L'ultramontanisme était utilisé par l'Église québécoise presque comme un outil de domination à long terme afin d'assurer le rôle puissant de l'Église – les philosophies de *la survivance,* l'antiétatisme, et le ruralisme facilitaient ceci directement. En revanche, le catalanisme catholique était une idée relativement nouvelle et s'est développé hors de nécessité pour la préservation de la culture catalane elle-même pendant une période répressive. Tandis que l'Église au Québec n'eut pas de difficulté à faire la promotion de son nationalisme, parce qu'elle était déjà considérée depuis la fondation de la province comme étant la gardienne principale de la culture québécoise, de son côté, l'Église catalane était un nouvel acteur dans le nationalisme catalan et avait dû lutter contre des sentiments anticléricaux. Cependant, les nationalismes promus par ces deux Églises n'étaient pas les seules qui existaient au Québec et Catalogne et l'éclat des deux évènements – la Révolution tranquille et le mouvement anti-franquiste – forceraient les Églises à répondre à l'apparition des autres mouvements nationalistes laïques.

La relation de l'Église avec d'autres mouvements nationalistes non religieux

Le nouveau nationalisme qui est apparu pendant la Révolution tranquille était caractérisé par son rejet de l'ultramontanisme. Ce nationalisme était laïque, libéral, et encourageait l'intervention de l'État pour améliorer l'économie québécoise faible et pour régler des problèmes sociaux. Les gens à la tête de ce nouveau nationalisme – les jeunes bureaucrates qui tenaient des valeurs démocratiques et libérales – opposaient surtout le cléricalisme du gouvernement qui a limité les meilleures positions dans la bureaucratie aux religieux (Seljak, 1996). La réaction de l'Église catholique à la laïcisation de la Révolution tranquille était une de soumission. Elle s'est retraitée de la sphère politique et ne s'opposait pas aux valeurs démocratiques et libérales de la nouvelle société (Seljak, 1996, p. 113). À partir de1970, il n'y avait plus de partis politiques qui visaient à rétablir des valeurs catholiques en société ou de promouvoir l'ultramontanisme – l'Église n'avait plus le désir ou le pouvoir de maintenir une société centrée sur le catholicisme (Seljak, 1996, p. 116). Quant au nationalisme québécois, l'Église a choisi de se limiter à donner des conseils moraux à d'autres acteurs nationalistes. Lorsque la question de la séparation du Québec du Canada se posa au cours du référendum de 1980, les évêques québécois ont publié des lettres qui affirmaient que les Québécois avaient le droit de décider pour eux-mêmes sans l'interférence de l'Église (Seljak, 1996). La neutralité de l'Église sur cette question nationaliste cruciale démontre que l'Église avait alors renoncé sa domination historique et également à sa propre définition du nationalisme québécois au profit celui des chefs de la Révolution tranquille.

Le fait que c'était le régime franquiste qui a réprimé la culture et la langue catalane signifiait que le mouvement nationaliste catalan serait synonyme du mouvement anti-franquiste. Le groupe anti-franquiste le plus fervent était le parti communiste catalan – qui a lutté contre le gouvernement pendant la guerre civile et était notamment ciblé et réprimé par lui. Les communistes et les autres nationalistes ne s'opposeraient pas au rôle principal de l'Église dans la revitalisation de la culture catalane. En fait, ces efforts ont aidé à améliorer la réputation de l'Église et à éliminer la rhétorique anticléricale parmi ces groupes (Dowling, 2012, p. 606-607). Les gauchistes catalans, malgré leur anticléricalisme historique, ont commencé à considérer l'Église comme une alliée potentielle (Dowling, 2012, p. 603). Bien que l'Église catalane se soit d'abord établie comme un instrument pour appuyer le gouvernement, sa promotion continuelle de la culture catalane a causé une rupture avec le régime franquiste. L'Église s'opposa plus et plus au gouvernement et a même commencé à accueillir des rencontres des groupes d'opposition dans les bâtiments religieux (Dowling, 2012, p. 607). Cette solidarité entre l'Église et le parti communiste s'est entre outre démontrée dramatiquement lors d'une manifestation en mai 1966 où presque cent prêtres se sont amassés devant la station policière pour protester le harcèlement d'un étudiant communiste (Dowling, 20120, p. 607). La relation de l'Église catalane avec d'autres mouvements anti-franquistes et nationalistes, notamment le parti communiste, était caractérisée par une solidarité – une relation imprévue considérant l'hostilité historique contre l'Église.

La réponse de l'Église québécoise au mouvement nationaliste laïque fut différente de celle de l'Église catalane à cause des idéologies du nouveau nationalisme. Dans le cas du Québec, le nouveau nationalisme était résolument contre toutes les idées de l'Église et attaquait son rôle au gouvernement provincial. En revanche, les autres mouvements nationalistes catalans applaudissaient l'Église pour ses efforts nationalistes et voulaient travailler avec elle pour promouvoir un but commun. Au Québec, la réponse de l'Église était de se retirer presque complètement de la politique, tandis que l'Église catalane fut de continuait de s'occuper des enjeux nationalistes en solidarité avec d'autres mouvements nationalistes laïques.

Conclusion

Les deux régions ont une histoire et une population catholique similaires, mais le rôle de l'Église catholique dans le nationalisme catalan et son influence dans le nationalisme québécois sont nettement différentes. L'Église québécoise était une institution dominante à partir de la création de la province jusqu'à la Révolution tranquille. En Catalogne, l'Église était historiquement faible en société à cause de l'anticléricalisme mais était donné des grands pouvoirs par le nouveau régime franquiste. Grâce à sa position privilégiée pendant l'époque franquiste, l'Église catalane pouvait assurer la survivance de la culture catalane et a réussi en introduisant un aspect catholique au nationalisme catalan. Par contre, l'ultramontanisme -- promu par l'Église catholique pour un siècle -- s'est effondré devant le nationalisme laïque et libéral de la Révolution tranquille. L'Église catalane, originalement faible, est devenue plutôt un joueur clé dans le mouvement nationalisme en collaboration avec d'autres nationalistes laïques, tandis que la domination de l'Église québécoise dans ce domaine était complètement écrasée pendant la Révolution tranquille quand elle a décidé de ne s'occuper plus aux questions nationalistes.

Bibliographie

Bélanger, C. (2000a). The Quiet Revolution [Text.Homepage]. Consulté 30 novembre 2017, à l'adresse http://faculty.marianopolis.edu/c.belanger/quebechistory/events/quiet.htm

Bélanger, C. (2000b, août 23). Quebec Nationalism [Text.Homepage]. Consulté 31 octobre 2017, à l'adresse http://faculty.marianopolis.edu/c.belanger/quebechistory/events/natpart3.htm

Bowcott, O., & Jones, S. (2018, mars 2). Puigdemont vows to lead Catalan government in exile. Consulté 25 mars 2018, à l'adresse http://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/02/exclusive-carles-puigdemont-vows-lead-catalan-government-exile

Catalans « win right to break with Spain ». (2017, octobre 2). *BBC News*. Consulté à l'adresse http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41463719

Catalonia government dissolved by Spain after declaring split - CNN. (2017, 28 octobre). Consulté 25 mars 2018, à l'adresse https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/27/europe/catalonia-independence-spain/index.html

Constitution 1978, Espagne, MJP. (s. d.). Consulté 27 octobre 2017, à l'adresse http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/es1978.htm

Courcy, R. (1988). L'ÉGLISE CATHOLIQUE AU QUÉBEC: DE LA FIN D'UN MONOPOLE AU REDÉPLOIEMENT DANS UNE SOCIÉTÉ PLURIELLE. *L'Année sociologique (1940/1948-)*, *38*, 109-133.

Dowling, A. (2006). The Catholic Church in Catalonia. From Cataclysm in the Civil War to the « Euphoria » of the 1950s. *Catalan Review*, *20*(1), 83-100.

Dowling, A. (2012). For Christ and Catalonia: Catholic Catalanism and Nationalist Revival in Late Francoism. *Journal of Contemporary History*, *47*(3), 594-610.

Jerez Farrán, C., & Amago, S. (2010). *Unearthing Franco's legacy: mass graves and the recovery of historical memory in Spain*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.

Johnston, H. (1989). Toward an Explanation of Church Opposition to Authoritarian Regimes: Religio-Oppositional Subcultures in Poland and Catalonia. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, *28*(4), 493-508. https://doi.org/10.2307/1386579

Krull, C., & Trovato, F. (2003). Where have all the children gone? Quebec's fertility decline: 1941-1991. *Canadian Studies in Population*, *30*(1), 193–220. https://doi.org/10.25336/P6JS4D

Laperrière, G. (2007). L'Église du Québec et les années 1960 : l'ère de tous les changements. *Cap-aux-Diamants*, (89), 10-13.

PlayGround. (s. d.). *8 minutos para entender qué sucede en Catalunya.* Consulté à l'adresse https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0MdruaTWayg

Requena, M., & Stanek, M. (2014). Religiosity and politics in Spain and Poland: A period effect analysis. Consulté 29 octobre 2017, à l'adresse http://journals.sagepub.com.proxy.bib.uottawa.ca/doi/abs/10.1177/0037768614535704

Ríos, P., Piñol, À., & País, E. (2018, février 23). Support for Catalan independence falls to 40.8%, new survey shows. *El País*. Consulté à l'adresse https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/02/23/inenglish/1519390093_184769.html

Seljak, D. (1996). Why the Quiet Revolution was « quiet »: the Catholic church's reaction to the secularization of nationalism in Quebec after 1960. *Historical Studies*, (62), 109-124.

The Constitution Act, 1982. (s. d.). Consulté 1er décembre 2017, à l'adresse http://www.solon.org/Constitutions/Canada/English/ca_1982.html

What's Next for Catalonia? | Harvard Political Review. (2018, 16 mars). Consulté 21 mars 2018, à l'adresse http://harvardpolitics.com/world/whats-next-for-catalonia/

Zubrzycki, G. (2016). *Beheading the saint: nationalism, religion, and secularism in Quebec*. Chicago, Illinois ; London, England: The University of Chicago Press, ©2016. Consulté à l'adresse https://login.proxy.bib.uottawa.ca/login?url=http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/ottawa/detail.action?docID=4526383

Grace Angkasa est une étudiante de deuxième année en science politique et en communication à l'Université d'Ottawa. Ses principaux intérêts de recherche incluent le nationalisme et la politique de l'identité, la sécurité internationale et les régions contestées. Elle travaille actuellement sur un projet de recherche examinant l'Arctique en tant que région contestée.

The Deficiencies of Nigerian Power-sharing Institutions

Selena Zhao, Harvard University

Abstract:

Power-sharing institutions, coined as consociationalism by Arend Lijphart, have typically been accepted as an effective institutional solution for ethnically, religiously, and linguistically divided societies, as they guarantee the political representation of all key demographic groups while promoting cooperation and consensus politics. However, although Nigeria maintains a robust, decades-long consociational democracy to help mitigate Christian-Muslim antagonism, it has still faced chronic religious violence, as well as the recent rise of religious terrorist groups such as Boko Haram. I seek to explain this incongruity by examining the negative byproducts of consociationalism, such as the entrenchment of ineffective governance by maintaining political elites in power—thereby fostering corruption and hampering representativeness—and politicizing religious identities, allowing them to be mobilized by politicians. These consequences of federal power-sharing, facilitating an ineffectual, unrepresentative government, lead to mass disaffection and mistrust, creating the optimal conditions for dissatisfied sectors of society to mobilize violently along existing religious cleavages.

Keywords: Consociationalism, Religious Identities, Power-sharing, Political Mobilization

Introduction

As one of the most populous nations in Africa, and with clear ethnic and religious divisions within its population, Nigeria faces particularly intense scrutiny on the government's ability to curtail ethnic and religious violence. One of the most oft-referenced institutions designed specifically to prevent the escalation of violence in divided societies is consociationalism, an institutionalized form of power-sharing within democracy that guarantees the political representation of all key ethnic or religious groups while promoting cooperation and consensus in politics (Lijphart, 1991, p.73). Although Nigeria has for decades federally implemented one of the forms of power-sharing most closely subscribing to Lijphart's consociational model, it has faced an ineffective state, corrupt and inept politicians, and mass public disaffection with democracy and the ruling government, leading to military coups, chronic religious violence, and the rise of religious terrorist groups such as Boko Haram. This poor performance has generated a vast debate among scholars at the efficacy of power-sharing in Nigeria—while some scholars argue that federal power-sharing has indeed served its intended purpose of moderating political rhetoric and promoting consensus, other scholars have argued that unintended side effects of power-sharing have instead weakened the government and hampered its ability to govern in a manner that improves the welfare of most citizens. Indeed, I argue that although power-sharing may limitedly allow equal access to power among religions, over long periods of time, it also entrenches ineffective governance by maintaining political elites in power—thereby fostering corruption and hampering representativeness—and politicizing religious identities, allowing them to be mobilized by politicians. These consequences of federal power-sharing, facilitating an ineffectual, unrepresentative government, lead to mass disaffection and mistrust, creating the optimal conditions for dissatisfied sectors of society to mobilize violently.

Literature Review

In order to analyze the performance of Nigeria's power-sharing institutions, it is important to first understand its specific characteristics and the manner in which the institution is intended to combat ethnic or religious divisions. Consociationalism was originally introduced by Arend Lijphart as a form of democracy characterized by four elements—a grand coalition, mutual veto, ethnic proportionality, and segmental autonomy—interacting to "achieve and maintain [a] stable democratic government in a plural society" by fostering consensus democracy, moderation, and cooperation among political elites across ethnic or religious cleavages (Lijphart, 1977, p. 1). Throughout his work, Lijphart references successful consociational democracies in (linguistically-divided) Belgium, the (politically-divided) Netherlands, and (religiously-divided) Northern Ireland as empirical support for his argument in favor of the efficacy of consociationalism. Indeed, his research indicates that power-sharing was able to serve as an institutional incentive to moderate political rhetoric and govern cooperatively between ethnic, linguistic, or political cleavages, mitigating the occurrence of violent outbreaks (Lijphart, 1991, p. 53). Despite the methodological emphasis on Western European nations as models for consociational efficacy, Lijphart's seminal argument is lauded within the political science community and power-sharing is typically viewed as the most viable and effective form of institutional conflict management for divided societies. Within the last decades, the institution "has been proposed time and time again and [is] often inscribed in peace agreements" (Mehler, 2009, p. 453). In fact, a central aspect of the US's post-invasion instatement of democracy in Iraq was a power-sharing agreement intended to foster peace between the Sunni and Shia (Younis, 2011, p. 1).

Yet, despite the general consensus around consociationalism, the model has faced serious theoretical and empirical challenges. A common argument among critics focuses on the anti-democratic nature of many consociational techniques that limit the representativeness of democracy by rigidly allocating seats in public office by ethnicity or religion (Butenschøn, 1985, p.93). Although Lijphart did concede that the model undermined the integrity and representativeness of democracy where it was enacted, he qualified his argument by specifying the transitional nature of consociationalism as a transient mechanism that could be removed once it had served its purpose of depolarizing societal cleavages, allowing democracy to strengthen after being freed from the limitations of consociationalism (Lijphart, 1977, p. 25). Accordingly, both Belgium and the Netherlands gradually transitioned out of consociationalism to a more traditional democratic regime once power-sharing had softened the societal divides (Keman, 2008, p. 149). However, as evidenced in Nigeria, the model of power-sharing developed by Lijphart has instead been decontextualized and adopted as a permanent institutional fixture in politics. Thus, many of the ensuing democratic problems found in Nigerian consociationalism are exacerbated and amplified by the longevity of the institution, entrenching harmful patterns in politics and society.

Historical Overview

Unlike many nations where power-sharing has only been adopted temporarily as a domestic response to intractable societal divides, consociationalism was implemented by the British before independence, and has existed alongside democracy throughout Nigeria's entire history. Beginning with the conception of an independent Nigeria in 1946 with the Richards Constitution—a product of compromise between the British colonial authorities and the Nigerian nationalist community—the democratic institutions developed "possessed a commitment to [regional] power-sharing" but also "witnessed a dramatic increase in graft and corruption." The ensuing regional competition for the patronage dominated by the North while in power led to the "descent into ethnic violence, a series of violent military coups in 1966, and the eventual secession of the Eastern Region and the bloody Nigerian Civil War" (Kendhammer, 2015, p. 152). Although the Ironsi military regime attempted to centralize power in a unitary state, it was overthrown by another coup, leading to the Gowon regime which returned Nigeria to an "ethnofederal model" while expanding the politicization of regional ethnic groups. Democratic power-sharing proved surprisingly resilient throughout Nigeria's turbulent history, enduring another return to military rule before in 1999 the Fourth Republic emerged as the present consociational democracy governing Nigeria.

In addition to Nigerian democracy's historically shaky performance, the country has been wracked by chronic violence and the emergence of a religiously-based terrorist organization, Boko Haram. Between 1999 and 2012, thirty notable incidents of religious violence (ranging from suicide bombings to church attacks to riots) between Christians and Muslims have been reported, resulting in fatalities upwards of 3000 people (Sampson 2012). In particular, the rise of Boko Haram has brought an unprecedented commitment to and magnitude of Islamic fundamentalist violence, plunging Nigeria into a series of "ferocious conflict and crises" (Adesoji, 2010, p.96). These acts of violence culminated in the infamous 2014 kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok Government Secondary School, generating mass international outcry, uniting activists, and drawing condemnation from public figures such as Michelle Obama (Sieff 2016).

Current Situation and Discussion

Clearly, the empirical evidence challenging the support for consociationalism as the primary solution to divided solutions is considerable and significant; whereas power-sharing is theorized to prevent ethnic cleavages from mobilizing violently, the current religious dynamic in Nigeria is proving to be anything but peaceful. Behind the outbreaks of violence is a "deeper and more diffuse malignancy: bad governance… that is not addressing the central policy challenges of the country… [and] that has produced a weak and feckless state" (Diamond 2014). Instead of mitigating religious violence, power-sharing has ironically promoted corruption and ineptitude among the political elite, breeding dissatisfaction and mistrust towards the government while framing the political playing field in terms of religious cleavages.

The primary manner in which consociationalism inspires dissatisfaction with the government is through the unintentional promotion of corrupt and ineffective politicians by maintaining the political elite. Although the intention of a grand coalition or of backdoor political pacts between key politicians from different religious groups is meant to promote consensus democracy and cooperation, the "inter-elite hierarchy of power in power-sharing is seen as a strategy by the dominant elite groups… to maintain their leading position. This strategy also includes the cooptation of the elite groups that accept the prevailing sharing arrangement" (Orji, 2010, p. 173). Thus, power-sharing institutions particularly incentivize collusion-style politics during backdoor negotiations that shut off access to power for others. Since "the benefits of mobilizing… identities accrue far more readily to elites with access to state power than those on the outside looking in" (Kendhammer, 2015, p. 149), the disproportionate advantage given to incumbent elites widens the gap between the elites and the rest of society so greatly that the barrier to entry seems insurmountable. Although even in the US, democratic institutions tend to favor incumbents in elections, the emphasis on backdoor deals and coalitions in power-sharing allows the same set of elites to manipulate rotational seats in office (intended to ensure no religion was barred from power) during negotiation discussions, entrenching a select few. Under these circumstances where democracy no longer appears representative and accessible, public disaffection intensifies and distrust in the government escalates. Unintentionally, consociational agreements of power foster distrust by facilitating the maintenance of political elite power, and the consensus politics they seek to create is instead viewed in the eyes of the public as opaque (as opposed to transparent) and evident of collusion, furthering distrust and perceptions of corruption.

Because consociationalism allowed the elites to consolidate power and wealth, widening the asymmetry between elites and the rest of society, the insurance of long-term power eroded the incentive to govern accountably, exacerbating public discontent and discrediting the government due to tangible poor performance. With pacts between the elites made and without an electoral incentive to govern responsibly and focus on issues of national concern such as poverty alleviation or food security, the entrenched political elite instead focused on lining their pockets with state resources. As "funds for development and agricultural revenues flowed through the regional governments… new bureaucratic and administrative posts provided access to public resources for private gain" (Kendhammer, 2015, p. 152). While the NPC members grew wealthy, "opportunities for wealth accumulation in businesses and the private sector [stagnated]" leading to intense dissatisfaction, distrust in the government, and frustration with democracy in general (Kendhammer, 2015, p. 152). The lack of accountability and corruption occurs at the expense of the rest of society, as policies become self-serving as opposed to developing the nation. In fact, an overall level of state ineptitude emerging from the corruption of high-level politicians allowed Boko Haram to flourish as "regular outbreaks of violence of many kinds [occurred] despite the state's continuous promises to check them" (Adesoji, 2010, p. 96). The lack of incentive to govern effectively and the ease with which corruption can take root in governments that manipulate power-sharing to widen the asymmetry between incumbents and potential opponents provide deep sources of dissatisfaction with the government, the democratic regime, and opportunities to mobilize violently in expressing such frustrations.

In addition to these unintentional side effects of power-sharing, the intentional politicization of religion facilitates the election of incompetent politicians who are more capable of mobilizing constituencies by religious appeals and solidarity than by developing functional policy platforms. Because power-sharing along religious identities causes candidates for public office to run on a religious ticket, the introduction of religion into elections deemphasizes the importance of policies at the expense of religious appeals. Secular democratic procedures such as elections are spiritualized and winners are perceived as being "ordained by God" (Ayantayo, 2009, p. 105). Similarly, some candidates have "whipped religious sentiments" to manipulate voters by insisting that "if certain groups of people or individuals refused to vote for them, then, some natural objects like stones, pebbles and leaves would vote for them in their stead." In addition, they claimed the potential to unleash "charm, magic and occultic powers to either threaten political opponents to withdraw in election contest or … to threaten electorates not to vote for candidates of their choice" even if the candidates appealed to them based on policy platforms (Ayantayo, 2009, p. 101). Even in the most recent 2015 election, where Muslim Muhammadu Buharu ran against Christian incumbent Goodluck Jonathan, Buharu's anti-corruption platform took a backseat to Jonathan's merits as a "good Christian leader," as well as Buharu's stance on implementing shari'a law (Ross 2015). The focus by politicians and voters on purely religious matters seriously undermines the basic norms of democracy as a secular institution, the validity and function of elections in producing candidates that represent the political views of the constituencies, and thus "deny the country the opportunity of producing the best material" for public office (Akinyele, 2000, p. 219). Similar to the corrupt and self-serving political elite, politicians manipulating religious sentiment instead of prioritizing policy platforms to win the election are generally less capable of governing effectively, intensifying the dissatisfaction with politicians and democracy. When extensive periods of ineffectual governance and corruption among the politicians in power are sustained, the public trust in the regime declines markedly, paving the way for frustration to turn armed and violent.

However, the last piece in the puzzle connecting power-sharing to religious violence is, counterintuitively, the increased hostility between religions generated from politicizing religious groups. Although power-sharing was designed specifically to target societal cleavages and promote cooperation between such divides, the act of politicizing religious divides is potentially dangerous and conducive to violence. In 2004, political scientist Daniel Posner published a study of two ethnic groups divided only by the arbitrary political border of Zambia and Malawi, holding all other variables constant by matching villages of nearly identical demographics across the border and researching differences in attitudes towards the other ethnic group between the villages in each country. Because of the research design, the lack of impact the border had on the demographics of the different villages, and the similarity between the villages, Posner's study has been lauded as closely resembling a scientific study—a rare opportunity as political scientists are unable to conduct controlled experiments on real communities in the world. Posner found that whereas inhabitants of both Zambian villages held favorable views of the other ethnic group and felt more or less united, Malawian villagers were hostile, confrontational, and insulting towards each other. The only variable "manipulated" between the two borders was the degree of ethnic politicization—in Malawi, a much smaller country, the two ethnicities dominate demographically, each comprising roughly 40% of the population, and thus are frequently mobilized by politicians to gain ethnic-based votes, while in the much larger Zambia, both ethnicities combined comprised roughly 5% of the population, and thus are not politically relevant, leading them to be mobilized together (if at all). Thus, Posner concluded that the political salience of ethnicities or religions is sufficient to breed hostility and, potentially, violence (Posner, 2004, p. 529). Turning back to Nigeria, the implications of this study can be seen clearly in the conflicts leading to the coup of 1966 where competition for limited state resources under the corrupt NPC quickly split into regional conflicts due to the regional nature of the power-sharing institutions during the First Republic (Kendhammer, 2015, p. 152). Thus, similar levels of public dissatisfaction and frustration with corrupt, entrenched, or inept politicians can quickly mobilize violently along sectarian divisions, and as the current power-sharing institution politicizes religion, general outbreaks of violence in society easily become religious in nature.

Rebuttal

However, before drawing broader conclusions from the analysis of Nigeria, the difference between ethnic and religious cleavages must be addressed, as often studies based on ethnic cleavages have been generalized to religious cleavages and vice versa. Although this distinction is important to note depending on the demographics of the given country, Nigeria is unique in that religion has "blurred the sharp edge of ethnic differences, hereby substituting for it, a new identity based on the acceptance of the new faith." Thus, "a religious conflict can easily become an ethnic conflict" (Akinyele, 2000, p. 203). In Nigeria, where a religious identity transcends the spiritual boundary and occupies the ethnic or heritage identity of a group of people, as has occurred in Nigeria, the line of distinction becomes unclear and the generalization between religious and ethnic cleavages becomes much less problematic, allowing a looser definition of religion or ethnicity to encompass the narrower definitions referenced in various studies.

In addition to clarifying the distinction between religious and ethnic cleavages, it is crucial to also address empirical evidence supporting the moderating influence of power-sharing: according to Bunte and Vinson, local informal power-sharing agreements have both moderated political rhetoric and also molded the public perception of other religions in a more "conciliatory" manner (Bunte Vinson, 2015, p. 49). Although the existence of local informal power-sharing institutions may indeed produce measurable increases in moderate rhetoric or public perception, these factors are only partially responsible for escalations in religious violence. Though political conflict without power-sharing may seem to be the most direct cause for outbreaks in religious violence, a broad, festering resentment for the current government coupled with the exploitation of religion in politics and elections also provides a breeding ground ripe for frustration to emerge in a violent religious confrontation, as seen in the preponderance of religious violence acts since the onset of consociationalism in the Fourth Republic in 1999.

Conclusion

Despite the extensive literature criticizing the efficacy of consociationalism in Nigeria, there seems to be no consensus on a better alternative. Even though the long-term presence of consociationalism entrenches a wide array of new political issues regarding effective governance and competent politicians, the removal of such an institution would not alleviate the issues inherent in a divided society, either. Seeming to be stuck between a rock and a hard place, Nigeria continues to muddle through an inefficient and problematic democracy while battling security threats such as Boko Haram. While scholars continue to research methods to alleviate the issues introduced by consociationalism, it remains clear that exalting power-sharing as an institutional band-aid to "fix" divided societies is neither accurate nor plausible. Although power-sharing does hold merit as a mediating, moderating institution, it also provides a vehicle through which the political elite can remain in power, widening the gap between them and those not in power, and govern ineffectively, corruptly, and without accountability to society. In addition, spiritualized elections prioritize religious sentiments of divine right over policy platforms, allowing inept politicians to be elected purely by the religious mobilization of the constituencies. Combined, the overall poor governance of the state and inability to address key issues plaguing developing countries breed dissatisfaction and distrust of both the government and of the democratic regime; yet, because religions are politicized under consociationalism, political issues can quickly intensify into religious conflicts. Though perhaps this progression of societal responses is more indirect than the intended effect of implementing power-sharing institutions, the surprisingly poor performance of Nigerian government under consociationalism suggests empirical support for the argument that power-sharing is not the viable, comprehensive solution to an ethnically divided society once agreed upon in political science literature.

References

Adesoji, A. (2010). The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria / Die Boko-Haram-Unruhen und die Wiederbelebung des Islam in Nigeria. *Africa Spectrum, 45*(2), 95-108.

Akinyele, R. (2000). Power-sharing and Conflict Management in Africa: Nigeria, Sudan and Rwanda. *Africa Development / Afrique Et Développement, 25*(3/4), 199-223.

Ayantayo, J. (2011). Religious Factors in the Nigerian Public Sphere: Burdens and Prospects. *Africa Development,34*(3-4).

Bunte, J. B., & Vinson, L. T. (2016). Local power-sharing institutions and interreligious violence in Nigeria. *Journal of Peace Research,53*(1), 49-65.

Butenschøn, N. A. (1985). Conflict Management in Plural Societies: The Consociational Democracy Formula. *Scandinavian Political Studies,8*(1-2), 85-103.

Diamond, Larry. (2014, June 30). Nigeria: Anatomy of a Feckless State. Retrieved May 09, 2017.

Keman, H. (2008). Introduction: Politics in the Netherlands after 1989: A Final Farewell to Consociationalism? *Acta Politica, 43(2-3),* 149-153.

Kendhammer, B. (2015). Getting Our Piece of the National Cake: Consociational Power Sharing and Neopatrimonialism in Nigeria. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics,21*(2), 143-165.

Lijphart, A. (1977). *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. NEW HAVEN; LONDON: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, A. (1991). Constitutional Choices for New Democracies. *Journal of Democracy,2*(1), 72-84.

Mehler, A. (2009). Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not So Obvious Relationship. *African Affairs,108*(432), 453-473.

Orji, N. (2010). Governing 'Ethnicised' Public Sphere: Insights from Nigeria. *Africa Development / Afrique Et Développement, 35*(4), 165-178.

Posner, D. N. (2004). The Political Salience of Cultural Difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas Are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi. *American Political Science Review,98*(04), 529-545.

Ross, W. (2015, January 29). Nigeria elections: Mixing religion and politics. Retrieved May 09, 2017, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-31026554

Sampson, I. T. (2012, April 1). Religious violence in Nigeria. Retrieved May 09, 2017, from http://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/%EF%BF%BCreligious-violence-in-nigeria/

Sieff, K. (2016, April 14). Boko Haram kidnapped 276 girls two years ago. What happened to them? Retrieved May 09, 2017, from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/04/14/boko-haram-kidnapped-276-girls-two-years-ago-what-happened-to-them/

Younis, N. (2011). Set up to fail: consociational political structures in post-war Iraq, 2003–2010. *Contemporary Arab Affairs,4*(1), 1-18.

Selena Zhao is an undergraduate student from Harvard University.

What Factors Explain the Uneven Development of Democracy Across Asian States?

Hanna Ahlqvist, School of Arts and Social Science, City University of London

Abstract

Democratic stability is one of the key challenges of contemporary politics. This article contributes to our understanding of this challenge by comparatively examining the sources of democratic stability and instability in India and Pakistan. The goal of this comparative case study is to analyze the main factors that affect the uneven development of democracy, evaluate how these factors can be generalized and if they can be applied to Asia as a whole. The factors examined are; decolonization, partition and independence, critical junctures affecting political parties and institutions, modernization theory, security problems and international actors. Upon examination of these factors it becomes clear that all these different components cause changes in regime outcomes and the analysis provides an explanation of why there can be an uneven development of democracy.

Key words: Democracy; decolonization; modernization; Asia, India, Pakistan

Introduction

There has been an uneven development of democracy in Asia. Most Asian countries have been colonized in the past by Western powers, all affecting the countries differently. When the colonizers left, some Asian countries were able to transition to a democratic political system, while in other countries more authoritarian forms of governance emerged. However, not many countries were able to preserve their democratic system (Gilley, 2014, p. 100-101). There are many different explanations for this uneven development and there are dispersed debates regarding what factors are the most important. This article will evaluate different factors by applying them to a case study and compare the uneven development of democracy in India and Pakistan.

This particular case study was chosen because India and Pakistan have a similar historical experience of British colonial rule and comparable socio-economic indicators. Although India is a large, diverse and still developing country, with relatively low levels of per capita income, it has managed to consolidate its democracy. Pakistan has not been able to do this despite the countries similar background. This comparison can provide insights for other Asian countries that share similar historical experiences and have low to middle income economies. The comparison between India and Pakistan shows that there are three reasons for India being more democratic than Pakistan. Firstly, the democratic framework, in particular political parties, are and have been better embedded in India (even before independence) than in the areas that became Pakistan. Secondly; India has a more diversified economy than Pakistan, which will later be connected to modernization theory. Finally; for various historical and international reasons, there is a powerful military in Pakistan, which leaves little room for democratic development.

Most of the literature involves certain factors for how India became a better democracy than Pakistan, which sets out the narrative for this article. One of the key factors that will be examined is decolonization, which led the way for independence and resulted in a partition, affecting the democratic outcome in both India and Pakistan. Another key factor examines how this critical juncture affected political parties and institutions in India and Pakistan. The third factor that will be examined is how modernization theory can explain these outcomes. Finally, security problems and the role of international actors will be examined. The article will later analyze if these key factors that affected the development of democracy in India and Pakistan can be applied and generalized to Asia as a whole.

Defining Democracy

Before addressing the puzzle, it is important to define democracy. It is a difficult and vague concept that scholars define in different ways. What one scholar would regard as a paradigm case, another would deny was a democracy at all. Therefore, there are both thick and thin definitions of democracy. A thin definition of democracy, that only involves citizens voting in regular and competitive elections, could describe countries as developed democracies. On the contrary, the same countries might not meet the criteria necessary to be recognized as a democracy, if a thick definition is applied. A thick definition involves a wider range of political conditions. For example, there are no restrictions on citizens expression and political parties compete on a relatively even playing field. (Karl, 1990, p. 1-2). Therefore, a thin definition defines democracy as simply having regular competitive elections but excludes the fact that these elections might not be fair, which a thick definition involves.

In this article, democracy will be defined through the work of Adam Przeworski (1991) and Joseph Schumpeter (2003). Schumpeter argues that, “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote” (2003, p. 269). A simpler definition of democracy would be through the work of Przeworski, where he argues that "Democracy is a system in which parties lose elections" (1991, p. 10). Meaning that, if there are different parties within a country and they lose elections it is because the people are able to vote and influence which political party is in power. To get a greater understanding on the subject, it is not only necessary to understand democracy but also what makes a democracy consolidate. This article is in accordance with Jeffery Haynes' conceptualization of democracy consolidation. Haynes argue that "*Democratic consolidation* is the process of embedding both democratic institutions and perceptions among both elites and citizens that democracy is the best way of 'doing' politics" (2013, p. 126).

Decolonization, Independence and Partition

To be able to analyze how independence and partition affected India and Pakistan differently, it is essential to know the historical background. The British crown ruled India for almost a hundred years and this rule was called the 'The British Raj' (Jalal, 1995, p. 11). Ayesha Jalal argues that there has always been a religious mistrust in India, which existed before the British arrived, but it was something the British worsened by putting majorities and minorities against each other (1995, p. 11). On one side there are the Hindus and Sikhs and on the other side there are the Muslims. T. V. Paul argues that when the British decided to leave India, many Muslims began to fear that they would have to live in a democracy under a Hindu-majority, and that way they would be underrepresented (2015, p. 6). Therefore, Indian politicians, such as Muhammad Ali Jinnah from the Muslim League, brought up the idea that there should be a separate Muslim state (Jalal, 1995, p. 14). On the other hand, many Hindus were upset that the Muslims wanted to break up the country. All this anger resulted in violence across the country with mass killings (Paul, 2015, p. 7). In 1947 the British left and divided the country into India and Pakistan. India was established as a secular nation with a majority Hindu and Sikh population (Paul, 2015, p. 7). India becoming secular means that the constitution is not based on explicitly religious principles. This is one of the reasons for India achieving a consolidated democracy. Since they became a secular nation, India established a political system in which most groups felt that they were being represented (Adeney & Wyatt, 2004 p. 8). Pakistan was established as an Islamic nation with primarily a Muslim population (Paul, 2015, p. 7). Before the British left they drew the borders of India and Pakistan and when these were established, it led to mass migration; the Muslims wanted to go over the border to Pakistan and the Hindus and Sikhs wanted to cross over to India. However, the result was a disaster with violence breaking out on both sides of the border with mass murder and killings (Paul, 2015, p. 7). The first problem for Pakistan came with partition because this was the point when institutions, parties, pluralism and democracy should have been consolidated. This was an extremely hard task for the state since it all had to be consolidated from scratch, something the country failed to do.

Critical juncture, Institutions and Parties

Across India, there has been a consolidated democracy. Even though India has not been able to eliminate poverty or reduce inequalities, it is still largely accepted as one of the most successful democracies in Asia (Adeney & Wyatt, 2004). One of the key events that paved the way for governmental change in India and Pakistan was decolonization. An event like this can be described as a critical juncture. Katharine Adeney and Andrew Wyatt define a critical juncture as political context, in which

> "There are periods of political openness when institutions are malleable, and individuals, or individuals acting collectively, are able to reshape them. Structural and institutional change is more likely during these 'critical junctures'" (2004, p. 7).

The most apparent critical juncture in Asia has been decolonization. However, this critical juncture affected the democratic framework, in particular political parties, differently in India and Pakistan.

Adeney and Wyatt argue that political parties in India were embedded in institutions before the British left. When independence came in 1947, India already had the necessary structures that made transition to democracy easier, which is one of the reasons for their consolidated democracy (2004, p. 8). An example of this would be the Indian National Congress, it managed to create compromise between elites, thus, reducing conflicts. Additionally, it had a structure, which encouraged pluralism and created a working link between the state and society (Adeney & Wyatt, 2004). Although India is a heterogeneous state, the Indian National Congress has been able to manage the ethnic diversity; firstly, through recognition and secondly, through subdividing the Hindu majority through region, language and caste. This ensured that there was no ethnic group that could undermine the Congress' primacy (Adeney & Wyatt, 2004, p. 10).

On the contrary, Pakistan has experienced periods of democracy but they never managed to consolidate it. It is clear that Pakistan has not been able to achieve a persistent democracy compared to India (Adeney & Wyatt, 2004). One of the reasons for this is that there was no institutionalized party in Pakistan, that was able to create a link between society and the state since independence. The Muslim League remained elite-dominated and there was an existing disagreement, which prevented them from creating a unified party (Adeney & Wyatt, 2004, p. 11-12). Adeney and Wyatt argue that the elite were more concerned about strengthening their position rather than creating a national unity in Pakistan. As a result, political parties were not able to create a working political program. Pakistan also failed to apply a specific structure regarding ethnic diversity the way India did (2004, p. 11-12). The majority of the population in Pakistan, the Bengalis, were not represented in any of the sectors. Instead, Punjabis were dominant in many of the different sectors and they did not have a positive approach to democracy, since a democracy would marginalize them as a minority and they would lose their power (Adeney & Wyatt, 2004,

p. 11-12). This occurred because the critical juncture was too long. This spread disunity and produced an evident institutional weakness that left vacuums to fill for other institutions, such as the army and bureaucracy, which were dominated by a minority.

Modernization Theory

Economic development is a factor that is often discussed in regard to the development of democracy in a country. Terry Karl argues that there are several preconditions for democracy and one of those is that there must be a certain level of wealth or degree of capitalist development (1990, p. 3). India has slowly started to develop into a more open-market orientated economy, by introducing several reforms over the last two decades, increasing the rates of economic growth (Kohli, 2004). India has a very diverse economy, which is mainly built around their agricultural sector but today, services and industries have become a major source of their economic growth (Kohli, 2004). When examining India, the country started to modernize during the period of colonial rule and when the British left, they already had working institutions, policies and political parties. If a state has a more modernized and diverse economy, there will be an increasingly stable middle-class, which is the class that tends to join and mobilize political parties. Therefore, it can be argued that India's economic development has played a significant role in the consolidation of their democracy.

On the contrary, Pakistan has had a much slower economic growth rate than India, which can be seen as one of the factors regarding their inability to consolidate their democracy. Pakistan has had decades of internal political disputes and has not been able to develop a consensus for the governance agenda or a long-term economic strategy, which has slowed down their economic growth rate (Hasan, 2015). The modernization theory would then argue that because of Pakistan's low economic growth, the country has not been able to create or mobilize political parties. It is clear that India is much more industrialized and has higher levels of service industry than Pakistan, which results in a higher level of wealth. According to the modernization theory and Karl (1990, p. 3), this could be one of the factors, which explains the uneven development of democracy in India and Pakistan.

Security Problems and the Role of International Actors

International actors can be a key factor for the democratic outcome in a state, depending on what kind of support the state receives. Maya Tudor argues that, "Democratization scholars have long suggested that international support for regimes can be an important influence on whether or not states democratize" (2013, p. 31). When examining American support for military regimes in Pakistan, it is evident that this type of support has further established anti-democratic forces in Pakistan (Tudor, 2013, p. 31). These alliances were not established until a few years after Pakistan became independent and by that time, Pakistan had already failed to provide a stable regime (Tudor, 2013, p. 31). This does not necessarily imply that American support influenced the political outcomes of Pakistan. However, their support did in fact strengthen pre-existing authoritarian tendencies (Tudor, 2013, p. 31). It was clear that the priority was to uphold these relationships rather than trying to develop and enforce democracy in Pakistan.

Another factor linked to the role of international actors is that since partition, Pakistan has seen India as a threat. After partition, Pakistan was immediately involved in a military conflict with its militarily stronger neighbor India. This resulted in Pakistan feeling weaker and threatened by India (Tudor, 2013, p. 32). Therefore, Pakistan tried to increase their security in the international system by making government spending on their military a priority (Tudor, 2013, p. 32). As the military became stronger, it also becomes harder to create political parties and for them to mobilize. This can further be connected to the modernization theory. Since Pakistan decided to focus their state finances on the military, there was not much left for other necessary investments in the country. This led to a lower degree of development in the country, thus, explaining the uneven development of democracy.

Application of Factors to Asia as a Whole

The factors that have been applied to India and Pakistan can be generalized and applied to Asia as a whole. Not every Asian country has experienced critical junctures such as decolonization and independence. However, these countries have experienced periods where politics is more malleable. For example, the civil war in China can be seen as a critical juncture because it led the way for a new regime and the communist party (Collins & Cottey, 2012, p. 5). The direction this change takes depends on the institutions and parties that are present at that time. There is a consensus in the literature that Asian states with weakly institutionalized parties have found the transition to democracy more difficult (Adeney & Wyatt, 2004, p. 8). If political vacuums emerge, it is important that a country has these parties that are institutionally embedded, otherwise it leaves room for undemocratic forces, which is what happened in Pakistan (Adeney & Wyatt, 2004, p. 8). Furthermore, most parties in Asian countries have had to reach compromises with undemocratic classes, but not every party has been able to go beyond the undemocratic preferences of these classes (Adeney & Wyatt, 2004, p. 8).

The second factor, modernization theory, argue that a higher level of wealth in a country promotes democracy, which is the case for India. However, the theory is not applicable to all Asian countries and there are exceptions. China is one of the biggest economies but it is not democratic. Although it is important to remember that China did not experience the same critical juncture as many other Asian countries, instead it was a civil war, which showed the way for a developmental autocracy. The modernization theory, however, is applicable to many other Asian countries even if there are exceptions such as China, it is still a relevant factor. Japan is also one of the biggest economies and it has a higher degree of democracy, which further proves the modernization theory is a significant factor.

International actors and security can also explain the uneven development of democracy across Asian states, since other countries can strengthen or weaken actors that promote or subvert democracy in a country (Tudor, 2013, p. 31). Examples of these influences have been in Pakistan where America kept on supporting their military and strengthening that regime type. On the contrary, American influence forced Japan to turn into a more democratic-style nation. If America would not have supported the Pakistani military like it did, it might not have been as embedded in the nation as it is. Also, Pakistan chose to focus on the military since they felt weaker than other countries in the international system, which created undemocratic features.

Conclusion

This article has examined different factors that explain the uneven development of democracy across Asian states. To understand these different factors, they have been applied to India and Pakistan. It reached the conclusion that the most important factors would be different types of critical junctures, when there is an increase in political openness and institutions are more malleable. Across Asia, this critical juncture has been decolonization. This factor is also linked to the countries institutions and parties, both playing a crucial role regarding democratization in a country. If there is a political vacuum during these critical junctures and non-working institutions, it leads the way for undemocratic forces. The modernization theory has also helped us understand the uneven development of democracy since it shows that countries with a higher level of wealth tend to become more democratic, even though there are exceptions. The last factor examined is security and international actors. Countries that want to increase their security tend to look for support to increase their military power, something America provided Pakistan with, which strengthened their non-democratic forces. However, if America would have acted the way they did with Japan, forcing them to introduce a more democratic-style it could have affected Pakistan differently. “In all of these ways, democracy represents both change and continuity in Asian politics” (Gilley, 2014, p. 141).

References

Adeney, K., & Wyatt, A. (2004), Democracy in South Asia: Getting beyond the Structure Agency Dichotomy, *Political Studies, 52* (1), 1-18. Retrieved from http://0 onlinelibrary.wiley.com.wam.city.ac.uk/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00461.x/epdf

Ansari, J. (2014). Modernization And Its Sociological Connotations And Trends With Reference To India. *New York Science Journal*, 72-80. Retrieved from http://www.sciencepub.net/newyork/ny0705/013_24606ny070514_72_81.pdf

Collins, N., & Cottey, A. (2012). An introduction to government in the People's Republic of China. In *Understanding Chinese politics* (pp 5). Manchester University Press.

Gilley, B. (2014). Democracy. In *The Nature of Asian Politics* (pp. 89–141). Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from https://0-www-cambridge org.wam.city.ac.uk/core/services/aop cambridgecore/content/view/34013999DA2D43EB030E92CD35246825/978113904537 c4_p89-141_CBO.pdf/democracy.pdf

Hasan, P. (2015). Failed Economic Promise: Lessons from Pakistan's Development Experience. In R. Amjad & S. Burki (Eds.), *Pakistan: Moving the Economy Forward* (pp. 2247). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781316271711.003

Haynes, J. (2013). Religion and democratisation. In *An Introduction to International Relations and Religion* (2nd ed., pp. 125-126). London: Routledge. Retrieved from https://0-www taylorfrancis com.wam.city.ac.uk/books/9780273782858/chapters/10.4324%2F9781315833026-13

Jalal, A. (1995). The colonial legacy in India and Pakistan. In *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective* (Contemporary South Asia, pp. 9-28). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511559372.003

Karl, T. (1990). Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America. *Comparative Politics*, *23*(1), 1 3. Retrieved from http://0-www.jstor.org.wam.city.ac.uk/stable/pdf/422302.pdf

Kohli, A. (2004). India's Fragmented-Multiclass State and Protected Industrialization. In *State Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery* (pp. 257-288). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511754371.011

Paul, T. (2005). Causes of the India–Pakistan enduring rivalry. In T. Paul (Ed.), *The India Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry* (pp. 3-24). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511616112.002

Przeworski, A. (1991). Democracy. In *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Studies in Rationality and Social Change, pp.10-50). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139172493.003

Schumpeter, J. (2003). *Capitalism, socialism and democracy* (p. 269). George Allen & Unwin. Retrieved from http://cnqzu.com/library/Economics/marxian%20economics/Schumpeter,%20Joeseph Capitalism,%20Socialism%20and%20Democracy.pdf

Tudor, M. (2013). How India institutionalized democracy and Pakistan promoted autocracy. In *The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan* (pp. 1-43). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9781139519076.002

Hanna Ahlqvist is a Swedish student living in London. She is about to enter her final year of her Bachelor's degree in Politics at City University of London. She is passionate about politics and how it can be used to influence change in society. After University, Hanna is excited to develop a career where she is able to make a difference in the world and express her ambitious and driven personality. In her spare time Hanna is either working for the marketing team at the university or skiing and spending her time outdoors.

The Butterfly Effect
How Environmental Change Shapes Political Opportunity and Power in Afghanistan

Annika Bratton, Pacific University, Forest Grove, Oregon, United States

Abstract

While Afghanistan is no stranger to global scrutiny from a political standpoint, a key area of the country's struggle is often absent from mainstream analysis: environmental change. This paper explores how environmental change has influenced political opportunity and power in Afghanistan and how these findings can be generalized to apply outside of the context of Afghanistan. By measuring two environmental variables (desertification and drought) alongside relevant political indicators (poverty, opium poppy cultivation, and the number of terrorist attacks) over a fifteen-year period, the study identifies clear trends suggesting that there is a significant correlation between the environment and sociopolitical conflict. While the causal relations identified in the study are complex, there is a clear indication that drastic environmental change affects political proceedings, which carries exciting implications about potential changes to the way scholars examine political conflict and unrest, particularly in regions experiencing increasingly extreme conditions from climate change.

Keywords: Afghanistan, Climate change, Opium, Poverty, Terrorism, Desertification, Drought, Political Opportunity

Introduction

A butterfly flaps its wings on a Tuesday afternoon, and miles away a week later, a tornado ravages a landscape the butterfly will never see. The concept of tiny perturbations creating large-scale effects is one that is common, but rarely applied to intersectional political studies. A butterfly flaps its wings—a drought begins in 1970s Afghanistan. A tornado touches down—by 2015, Afghanistan sees alarming rates of poverty, drug activity, and terrorist activity. Are these things related? Yes, but not necessarily in an obvious way. The complex culmination of the various factors of causality can disguise the significant relationship between the tumultuous nature of the country of Afghanistan and the environmental hardship the region has experienced.

The developed world, particularly America, is fairly familiar with the country of Afghanistan and the general political issues that it faces, due to United States' occupation of the country since 2001 and the media coverage that has followed. Many studies on the country exist, examining everything from oil to poverty rates. However, in the midst of all of this discussion is a notable gap. Even though Afghanistan experiences significant tangible effects of climate change, these factors are rarely considered in terms of the influence they exert on national sociopolitical issues, especially in an academic context. While considerable research exists regarding both Afghanistan's environment and political structure and conflict, the two rarely intersect in a significant way. Arguably, this is a mistake.

Mainstream acknowledgement of the impact that climate change has already had on landscapes other than in the Arctic is relatively recent, and arguably opens a door to a whole new way of considering political conflict. While political factors can stem from a number of sources (social, political, economic), does the environment fit in through correlation, causation, or not at all? Identifying key environmental indicators could, in time, prove to be an effective preventative method for certain types of political conflicts or issues.

Afghanistan is a compelling region for analysis because of both the complex, tumultuous political situation and the very evident toll that climate change has already taken on the country. An in-depth research project centered on the variables within the country provides a convincing case study for the overarching question: how does environmental change influence political opportunity and power?

Literature Review

Power and Opportunity

The presence, structure, and execution of power is paramount in any discussion of political relevance, whether explicitly or implicitly. Particularly relevant in an examination of the influence of environmental change on political opportunity structure is three-dimensional power as described by Steven Lukes. Lukes claims that two-dimensional power encompasses not only the non-decision-making that is afforded by first-dimensional power (described as direct power over something), but also agenda-setting power as well as influence on which events and issues are considered pressing and worthy of discussion (see *Figure 1*). (Lukes, 2005.)



Figure 1: Dimensions of Power

Agenda-setting power is central to environmental change. Some scholars argue that this power, even when third-dimensional, is granted by the normative context of a given situation and that Lukes has a tendency to oversimplify the concept (Dowding, 2012, p.120). Lukes claims that the most effective variety of power is the least observable, similar to Michel Foucault's Panopticon model (Foucault, 2002, p. 234). If this holds true, it can be assumed that an entity which exerts relatively unobservable power but carries a significant sway in agenda-setting would hold a considerable amount of political power and influence. What entity fits this description? Tangible environmental change.

The discussion of environmental change, even at an academic level, while analyzing the attempts of policy-making and regulations to protect, respond to, or shape the environment, often leaves out the political effects that the drought, flood, hurricane, or other natural disaster directly create. In the case of Afghanistan, droughts, flooding, and desertification are all commonplace, but rarely appear in the political analyses of the region (Bohle, Downing & Watts, 2004, p. 37). This can be attributed to a number of factors, including media and their agenda-setting power, political interest and platform, and the interest of the general public (Hoijer, 2010, p. 720; Riffkin, 2014).

Media sources have independent agendas which are set clearly and effectively in the mass media. Studies show that there exists a "strong correlation between the emphasis that mass media place on certain issues (e.g., based on relative placement or amount of coverage) and the importance attributed to these issues by mass audiences. (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007.)" Notably lacking in these discussions, however, is the power that the environment itself, particularly effects such as drought, hurricanes, and other natural disasters, exert over the media and the political agenda. Oftentimes, political and social experts place their focus so much on the interaction of government, the people, and social institutions, that the concept of environmental impact is not mentioned at all (Birkland, 1998, p. 61-63).

Political Opportunity Structure is a theoretical framework primarily based in sociology that claims that the success or failure of social and political actions and movements is based solely on the framework of the political and social aspects within a given system. Essentially, that success can be attributed to political opportunity (Meyer & Staggenborg, 1996). The Political Opportunity Structure theory is particularly relevant to a research question examining the political influence of environmental change, because environmental factors can be considered influential to political opportunity. In relation to Afghanistan, this is intriguing because Political Opportunity Structure theory suggests that the prevalent flooding, drought, and desertification alter the potential for success of political and social movements.

Environmental Change and the Climate

Often in academic and scholarly settings, it is acknowledged that environmental change is a key confluence of science, politics, and economics. However, climate change and even environmental change are often discussed as a singular issue that is relatively isolated from other key factors (Parenti, 2011; Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007). Any relationship between environmental change to political factors or phenomenon is typically viewed as a cycle of environmental change, environmental regulations, and continued human impact on the planet (see *Figure 2*). However, in the modern world, the politicizing of environmental and climate change is not a new phenomenon, but rather a common theme in any analysis of the current state of the environment (Kestenbaum, 2009; “The Consequences of Climate Change”, 2017).



Figure 2: Typical Concept of Environmental Change in Political Realm

How is the collective political globe thinking about environmental change? Environmental summits are occurring with increasing frequency and urgency since the first major Earth Summit in Rio, Brazil, 1992. The convergence of so many countries in an effort to reduce the impact of climate change and prevent harmful results is perhaps one of the most prominent indicators of the intertwined nature of politics with climate change. Most developed countries are making efforts to reduce carbon emissions and implement successful policies aimed at environmental benefit (Seyfang, 2003, p. 224).



Figure 3: Adjusted Concept of how environmental change functions in a political context

However, the frame in which environmental change is viewed is ever-shifting, even described by some as a marketing opportunity or publicity option (Hansen & Machin, n.d). While information about the policies being wielded against climate change is readily available, the more relevant analysis lies in the reversal of this cause and effect, leading to a central research question: how does environmental change influence political opportunity structure? (See *Figure 3*)

Thomas Malthus, a 19th century scholar of demographics and politics, famously predicted with relative accuracy trends in population as they relate to the nature of invaluable resources like food and water (Galor & Weil, 2000, 806). While many scholars have discredited

Malthus' central principle that the human population would be completely wiped out due to insufficient food resources, a principle outlined in 1798, Malthus' theory of the correlation between the swells and troughs of population and resource availability have been demonstrated themselves to hold relative truth (Smith, 2015, 188).

The resources that are necessary to support population growth stem from what can be described as public goods, or "the commons." Most scholars are familiar with the tragedy of the commons theory —resources are exhausted and abused to the point of degradation and at the expense of the entire community in question. In this model, the community in question is global. The tragedy of the commons is happening in real time; exhausted resources and abused environments are yielding not only tangible environmental results but immense shifts in social, political, and economic realms (Kestenbaum, 2009). Still, some scholars argue that any political interest in climate change and the environmental effects that it yields is simply a web of international political interests and personal economic gain (Purdon, n.d.; Adler, n.d.).

While the political climate has a heavy hand in attempting to influence environmental change, the constituents within global communities, many of whom will feel the effects of climate change during their lifetime, or already are feeling the effects of climate change, manifested as drought, flooding, hurricanes, and other natural disasters, are proportionally speaking unconcerned with the impending threat of an environment that is facing potential collapse (Riffkin, 2014).

Environmental Change Manifested: Case Studies

The key to examining this question is to isolate the relationships between the aforementioned factors, allowing us to examine the anticipated correlations between them (Payne, 1996). Specifically, studies which tackle the convergence of environmental and political factors are key.

The central case study in this research project will be Afghanistan. While many scholars acknowledge and bemoan the role of the United States in contributing to a tumultuous political environment that has contributed to an increase in poppy growth and black market activity in the country, the environment is seldom mentioned as a related issue (Durch, 2003; Jakupcak, n.d.). When theorizing on the politics and conditions of countries located in the Middle East and South and Central Asia, many Americans disregard the potential influence of any sort of environmental factors due to deep-seated cultural associations with the presence of terrorism and terrorist groups in these areas (Avraham, 2013; Kamlipour, 2000). Yet another example of politics weighing into environmental change in an overt way, while ignoring the significant yet subtle influence of the environment asserted over the political path of the globe.

Afghanistan functions as such a compelling case study because of the culminating factors of United States' military presence, ongoing civil and political conflict, prominent action from a terrorist organization, and above all, ongoing drought and desertification in the country (Sedra, 2002; Parenti, 2011). The existence of all of these factors in a singular case study makes it easier to isolate the relationship between any of the political variables and the presence of significant environmental change. Central within the Afghanistan case study are the ebbs and flows of drug activity within the state, particularly when we consider the country's alternation between encouraging and banning the growth of opium poppy (Farrel & Thorne, 2005, p. 81).

In his book *Tropic of Chaos*, Christian Parenti delves into the issue of poppy growth and Afghanistan, but gives direct attention to the role of climate change. Parenti takes a multifaceted approach to the issue of poppy growth. Where some scholars claim that the drug trade is driven solely by high profits and greed, Parenti discusses the economic benefits, which often mean just enough income to survive, that accompany the illicit poppy growth (Parenti, 2011, p. 97-99;

Rubin, 2007, p. 57). He also provides unique insight into the so-called police "crackdown" on poppy growth, as his account describes law enforcement taking bribes in lieu of shutting down poppy growing operations (Parenti, 2011, p. 97).

In particular, Parenti wrestles with the influence of drought, explaining that "*poppy uses only one-sixth the water needed for wheat.* That fact alone can explain the drug trade in drought-stricken Afghanistan. Additionally, though grain prices have surged since 2008, poppy still earns more than wheat [Emphasis added]" (Parenti, 2011, p. 107). The global opium crisis can largely be traced back to Afghanistan, as an approximate 90 percent of the world's opium stems from the Afghan economy (Goodhand, 2000, p. 87).

Parenti effectively combines the variables of the black market drug trade, climate change, and violence and unrest in a singular cohesive perspective on the modern global reality and how it came to be. While the focus often tends towards the more recent war in Afghanistan, Parenti points out that war and conflict were present and often rampant in Afghanistan even before America became involved. A major factor of this violence, he maintains, is changing climate and drought conditions (Parenti, 2016). Between corruption, poverty, and a changing climate, seemingly external issues such as the skyrocketing growth of poppy becomes a phenomenon that is scarcely surprising, and becomes highly understandable given the poppy's economic advantages. This type of analysis is unfortuneately rare the scholarly world (Rowe, Dempsey & Gibbs, 2016). However, Parenti's analysis, while highly insightful, often only allows for a conclusion of correlation. The research presented within this project goes further in trying to establish actual causation.

Scholarly Methodology

The compiled basis of scholarly research operates nearly congruently with a case study methodology, particularly favoring case within case analysis (Parenti, 2011). While scholars alternate between quantitative and qualitative analyses, depending on the nature of the data they are examining, the remainder of this research project will operate in qualitative terms as it continues to expand upon the existing conclusions and theories described here. Specifically, this research seeks to apply an analysis similar in nature to that of Parenti to the Afghanistan case study. Additionally, my research will fill in the temporal gap between the publication of *Tropic of Chaos* and the situation in Afghanistan in 2017, as many developments have occurred since Pareniti's publication was released in 2011. Overall, this research project will seek to create a holistic and multifaceted analysis of the nature of environmental change and its influence on political power and opportunity.

Methodology

To examine this research question, data was first gathered about the environmental trends in the region, within the fifteen-year time frame (2000–2015). For the purposes of this project, the term "environment" will refer to the immediate natural conditions in the region, specifically regarding water and arable land. Due to the tumultuous political situation of the country, environmental empirical data is sometimes difficult to obtain, due to lack of resources, incentives, and the ability to keep records of these factors through wartimes ("Afghanistan Initial National Communication", 2011; "Afghanistan", 2009, p. 14). The data represented was taken from multiple sources, and due to gaps in statistics, which made the data unavailable on a yearly basis, drought and desertification are considered through a qualitative lens. This allows the visual representation to be easily compared to the political visual.

Both desertification and drought levels were considered, with trends gathered on an annual basis. This data, which was compiled from both satellite imagery and regional reports on drought and desertification levels, was assessed both numerically and based on descriptions of the severity of the conditions.[1] This data was then visually compiled to represent the patterns and changes in the region in a manner that is easy to grasp. The data is represented in a line chart with two data sets, desertification and drought, represented over the given time period. This will allow for a clear and simple understanding of the progression of environmental conditions in Afghanistan, and will simplify the communication of a significant amount of scientific data to the reader. The visual representation was created through the utilization of a Likert scale, ranging from one to five, to simplify and summarize the nature of the environmental conditions within a given year (see *Figure 4*) (McLeod, n.d.).

Likert Score	Drought (Severity of conditions)	Desertification (severity of conditions)
1	Very Slight/None	Very Slight/None
2	Slight	Slight
3	Moderate	Moderate
4	Severe	Severe
5	Very Severe	Very Severe

Figure 4: Likert Scale Values for Environmental Factors

Next, a similar examination of political variables within the same time frame were conducted. However, factors of political unrest are often represented in less quantitative forms than environmental data. In order to represent this data in a way that is comparable to the environmental factors, the political variables were assigned values on a Likert scale of one to five. Three political variables, poverty rate, terrorist attacks per year, and drug trade, were

[1] In order to quantify highly quantitative data, sources were coded for indications of the how large the area affected by drought and desertification was during that year, as well as for terms such as "critical," "improved," "moderate," and references to the resulting inhabitability of an area.

analyzed on a yearly basis. While these variables, specifically drug trade and poverty rate, are not inherently rooted within political proceedings themselves, they are factors which many scholars agree are so intertwined with political results that they can be described as such (Asiedu, 2006; Fraser, 2006).

In terms of poverty rate, the amount of poverty in the country was assigned a value between one and five, based on a range assigned to each value. Terrorist attacks were considered in the number of attacks per year, and assigned values on the Likert scale accordingly. The drug trade variable was measured in the number of hectares used in opium poppy cultivation. This last factor proved to be the most difficult to measure, as it was difficult to locate accurate records of illicit trade. However, accurate records of the amount of land utilized in cultivating opium poppy is readily available. Compiling this data visually will lend itself to a more parsimonious comparison and analysis of the variables (see *Figure 5*).

Likert Scale	Terror	Opium Hectares	Poverty (percent of population)
1	0-1,999	0-49,999	0-9
2	2,000-3,999	50,000-99,999	10-19
3	4,000-5,999	100,000-149,999	20-29
4	6,000-7,999	150,000-199,999	30-39
5	8,000-9,999	200,000-250,000	40-49

Figure 5: Likert Scale Values for Political

Once the two graphs were created, with representation given to each of the variables discussed, they were overlaid to create one cohesive visual representation of both environmental changes and political unrest and power shifts within the last fifteen years in Afghanistan. From here, it was possible to locate and focus on specific years, events, or regions that stand out as potential markers of significant correlation between environmental and political factors. This includes areas where desertification and drought conditions are rising simultaneously with one of the political variables, as well as areas in which significant changes in environmental factors are followed by clusters of activity in political aspects. In particular, two years within the period stood out in terms of establishing a significant correlation between variables, and each will be treated as miniature case studies within the larger one.

With these key points located, further research followed for each specified time period, with attempts to locate the other factors which may have contributed to the assumed complex causality of the situation. Specifically, factors such as Taliban activity, regional desertification, and international influences were focused on, as they are influencial and necessary factors to consider for which there was a lack of quantitative data on a frequent enough basis to include in the broader visual representation. From here these and other outlying factors were screened against one another to determine if any particular factors stood out as being key influencers which perhaps negated the perceived impact of the environment. Additionally, if environmental change is the common variable between all the cases, it can be assumed that environmental change is exerting at least some influence over the political opportunity and power within Afghanistan.

To examine the research question and investigate how environmental change impacts political opportunity and power, the case study research method will be utilized to conduct a within-case analysis. The central case study focused on will be Afghanistan, within a time frame of the past fifteen years, through lenses of both environmental and political change. This research question involves and requires both quantitative and qualitative aspects, but the analysis will rely primarily on a qualitative analysis. This research study is not seeking to imply sole causation between environmental change and political unrest, but rather to isolate and examine the potential presence of complex causality and identify where causality is occurring between factors.

This method is the best fit for this research question because the case study which was examined is self-contained and the most important comparisons will be those drawn within the case study itself, particularly within this smaller case-study-within-case-study approach. For these purposes, a method that blends qualitative and quantitative factors is superior because of the presence of both quantifiable factors and softer variables that are more difficult to measure. In appropriate scenarios, quantitative methods and data will be included to demonstrate measurements across time and the prevalence of certain activities or trends in a more concrete fashion. Analysis of political opportunity and power have taken on an inherently more qualitative method, but are founded in data whenever possible.

The use of methodology that relies heavily on visual representations of data is valuable for this research question because it compartmentalizes the large number of variables and allows a comparison across content that would be much more difficult from a non-visual perspective. The bulk of this research has been pulled from multiple information sources, both from scholarly journals, relevant local media, and global records of environmental change. This method allows comparisons and conclusions to be drawn about the way in which climate change impacts the case study in question, but also create a larger, more generalized sense of the extent to which environmental trauma poses a threat across disciplines. Ultimately, this method is designed with the intention of explaining the intricacies of how the almost abstract idea of climate change creates very tangible results, not only in the environment but also in political and social results.

According to my hypothesis, there should be notable correlations between environmental changes and political opportunity and power. Specifically, the drug trade and Taliban activity statistics will show the most drastic reaction to the environment, both because of the political opportunity created by the vulnerability of drought, and the agricultural and economic benefits of growing poppy in drought conditions.

Findings

Political Variables in Current Afghanistan

The three political variables being considered in a long-term context are poverty rate, number of terrorist attacks per year, and hectares of land used for the production of opium poppies. I applied the Likert scale method to sort the data by assigning values ranging from one to five, with each number representing a range of values from each respective variable. This allows the political factors to be compared clearly and succinctly. While this does eliminate some of the nuance and fluctuation of some of these statistics, it is preferable, because it makes all the variables easily comparable, and simplifies the data so that general trends or patterns can be more easily recognized.

Figure 6 shows three political variables over a fifteen-year period in Afghanistan as a whole. These factors are terrorist attacks per year, poverty rate in the entire country, and hectares of land used for opium poppy production.







Figure 6 parts 1-3: Political Variables in Afghanistan

While this chart clearly demonstrates the upward trends of these variables, there are notable synchronicities between all factors between 2006 and 2007, and in 2011 (*Figure 7*) ("Afghanistan, 2015; "Afghanistan", 2017). These timeframes stand out as key areas where outside influences may have been influencing the political and social structures within the region at the time, and will be examined further in relation to the environmental data. As is clear from the contrast between *Figure 6* (page 22–23) and *Figure 7* (below), these variables do not necessarily increase simultaneously, but the effect of their combined influence means a steadily worsening effect, as is visible through *Figure 7*.



Figure 7: 2006 and 2011

In addition to generalized factors of economy and dissidence, Afghanistan scores a 0.349 on the Human Development Index, which ranges from 0–1, well below its neighboring countries ("Afghanistan", n.d.). Throughout history, the country has changed hands between traders, Soviets, the United States, and others, seemingly constantly occupied by either external international forces or locally-based terror organizations (Amstutz, 1986; Katzman, 2010). The emergence of the Taliban in the early 1990s, and the group's rule of the country from 1996 to

2001 (at which point occupation by United States forces ousted the group from power), played an instrumental role in sculpting the escalating political tensions that are illustrated in *Figure 7* (page 19) (Laub, 2014).

While factors such as terrorist attacks are clearly linked to Taliban activity, there is also a central connection between opium poppy growth and Taliban power. However, this relationship is anything but linear. The Taliban have alternated between banning and encouraging the drug trade out of Afghanistan, depending on external political factors and the regions within their control (Peters, 2009).

Environmental Variables in Current Afghanistan

While Afghanistan is a state that has often been under global scrutiny, particularly from an American perspective following the 2001 invasion and occupation, there is a notable lack of empirical data, particularly in environmental sectors. According to a 2006 report from the United Nations Environmental Programme, "Empirical data on the extent and impact of desertification in Afghanistan is lacking, [but] broad indicators show that the cost of desertification to Afghanistan is extremely high and ever increasing." Because of the holes in the numerical data for the purpose of visual representation in detecting trends and patterns in the environment of Afghanistan, the Likert scale values assigned to each factor account for qualitative analysis of the severity of the drought or desertification for the year, while considering empirical data when available. Visually, this yields a parsimonious representation of the general trends of drought and desertification in Afghanistan in the past fifteen years (see *Figure 8*) (Dregne, 1986; "Environmental Crisis Looms as Conflict Goes On", 2007; Reykin, 2001).

Figure 8 parts 1-2: Environmental Variables in Afghanistan





As is apparent from *Figure 8*, both drought and desertification levels have fluctuated over the last fifteen years, but overall have a definite upward trend. The increasing severity of these environmental conditions can be assumed to be having an increasingly detrimental effect—

continuous exposure to even a moderate level of drought or desertification would take a considerable toll on a region, therefore, the worsening levels experienced in Afghanistan would be truly problematic.

Confluence of Politics and Environment



Figure 9: Environmental and Political Factors in Afghanistan

In order to isolate specific time periods that may suggest correlation between environmental conditions in Afghanistan and the ever-shifting political structure and power dynamics, the history of each set of factors must be compared (see *Figure 9*).

The general upward trend of the entire chart in *Figure 9* suggests that, if anything, the situation in Afghanistan is growing increasingly tumultuous and escalating in severity. As aforementioned, these variables do not necessarily require a uniform increase or even uniformity in trends, because as *Figure 9* illustrates, the resulting amalgam of hardships yields an increasingly taxing and unbearable environment, both in the natural world and politically.

Based on the chart above, two areas stand out as notable for thei apparent confluence between all or most of the variables represented. The timeframes leading into both 2006 and 2011 suggest symmetry in escalation between both the worsening environmental situation and the complex sociopolitical status (see *Figure 10*).



Figure 10: 2006 and 2011

While there are slight variations in the magnitude of increase in each of these variables, there is a definite symmetry to the upward trend in each. Particularly within 2011, many of the variables are reaching the highest level on the Likert scale that they have during the entirety of the fifteen-year period being examined. Based on the findings from *Figures 7–11*, three primary possibilities exist as to why the factors line up in this way: first, the possibility that, due to the steadily rising rates of desertification, coupled with a complex and escalating political situation, the convergence of these factors in a manner that suggest correlation is purely coincidental; second, that the worsening environmental conditions have fueled the metaphorical fire of sociopolitical conflict; or third, in an echo of the general hypothesis of this research project, that environmental change has exacerbated the existing sociopolitical issues within Afghanistan, and added another dimension to already complex conflicts.

Major Players and Influencers in Afghanistan

Before an analysis of the confluence of political and environmental factors can truly take place, an analysis of the major players and significant power dynamics within Afghanistan must occur. With so many shifts in occupation, power, and constantly transforming conflict, it can be difficult to isolate specific entities as particularly important or influential. As a way of identifying the political entities influential enough to be considered in the larger intersectional spectrum of the research question, information from the most recent Loya Jirga in Afghanistan will be factored into the analysis.

Loya Jirga is a meeting of politically and culturally significant group leaders within the country that historically convenes in order to make big decisions. This "grand council" (the meaning of Loya Jirga in Pashto), meets to make decisions regarding war declarations, significant social or political reforms, or the election of a new king. The most recent Loya Jirga within the fifteen-year timeframe of this study took place in 2013, when officials met to discuss a security pact with the United States (Bezhan, 2013).

The Taliban has already been identified as a key player in shaping the country's reaction to climate change, but, for more mainstream groups, consideration must be given to the parties and groups represented during the most recent Loya Jirga in 2013. Even though Afghanistan now has an elected parliament, which did not exist during the frequent historical Loya Jirgas, the tradition is one that is deeply rooted in the country's culture. While major players such as the Taliban are invited to send representatives to the meetings, they never do. Most frequently, the groups in attendance are the representative of the party in power, from parliamentary to local government level. Additionally, opposition parties are invited, though frequently mainstream opposition figures boycott the event (Nordland, 2013).

The range of mainstream political parties and movements in Afghanistan provides a starting point for analyzing entities which may have played a significant role in the trends of sociopolitical variables between 2000 and 2015.

Rural and Urban Communities in Afghanistan

It should be noted that while Afghanistan's poverty rate is nationally very high, there is a severe distributional inequality between urban and rural communities. Urban areas in Afghanistan have significantly lower rates of poverty, while rural areas see rates above 50 percent. Indicators of development such as literacy rates and poverty rates are grim in urban areas, but rise to astounding levels in rural communities (Kline, 2015). Additionally, key cultural differences between these communities, as well as typical climate patterns within the region, greatly affect the level to which these communities interact, or can successfully make strides in development ("Rural Poverty in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan", 2014).

So what does this mean for environmental change? Rural areas are hit much harder in terms of tangible effects of climate change, as drought makes food security even harder to obtain for subsistence farmers and pastoralists, lifestyles which are already difficult. In rural regions, which typically rely much more on the environment for survival, food and water becomes much more difficult to procure in times of extreme drought. Recent history in Afghanistan has yielded steadily worsening conditions that only add obstructions to these difficulties ("Afghanistan- Climate Change: What Does it Mean for Rural Livelihoods and Food Security?", 2016).

In addition to issues of food scarcity and barriers to subsistence agriculture, climate change threatens Afghan citizens with a heightened risk of natural disaster. Rising temperatures lead to glacier melt and runoff, creating a higher risk of flooding. Floods are not only detrimental to food and livelihood sources, but are also highly dangerous and often lead to casualties ("Afghanistan- River Flood", 2016).

Isolating Timeframes

As the previous findings have reinforced, isolating the intersectional crossroads between the specific environmental and political variables being observed is anything but simple. The party in power, as well as mainstream opposition, and radical groups sculpt the nature of politics within the country during a given time (Nordland, n.d.). The location of a community, either urban or rural, impacts the degree to which the community feels the strain of drought, desertification, or poverty. The specific geographic location within the country of Afghanistan is also an important factor when considering the severity of environmental factors, as the diverse landscape within the country results in isolated areas receiving an overwhelming majority of the negative environmental effects ("Afghanistan: Support to the prevention, mitigation and response to natural disasters in Farah province- Drought Hazard", 2011); *Relief Web*, 2013). Therefore, when isolating the specific years which stood out as potentially significant, it is important to consider the complex causality at work, and consider these additional factors when analyzing 2006 and 2011.

2006 Case study

As drought conditions began increasing in the early 2000s, the regions most harshly affected were those in southern Afghanistan, particularly the province of Zabul. Southern provinces within the country are also the most likely to be affected by flooding (Kline, 2015). 2006 was a year of escalation for environmental factors within the country, both in terms of drought and desertification, but individuals in the rural southeastern provinces were the most adversely affected by the changes. Between 2002 and 2005, many refugees from these areas attempted to return to their homes, hoping to reestablish their livelihoods and homes. Migration, refugees, and refugees returning home likely influenced the upward shift in poverty rates as the economy struggled to adjust to such changes (“Rural Poverty in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan”, 2014).

Amid escalating conflict between the Taliban, al-Qaida fighters, and the Afghan government, NATO peacekeeping forces extended into southeastern Afghanistan, taking over from the American-led forces previously in the region. In response, a series of suicide terror attacks against the international forces came from the Taliban, accounting for the increase in terror attacks that is clear in *Figure 10* (above) (“A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan”, 2011).

Growing Taliban activity, coupled with an influx of citizens migrating back to their homes, led to a spike in opium poppy cultivation. Families living in poverty sought to ameliorate their situation by growing the crop with the promise of financial gain, and more importantly, Taliban protection as tensions and violence increased. It was common practice for Taliban forces to promise credit and protections to farmers willing to plant and cultivate opium poppy, and the situation during 2006 meant that many families accepted this offer (Schweich, 2006).

The convergence of worsening environmental and political conditions during 2006 reveals a considerable amount of correlation. Worsening poverty rates can be attributed to environmentally and politically-triggered migration, as well as deepening drought impacting the agriculture sector. Following this, peacekeeping forces extending into the southeastern provinces garnering increased tensions between international actors and the Taliban, leading to more terrorist attacks and a spike in opium poppy production to fund the radical group.

2011 Case Study

2011 yielded a similar combination of factors, but within a different context. By this time, United States forces had been in the country for a decade: the conflict in Afghanistan had evolved and changed. The previous year, in 2010, a Loya Jirga took place in an effort to promote peace and work out a negotiated settlement with Taliban forces ("World Report Afghanistan: 2011", 2011). As both drought and desertification continued to increase, poverty rates and hunger grew. However, because of the enormous ongoing conflict, and all of the international attention drawn by it, much of the world, aside from international relief-based organizations, was unaware of or ignored the severity of the drought, desertification, and poverty conditions, ("Afghanistan Drought – 2011", 2011).

Opium production skyrocketed, in the wake of frantic Taliban forces struggling to maintain power and an impoverished civilian body struggling with the devastating agricultural effects of drought. Between 2010 and 2011, despite efforts to eradicate opium production, production swelled and financial yields increased. The number of provinces involved in the cultivation of opium poppy also increased ("Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011", 2011).

2011 mirrored many of the same parallels as 2006, but increased international involvement and tension clouds the direct environmental correlation. Escalating war and conflict made it more difficult to consider, measure, and aid the worsening drought and desertification conditions. This, in turn, maked it more difficult to draw conclusions about the relationship between the environmental and political variables.

Discussion

Environment as a Political Indicator and Influencer

The findings from this project indicate that there is some measurable correlation between the environmental change and the sociopolitical conflicts and power shifts within a region. However, Afghanistan is a relatively unique case study. The characteristics that make it an appropriate case study for this project also complicate the application of the findings to other countries. Prominent environmental changes and struggles, coupled with highly active and dynamic shifts in political power provide plentiful data for research, but are characteristics not often shared with other countries.

The specific variables, both environmental and political, from this study are ones that overlap in logical ways. In a country that is largely sustained by agriculture, it makes sense that rising drought and desertification would raise the poverty rate along with it. These variables also carry logical correlations with drug trade out of Afghanistan. As opium poppy is relatively drought-resistant, and more profitable than other crops, individuals experiencing poverty or suffering from drought conditions, and rising poverty would certainly contribute to participation in the opium market. A process influenced by encouragement or pressure from the Taliban (Parenti, 2011).

Hypothetically, the prolonged conflict and suffering of the Afghan people from a political perspective during the fifteen-year period analyzed could have been ameliorated to some degree if such harsh environmental conditions had not been present. While this is not proof of the singular presence of causation, and the political conflicts would have likely existed with or without a declining environment, it is likely that these conflicts would have occurred at a smaller magnitude, or been more easily remedied. The absence of drought and desertification, which essentially trapped the general population of Afghanistan into trends of poverty, hunger, and participation in opium cultivation, could have drastically reduced key aspects of the ongoing struggle in Afghanistan, particularly in relation to reducing Taliban power.

Ultimately, the links between these variables are not particularly innovative or difficult to understand. What is original is the use of the variables to *see* correlations or *predict* outcomes. Failure to acknowledge environmental change as a major political influencer is arguably an oversight, and does not utilize the easily-accessible tools afforded to researchers. Moving forward, this method could benefit from application to countries and regions with less prominent environmental change and political unrest.

Countries with the same conglomeration of political conflict and declining environmental factors exist around the world; for example, this pattern crops up in Chad, Syria, and Kenya (Taub, 2017; Eriksen & Lind, 2009; Gleick, 2014). The ability to extrapolate the information presented in the findings of this project, and then apply it to a variety of unique case studies would present the opportunity to evolve the way in which scholars analyze sociopolitical unrest and power dynamics.

In order to apply and utilize the potential warning system of large-scale environmental change, the general public within the developed world must acknowledge and push for research and linkage between the two often unrelated systems. The public wields the two-dimensional power that Lukes (2005) speaks of. Unfortunately, it seems that the necessary degree of concern cannot be achieved until the drought is happening in *your* province, or the desertification is rendering *your* soil useless.

To act proactively, as I suggest, requires initiative from those within each respective field to elicit a shift in perspective that would encourage an approach to global political conflict that includes environmental factors as a central influence. As academics, scholars, and citizens of the developed world, there is a responsibility to push for the viability of any factors that can serve as a warning system. Environmental changes are exactly that: warning systems that hint at approaching political turmoil. In addition to the concern for the planet and natural world, large-scale shifts in the characteristics of the human habitat should serve as an indicator that political unrest may follow. Experts in the various fields have a responsibility to advocate for research of this intersection, which will lead to wider concern, acknowledgement, and ultimately a larger base of possible solutions or remedies.

If saving the planet was not already a compelling enough incentive to combat climate change in a serious way, more extreme political conflict certainly should be. The modern age affords scholars a multitude of information and variables to consider. While it can be difficult to parse out the relevant or important factors among an amalgam of variables, it is important not to overlook a seemingly distant entity that could be exerting influence over the question at hand. The flap of a butterfly's wing can cause a tornado, miles away.

References

A Historical Timeline of Afghanistan. (2011). PBS. Retrieved from https://www.pbs.org/newshour /politics/asia-jan-june11-timeline-afghanistan.

Afghanistan: Climate Change Knowledge Portal. (2015). World Bank Group. Retrieved from http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportal/index.cfm?page=country_historical_climate&ThisCCode=AFG.

Afghanistan - Climate Change: What Does it Mean for Rural Livelihoods and Food Security?. (2016). World Food Programme. https://www.wfp.org /content/climate-change-afghanistan-what-does-it-mean-rural-livelihoods-and-food-security.

Afghanistan Drought- 2011. (2011). Humanitarian Response. Retrieved from https://www .humanitarianresponse.info/es/disaster/dr-2011-000150-afg.

Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011. (2011). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afghanistan_opium _survey_2011_web.pdf.

Afghanistan- River Flood. (2016). Think Hazard. Retrieved from http://thinkhazard.org/en/report/1-afghanistan/FL.

Afghanistan: Support to the prevention, mitigation and response to natural disasters in Farah province - Drought hazard 2011 (map). (2013). Relief Web. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int /map/afghanistan/afghanistan-support-prevention-mitigation-and-response-natural-disasters-farah-2.

Amstutz, J.B. (1986). Afghanistan: the First Five Years of Soviet Invasion. *Defense Technical Information Center.*

Asiedu, Elizabeth. (2006). Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: The Role of Natural Resources, Market Size, Government Policy, Institutions and Political Instability.*The World Economy*. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2006.00758.x/full.

Avraham, Eli. (2013). Crisis Communication, Image Restoration, and Battling Stereotypes of Terror and War. *American Behavioral Scientist* 57 (9), 1350–1357.

Bell, J., & Waters, S. (2014). Doing your research project: A guide for first-time researchers (6th ed.). New York, NY: Open University Press.

Bezhan, Frud. (2013). Loya Jirga—an Afghan Tradition Explained. Retrieved from https://www.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-loya-jirga-explainer/25174483.html.

Birkland, Thomas A. (1998). Focusing Events, Mobilization, and Agenda Setting. *Journal of Public Policy* 18 (1), 58–74.

Bohle, Hans G., Thomas E. Downing, Michael J. Watts. (2004). Climate Change and Social Vulnerability: Toward a Sociology and Geography of Food Insecurity. *Global Environmental Change* 4 (1), 37–48. doi: 10.1016/0959-3780(94)90020-5.

Boykoff, Maxwell T., and Jules M. Boykoff. (2007). Climate Change and Journalistic Norms: A Case-Study of US Mass-Media Coverage. *Geoforum* 38 (6), 1190–1204.

Christian-Smith, Juliet, Morgan Levy, and Peter H. Gleick. *Impacts of the California Drought from 2007–2009*. Pacific Institute. 59–68.

Colton, M. (1989). Attitudes of special foster parents and residential staff towards children. Children & Society, 3(1), 3-18. doi:10.1111/j.1099-0860.1989.tb00565.x

Dowding, Keith. (2012). Why Should We Care About this Definition of Power? *Journal of Political Power* 5 (1), 119–135. doi: 10.1080/2158379X.2012.661917.

Dregne, H. E. (1986). Desertification of Arid Lands. *Physics of Desertification*. http://www.ciesin.org/docs/002-193/002-193.html.

Durch, William J. (2003). Peace and Stability Operations in Afghanistan: Requirements and Force Options. *The Henry L. Stimson Center*.

Environmental Crisis Looms as Conflict Goes On. (2007). *Integrated Regional Information Networks*. Retrieved from http://www.irinnews.org/report/73481/afghanistan-environmental-crisis-looms-conflict-goes.

Eriksen, Siri, Jeremy Lind. (2009). Adaptation as a Political Process: Adjusting to Drought and Conflict in Kenya's Drylands. *Environmental Management* 43 (5). doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00267-008-9189-0

Farrel, Graham, John Thorne. (2005). Where have all the flowers gone?: evaluation of Taliban crackdown against opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. *International Journal of Drug Policy* 16 (2), 81–91. doi: 10.1016/j.drugpo.2004.07.007.

Firewicz, Sharon L. (2009). Poppy Eradication in Afghanistan: why isn't it working? *Defense Technical Information Center*, 1–49.

Foucault, Michel. (2002). Panopticism in David Bartholomae and Anthony Petrosky (eds.) *Ways of Reading*, New York: Bedford/St. Martins.

Galor, Oded, and David N. Weil. (2000). Population, Technology, and Growth: From Malthusian Stagnation to the Demographic Transition and beyond. *The American Economic Review* 90 (4), 806–28.

Gleick, Peter H. (2014). Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria. *American Meteorological Society*. doi: https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-13-00059.1.

Goodhand, Jonathan. (2000). From Holy War to Opium War? A Case Study of the Opium Economy in North-eastern Afghanistan. *Disasters* 24 (2), 87–102. doi: 10.1111/1467-7717.0013.

Hansen, Ander, David Machin. (n.d.) Visually branding the environment: climate change as a marketing opportunity. *Discourse Studies* 10 (6), 777 – 794.

Höijer, Birgitta. (2010). Emotional Anchoring and Objectification on the Media Reporting on Climate Change. *Public Understanding of Science* 19 (6), 717–731. doi: 10.1177/0963662509348863.

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan National Environmental Protection Agency. (2011). Afghanistan Initial National Communication. *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*. Retrieved from http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/afgnc1.pdf.

Jakupcak, Matthew. (n.d.) Posttraumatic Stress and Its Relationship to Physical Health Functioning in a Sample of Iraq and Afghanistan War Veterans Seeking Postdeployment VA Health Care. *The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease* 196 (5), 425–428.

Jones, Jeffrey M. (2015). Americans Don’t Attribute Cold Weather to Climate Change. Gallup. Retrieved from www.gallup.com/poll.

Kamalipour, Yahya R. (2000). The TV Terrorist: Media Images of Middle Easterners. *Global Dialogue* 2 (4), 88–96.

Katzman, Kenneth. (2010). Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy. *Defense Technical Information Center*.

Keller, Edmond J. (n.d.) Drought, War, and the Politics of Famine in Ethiopia and Eritrea. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 30 (4), 609–624.

Kestenbaum, David. (2009). Climate Change is Victim of ‘Tragedy of the Commons.’ NPR Oregon Public Broadcasting, Morning Edition.

Kingdon, John W. (2003). Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies. *Longman Classics in Political Science*.

Kline, Jordan. (2015). Poverty in Afghanistan. The Borgen Project. Retrieved from https://borgenproject.org/poverty-in-afghanistan/.

Lukes, Steven. (2005). *Power: A Radical View*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Merino, Jose G. Ashish Jha, Elizabeth Loder, Kamran Abbasi. (2017). Standing Up For Science in the Era of Trump. *British Medical Journal*.

Meyer, David S. Suzanne Staggenborg. (1996). Movements, Countermovements, and the Structure of Political Opportunity. *American Journal of Sociology* 101 (6), 1628–1660. doi: 10.1086/230869.

McLeod, Saul. (2008). Likert Scale. Simply Psychology. Retrieved from https://www.simplypsychology.org/likert-scale.html.

Moore, David, Susan Fraser. (2006). Putting at risk what we know: Reflecting on the drug-using subject in harm reduction and its political implications. *Social Sciences and Medicine*. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0277953605006751.

Morris, Peter. (2006). Steven Lukes on the Concept of Power. *Political Studies Review* 4 (2), 124–135. doi: 10.1111/j.1478-9299.2006.000104.x.

Nordland, Rod. (2013). Afghan Gathering Steeped in Tradition, and Consent. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/world/asia/an-afghan-gathering-steeped-in-tradition-and-consent.html.

Parenti, Christian. (2016). Afghan Wonderland. Middle East Research and Information Project.

Parenti, Christian. (2011). *Tropic of Chaos: Climate Change and the New Geography of Violence.* New York: Nation Books.

Payne, Rodger A. (1996). Deliberating Global Environmental Impacts. *Journal of Peace Research*, 33 (2), 131–132.

Peters, Gretchen. (2009). How Opium Profits the Taliban. *Peace Works* 1 (62).

Reinhart, RJ. (2017). Partisan Gap on Environment Widens After Trump's Election. Gallup. Retrieved from www.gallup.com/poll.

Revkin, Andrew C. (2001). A Nation Challenged: Afghan Drought Inflicts Its Own Misery. New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/16/world/a-nation-challenged-climate-afghan-drought-inflicts-its-own-misery.html.

Riffkin, Rebecca. (2014). Climate Change Not a Top Worry in the U.S. Gallup. Retrieved from www.gallup.com/poll.

Rodriguez, Lizette, Marcel Horowitz, Dorina Espinoza, Alberto Aguilera, Adela de la Torre, and Lucia L. Kaiser. (2015). The Impact of the California Drought on Food Security Among Rural Families of Mexican Origin. *Journal of Applied Research on Children: Informing Policy for Children at Risk* 6 (2).

Rowe, James K., Jessica Dempsey, and Peter Gibbs. (2016). The Power of Fossil Fuel Divestment (And its Secret). *A World to Win: Contemporary Social Movements and Counter-Hegemon*.

Rubin, Barnett R. (2007). Saving Afghanistan. *Foreign Affairs* 86 (1), 57–78. www.jstor.org/stable/20032211.

Rural Poverty in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. (2014). Rural Poverty Portal. Retrieved from http:/ /www.ruralpovertyportal.org/web/rural-poverty-portal/country/home/tags/afghanistan.

Scheufele, D. A. and D. Tewksbury. (2007). Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models. *Journal of Communication* 1 (57), 9–20. doi:10.1111 /j.0021-9916.2007.00326.x

Schweich, Thomas A. (2006). Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006. U.S. Department of State Archive. Retrieved from https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/inl/rls/rm/72067.htm.

Sedra, Mark. (2002). Challenging the Warlord Culture: Security Sector Reform in Post-Taliban Afghanistan. Germany: Bonn International Center for Conversion. 4–49.

Seyfang, Gill. (2003). Environmental Mega-conferences—from Stockholm to Johannesburg and Beyond. *Global Environmental Change* 13 (3), 223–228.

Smith, Pete. (2015). Malthus is Still Wrong: We Can Feed a World of 9–10 Billion, But Only by Reducing Food Demand. *Proceedings of the Nutrition Society* 1 (74), 187–190.

Sustainable Development Goals. (2017). Afghanistan. Voluntary National Review at the High Level Political Forum. Retrieved from https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content /documents/16277Afghanistan.pdf.

Swift, Art. (2014). Americans Again Pick Environment Over Economic Growth. Gallup. Retrieved from http://news.gallup.com/poll/168017/americans-again-pick-environment-economic-growth.aspx?g_source=&g_medium=&g_campaign=tiles.

Taub, Ben. (2017). The Emergency: Around Lake Chad, the world's most complex humanitarian disaster is unfolding. New Yorker. Retrieved from www.archives.newyorker.com.

The Consequences of Climate Change. (2017). NASA: Global Climate Change.

UN Data. (2015). Afghanistan. World Statistics Pocketbook. Retrieved from http://data.un.org/CountryProfile.aspx.

UNEP, NEPA, GEF. (2009). Afghanistan. *National Capacity Needs Self-Assessment for Global Environmental Management (NCSA) and National Adaptation Programme of Action for Climate Change (NAPA) Final Joint Report*. (14). Retrieved from http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/afg01.pdf.

World Report Afghanistan: 2011. (2011). Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2011/country-chapters/afghanistan.

Annika Bratton is a Politics and Government student at Pacific University in Forest Grove, Oregon. She will graduate in May of 2018 and will continue on as a secondary science teacher with Teach for America. Annika is passionate about social justice and international relations, and hopes to pursue a graduate degree in Peace Studies later in her career. Annika's undergraduate years have been defined by her activist involvement with contemporary social issues. She has enjoyed working as the head coach for Banks Youth Dance Team for the past two years.

Vindication for Anthropocentrism: The Humanitarian Case for a Pre-emptive Treaty Ban on Autonomous Weapons

Dylan Edmonds, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada

Abstract

This paper will build on a growing chorus of stakeholder voices in civil society, academia and disarmament forums advocating for a pre-emptive treaty ban on lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs). Fundamentally, this piece's raison d'être is to address a disparity in the literature, that being the very little attention dedicated to conceptualizing the most feasible strategy which could lead to a pre-emptive ban. Drawing on International Humanitarian Law's established norms of military necessity, Marten's Law and the emerging norm of meaningful human control, this paper makes a compelling humanitarian case for a treaty ban. Framing theory, a theoretical lens borrowed from Goffman's micromobilization theory, is then invoked to make the ultimate argument that civil society's framing of autonomous weapons as a humanitarian threat is the surest strategy towards a pre-emptive treaty ban.

Keywords

International Humanitarian Law, Civil society, Lethal autonomous weapons, Framing theory

Introduction

As the burgeoning debate over artificial intelligence (AI) gains traction in the public sphere, there has been an endless supply of pundits and scholars offering their take on the actual and projected effects of this emerging phenomenon. Whatever their prognosis, these commentators have focused primarily on AI's potential to further automate and autonomize society in peacetime. On the periphery of these discussions, due perhaps to the popular perception that it is little more than an abstraction, is the ethical debate over the increased interfacing of weapons development and AI research. AI has begun to push the boundaries of weapons' autonomous features, and these autonomous modes are part and parcel of what has been dubbed the Third Military Revolution – after gunpowder and nuclear weapons (Future of Life Institute, 2015). Despite most conservative estimates predicting that fully autonomous Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWs), or weapons that if fully realized, can identify and select targets without the involvement of a human operator are still twenty years away, this paper will build on the chorus of civil society, scholarly, citizenry and even military voices pushing for a pre-emptive treaty ban on this nascent technology (The Economist, 2018) (Lin, Abney and Beckey, 2012). Since the United Nations' (UN) Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons' (CCW)[1] now five year-long study of the issue has exposed the geopolitical fault lines preventing any progress towards a

[1] For the very first time, UN member states debated the rise of autonomous weapons systems at the United Nations Human Rights Council (HRC) on May 30th 2013. Deliberations were prompted by an alarming report on the growing relevance of autonomous weapons issued by the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions which concluded: "If left too long to its own devices, the matter [of prohibiting autonomous weapons] will, quite literally, be taken out of human hands" (Heyns, 2013, p.21). As awareness of autonomous weapons grew, the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) decided to take up the issue in November of 2013. The CCW examination of autonomous weapons has drawn repeated criticism for its lack of progress brought on by cancelled meetings due to funding aberrations, myopic goal setting, and most recently, unambitious governmental expert meetings.

ban or constructive dialogue, there has been a deepening sentiment that International Law is unable to keep pace with technical innovations.

Fundamentally, this piece's raison d'être is addressing a lacuna in the literature, that being the very little attention that has been dedicated to conceptualizing the most feasible strategy which could conceivably lead to a pre-emptive treaty ban. The ancillary argument to this ultimate end is as follows: this paper build a humanitarian case against autonomous weapons by drawing on Professor Ian Kerr's military necessity argument as derived from International Humanitarian Law (IHL)[2], also known as the Laws of War, and Professor Peter Asaro's claim that these weapons would infringe on the emerging IHL principle of meaningful human control. Once this humanitarian case is adumbrated, this text will assume a theoretical lens known as Framing Theory to argue that civil society is the most suitable vehicle to drive the autonomous weapons' treaty ban movement because of its recent successes in framing disarmament issues as humanitarian concerns, and then crystallizing this humanitarian reframing into treaties with a strong legal footing.

Terminology

Before launching into the humanitarian case for an autonomous weapons treaty ban, certain terminology must be defined. It is crucial to understand what is exactly being said when scholars note that weapons development has progressed from automatic to semi-autonomous, and in the

[2] Although there are overlaps, International Humanitarian Law is categorically separate from other major fields of International Law, such as International Criminal Law and International Human Rights Law, among others. A definition of International Humanitarian Law, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, "International humanitarian law is a set of rules which seek, for humanitarian reasons, to limit the effects of armed conflict. It protects persons who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities and restricts the means and methods of warfare" (ICRC, 2004).

span of two decades at most, we will have the technological prowess to develop fully autonomous LAWs. Automated weapon systems follow a script so to speak, or a set of instructions in software programming whose confines dictate the outcome of all scenarios (The Economist, 2018). Many of today's anti-aircraft defense systems incorporate automatic features; a rather ubiquitous example in the United States (US) military arsenal is the MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System, which when mounted on navy vessels, follows a programming script to shoot down approaching enemy missiles and aircrafts (Bills, 2014, p.181). On the other end of autonomy's spectrum is a fully autonomous LAWs with general AI. According to the US Defense Science Board (2016), to be a LAW, "[the] system must have the capability to independently compose and select among different courses of action to accomplish goals based on its knowledge and understanding of the world, itself, and the situation" (p.4). These LAWs would be supplied with general AI, which theoretically execute any intellectual task humankind has historically undertaken. Currently, humans have managed to, in only a short time, create partially autonomous weapons with narrow AI. Narrow AI follows algorithms for a prescribed task similar in a way to scripted automation, but narrow AI is a far more dynamic structure enabling machine learning. For now, humans retain control of the lethal faculties of these weapons.

A final specification to be had is that of the further breakdown of general/narrow autonomy. This can be broken down in the following three groupings: man *in* the loop, man *on* the loop, and man *off* the loop. Man *in* the loop LAWs are only capable of acting after human authorization, such as the South Korean SGR-A1 robot which populates the Korean Demilitarized Zone (Bills, 2014, p.182). In the event that an enemy approaches the robot, the SGR-A1 can command the person to put their hands up and surrender. Should the enemy not pay heed, prior to initiating lethal force, the SGR-AI must receive authorization from a human in the loop. Conversely, man *on* the loop systems do not require human authorization prior to administering lethal force but a human is actively monitoring the weapon's activities. The United States X-47B UCAV drone fits this description in the sense that the drone makes its own decisions, e.g. the route it takes, but always with human oversight (Bills, 2014, p.183). Fully-fledged autonomy, as defined by the full removal of "human controllers from lethal decision-making altogether" (Carpenter, 2016, 58), are fully as defined by a man *off* the loop system, does not yet exist and contradicts the official policies of the P5 countries, who purport they will maintain effective control of the weapons they deploy (Wallach, 2017). This paper is advocating for a ban on autonomous weapons that fall within the man *off* the loop category but remains cognizant of the spectrum-like quality of these categorizations, and would therefore advise that man *on* the loop systems, which do not provide humans the actual possibility of asserting their control, also be proscribed. Man *off* the loop systems and man *on* the loop systems could be powered by either narrow or general AI.

Characteristic to most global issues, where a panoply of stakeholders jockey for their own policy position, definitions are the subject of rancorous debate. The United Kingdom (UK) delegation to the CCW has maintained that autonomy must be defined in its most extreme version as "near humanlike capabilities," whereas the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, an umbrella civil society organization, defines autonomy in a similar respect to the concept of man in the loop (Wallach, 2017, p.29). Thus, it is impossible to give a legal definition of autonomy at this point in time, and even the relatively innocuous definition provided in this paper could garner some controversy when deciding its applicability to various weapons systems.

The Humanitarian Case for a Pre-emptive Ban on Autonomous Weapons

For those scholars who are either non-committal or who have voiced their outright dissent to a treaty banning autonomous weapons, their reasoning is suffused with a notion of inevitability. To quote two of these scholars: “The certain yet gradual development and deployment of these systems, as well as the humanitarian advantages created by the precision of some systems, make some proposed responses – such as prohibitory treaties – unworkable as well as ethically questionable” (Anderson & Waxman, 2012, p.36). This assumption that a certain technological development is *certain* represents a technological determinism of sorts, where societies become powerless, captured audiences resigned to the technological developments they presumably engineer. From the vantage point of today’s technologically-driven society, the gift of hindsight affords us an alcove where we can make these deterministic assumptions. Indeed, autonomous systems are well on their way to development, but as Peter Asaro (2012), a philosopher and historian of science and technology, points out, it is problematic to make the assumption that deployment proceeds thereafter. Even when technologies do take hold in a society for a short while, this does not assure their persistence. For instance, only a few decades after the introduction of guns in Japan by two Portuguese adventurers in 1543, the country was home to the most preeminent gun technology in the world. Soon after this technological diffusion, the Japanese government, bolstered by a nationalist movement, restricted foreign products, including guns, until Japan was nearly gun-less (Diamond, 1999). In short, though there is a high likelihood that autonomous weapon systems will eventually be deployed, this does not equate to inevitability as national weapons reviews, existing IHL norms and a possible pre-emptive ban all pose existing and hypothetical hurdles.

Some scholars, such as Robert Arkin, are not only convinced of the inevitability of autonomous weapons' deployment, but consider it to be probable that these weapons will respect the foundational principles of IHL, namely discrimination and proportionality. Discrimination requires the capacity during military operations to distinguish non-combatants from combatants, while proportionality requires that the damage caused through the use of force in a military operation be commensurate with the "strategic importance of the mission" (Kerr & Szilagyi, 2016, p.343). Arkin offers a unique perspective to this debate as he heads a lab on the frontier of AI research, which seeks to test autonomous weapon systems in war-like scenarios. In a 2009 book he stated that if autonomous systems were properly inculcated with an ability to adhere to IHL, they could outperform human soldiers with respect to humaneness (Arkin, 2009). More recently, Arkin (2011) made the claim that due to this superior adherence to IHL, "if the technology is developed properly it could potentially lower non-combatant casualties" (p.10). On the face of it, these are indictments against any argument for a pre-emptive treaty ban. Certainly, autonomous weapons would face glaring challenges in superseding humankind's ability to respect these principles. Discrimination is made even more complicated in modern, urban warfare where non-state actors are increasingly entangled in protean, vicious armed conflicts. As for the principle of proportionality, IHL is equally nuanced. The International Committee of the Red Cross' guidelines for determining whether a civilian is a legitimate target are harrowingly complex and include three requirements that must be met: threshold of harm, direct causation and belligerent nexus (Asaro, 2012).

Whether the difficulties in meeting these IHL norms are surmountable remain to be seen, but this surely constitutes a glaring weakness of this presumptive argument. Notwithstanding these assumptions, the debate of whether autonomous weapons could meet or exceed human adherence to IHL is a red herring and, aside from much speculation, does little to advance the cause for or against a treaty ban. Asaro (2012) succinctly summarizes the inherent digression in this debate in saying that:

> Given the complexity of these systems, and our inability to foresee how they might act in complex operational environments, unanticipated circumstances, and ambiguous situations, there is a further difficulty – how we can test and verify that a newly designed autonomous weapon system meets the requirements imposed by IHL. (p. 692-693)

The argument for autonomous weapons' ability to faithfully follow IHL's cornerstone values lacks the empirical basis it requires to be sound. Thankfully for the proponents of a treaty ban, this paper will outline a humanitarian appeal that does not fall victim to the same empirical paucity. At best, pursuit of this speculative argumentation broaches, albeit tangentially, the ethical debate that rages at the heart of LAWs – that being whether human decision-making and responsibility for lethal violence should be delegated to non-human entities. With this transition from a *can*: can LAWs adhere to the principles of IHL, to a normative *ought*: ought it be acceptable for LAWs to initiate lethal force without human oversight, the debate over LAWs regains the anthropocentric lens it so desperately requires. The time is now fortuitous to turn to the humanitarian arguments which address this crucial question, ones which reemphasize humankind, in both its combatant and non-combatant forms, as the overriding consideration in any disarmament discussion.

Although we cannot know for sure if LAWs would be superior followers of IHL than humans, we can determine beyond a reasonable doubt that their availability would almost certainly be a force multiplier for the IHL principle of military necessity. Put bluntly by Professor Pagallo (2011), "[i]f we have expendable mechanical mercenaries that we can send into battle instead of our children, how could we not do so?" (p.303). According to Nils Melzer (2009), the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, military necessity can be defined as "only that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict [IHL], that is required in order to achieve the legitimate purpose of the conflict" (p.79). As a disruptive technology, the existence of LAWs, without adequate legal devices to curtail their usage, would expand the "scope of inclusion for what can prospectively be perceived as 'necessary'" (Kerr & Szilagyi, 2016, p.359). Even the most cursory glance at the history of military technologies trend towards this disturbing pattern – once a new military technology is included in the arsenal of choice, the perspective on what is deemed militarily necessary to reaching a stated objective shifts even if this technology brings greater casualties (Kerr & Szilagyi, 2016, 363).

An illuminating example of this is the introduction of the submarine. As was custom in International Maritime Law, the vanquisher was obligated to rescue the vanquished by bringing them aboard at the end of a battle (Kerr & Szilagyi, 2016).[3] This humanitarian approach to regulating war at sea was impaired by the introduction of submarines whose small cabin spaces could not accommodate enemy crew. To borrow an economics' term, the submarine's competitive advantage is in its stealth – a quality that would no longer be maximized if it was forced to surface (Kerr & Szilagyi, 2016). The usage of submarines proliferated in the Second World War, and in order to ensure the submarine's strategic potential, the notion of rescuing sinking enemy crew was soon forgotten. As submarines became deeply entrenched in the naval strategies of all the great powers, the perspective which was manifested that despite the added

[3] This custom was even codified in the 1930 and 1936 London Naval Treaties.

casualties which submarines wrought, these were an indispensable weapon. In other words, they become a military necessity and force multiplier. Tragically, with the sinking of this humanitarian custom of saving overboard crew, countless drowned at the hands of submarines. This is but one example of how the malleable principle of military necessity shifted with the inclusion of a new technology, and as a result, humanitarianism at sea was derogated.

With prospective LAWs raising the humanitarian stakes, recourse can be found in the Martens clause, IHL's explicit reference to its moral origins. First appearing in the 1899 Hague Convention II on the Laws and Customs of War on Land in 1899, it states that:

> In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience. (Human Rights Watch, 2012, section 2, para.13)

The International Court of Justice has gone so far as to connect the Martens Clause with the proliferation of weapons technology by asserting that this customary law can be an effective preventative measure against growing lethality (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Central to this paper's first argument is that the fact that Martens Clause renders a powerful acknowledgement of "the principles of humanity" and "the dictates the public conscience" as legitimate sources of new IHL (Human Rights Watch, 2012, section 2, para.13). What emerges then from this is a more visible role for civil society, the traditional champion of humanitarian causes, in spearheading movements aimed at assessing the alignment of weapons to IHL's moral underpinnings.

Despite its notorious ambiguity, to arrive at any sort of semblance of the public conscious, various actors from public forums such as civil society must actively participate in disarmament conferences. Civil society groups and coalitions, such as The Campaign to Stop

Killer Robots, are well-suited to identify the existing and emerging norms and dictates of public conscious as many of these groups work at the grassroots level, reifying individual and stakeholder perspectives. However, as alluded to above, the Martens Clause is notoriously amorphous. Human Rights Watch, one of the first organizations to make the case for an autonomous weapons ban, was cautious in relying too heavily on the Martens Clause simply because of its subjective quality. For example, Professor Peter Assaro (2016) warns that one must not equate public conscious to public opinion, and cautions against the manipulative ways in which public opinion is typically solicited. Thus, the reader is left with the vague impression that perhaps a recent letter written by Canadian AI researchers and technology scholars entreating Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to declare Canada's support for an autonomous weapon's ban would be more constitutive of the public conscious than adding a question about these weapons on the next census.[4] Still, with all of Asaro's warnings against the legitimacy of public opinion, we are left no closer to defining public consciousness. Even questions over the exact nature of the principles of humanity persist, as Asaro rejects the argument that these are contained in the UN Declaration of Human Rights, while others concur that in fact they are. These definitional issues aside, the Martens Clause, which is a crucible of the destructive Napoleonic Wars, is testament to the legal weight humanitarian ideals and the need for civil society contribution in not only defending but devising new IHL. It is from this clause that a new IHL norm, one

---

[4] Published on November 2nd 2017, this open letter was penned by five leading Canadian researches of AI including Professor Ian Kerr, Canada Research Chair in Ethics, Law and Technology, University of Ottawa whose research into the intersection of autonomous weapons and the law was essential to this paper's manifestation. While the letter does implore the Canadian government to take a firm global stance against autonomous weapons, it does acknowledge the "remarkable investment" that Canada is making to assure its place as a leader in AI research and innovation.

propounded by the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and several member states of the CCW, is beginning to take shape.

Throughout its five-year existence, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots has touted the position that LAWs would contravene the incipient IHL norm of meaningful human control, which they claim is required when initiating lethal force. One of the ways they have broadcasted this goal to various audiences is by releasing blog posts on their website championing countries such as Pakistan and the Nordic states for explicitly including meaningful human control in their arguments for a treaty ban at any given CCW meeting on the subject (Stop Killer Robots, 2017). Even those countries that have not voiced their support for a treaty ban have converged as early as May 2014 around the shared belief that meaningful human control must remain in place. This fundamentally humanist principle is a natural corollary to the Martens Clause, and though it remains to be seen if states in the long run will feel compelled to abide by it, the fact that there is at minimum consensus amongst a majority of the world's states that humankind must exert some sort of control over LAWs is a positive development. Though this control has yet to be defined, the connotation that the descriptor *meaningful* affords is again positive for those advocating in favour of a ban.

In essence, the emerging meaningful human control norm, which was even italicized for emphasis in the aforementioned letter written by some of Canada's leaders in AI research, answers in the negative the normative question of whether LAWs should be a final arbitrator in life and death situations. Stakeholders in favour of a ban share in the "widely held belief that the law at least aims to express shared norms, and that many legal norms coincide with moral norms" (Asaro, 2016, p.271). Since IHL is a protean system, there is an opportunity to promulgate this emerging norm until it is fully inculcated as a custom to which states abide. Put differently, in the new moral space that a disruptive technology like LAWs precipitate, there is potential for the international community's beliefs and actions to coalesce around the behavioral expectation of meaningful human control (Asaro, 2016). If common ground is achieved, a treaty ban would be in easier reach, since one of the proximate causes for new law is "the emergence of new behaviours by states or non-state actors" (Asaro, 2016, 371). Since the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots has been so central in propounding this emerging principle, the coalition will be crucial going forward in any efforts to substantiate meaningful human control as a norm worthy of customary law status.

A caveat is in order: this customary status need not be considered *Jus Cogens*, or a fundamental principle of International Law, to be a powerful influencer on state behaviours. There are, of course, other scenarios which lead to the creation of new international law – inconsistencies in the law or the emergence of new technologies that alter state behaviours in such a profound manner that the assumptions of customary or treaty law are violated – one or both of which might be salient to LAWs. The emergence of new norms which shape actors' behaviour, e.g. meaningful human control, has, in antecedence to the actual existence of LAWs, been demonstrably externalized in the discourses of state and non-state actors alike. This antecedent quality is unique because the other proximate motivations for creating new law (e.g. the actual emergence of technologies which disrupt affairs in real time and inconsistencies in existing law) would only be triggered after LAWs are immediately accessible. Having demonstrated the power that this emerging norm has to hasten the codification of treaty law, the

Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, as the leading purveyor of the norm, will be crucial to any successful strategy for a pre-emptive ban.

At this point, it would be useful to explore other ways in which civil society has shaped diplomatic circles' decision-making on autonomous weapons. Civil society has only been able to propound emerging norms, such as meaningful human control, because it successfully appropriated the science-fiction tropes which had historically left autonomous weapons off the humanitarian agenda. Prior to 2012, autonomous weapons were subject to "the giggle factor" due to its close resemblance to science fiction themes depicted in popular media, and this meant that the topic was not a contender for advocacy according to humanitarian elites (Carpenter, 2016, 57). In a 2010 interview, a Human Rights Watch Officer surmised the general sentiment of civil society towards autonomous weapons in saying: "I don't think there's much of a taste for being too forward leaning on science fiction if I may be blunt. The emphasis is definitely on existing state practice, not on laboratory weapons that are unproven" (Carpenter, 2016, 59). Subsequently, and in a matter of two years, Human Rights Watch published "Losing Humanity" a substantiated manifesto detailing the first complete argument in favour of an autonomous weapons ban. This report was the crucible of two pivotal years wherein mounting, incontrovertible documentation of drone casualties combined with real-world research into growing autonomy and the effects of growing automation spurred civil society into action (Carpenter, 2016). To overcome the science-fiction stigma surround LAWs, civil society organizations like Article36 or Human Rights Watch advanced very technical and legalistic arguments in favour of a ban. In other words, their arguments were diametrically opposed to the futuristic quality of science-fictions.

However, civil society was not averse to the association of LAWs' with science-fiction, especially if this stigma could be manipulated to generate public attention. By adopting the rhetoric of "killer robots", a terminology with origins in popular science-fiction culture, civil society's inflammatory word choice compounded media attention- it is perhaps of little coincidence that the CCW, pressured by the significant spotlight LAWs were garnering, held their first session on LAWs in 2013 (Carpenter, 2016). Civil society has carefully constructed a rhetoric that is both scientifically rigorous, yet tactfully employs science fiction discourse. Thus, the science fiction label was once a disabler, but when wielded effectively, civil society has used it as a sort of "social lubricant" (Carpenter, 54).

Charli Carpenter (2016), a security analyst who interviewed members of civil society extensively on LAWs, captures the rhetorical power in science fiction tropes in the following quote from a civil society member attending a CCW session: "When I first attended a multilateral meeting with a 'killer robots' bumper sticker on my computer, diplomats would walk past and do a double-take then sit down and say: 'Tell me more, I want to know more about these killer robots.' It's the perfect hook to get a conversation started" (63). Thus, civil society, by selectively abstaining from invoking allusions to LAWs' futuristic elements, positioned itself well to appeal to policy wonks and government bureaucrats through legal and scientific argumentation. However, to generate the necessary media attention for these issues to appear on government policy radars, civil society did not shy away from employing science fiction tropes in its public outreach. Without civil society to undertake this two-pronged task of mobilizing public attention and targeting state diplomats, it is perhaps reasonable to conject that the autonomous weapons debate would have yet to reach the UN.

Civil Society's Humanitarian Framing: The Vehicle to a Treaty Ban

Hitherto, this paper has supported an outright ban on autonomous weapons by outlining the major arguments (i.e. that autonomous weapons are an infringement to the principle of military necessity, the Marten clause, and the emerging norm of meaningful action) which engender the humanitarian ethos in favour of a ban on autonomous weapons. To consolidate this first argument, this paper will now draw upon Framing Theory to propound the claim that the strategy spearheaded by civil society groups, of analyzing disarmament issues through a humanitarian lens, has the greatest likelihood of achieving a treaty ban. Framing Theory is derived from the work of sociologist Erving Goffman on micromobilization, which refers to the multitude of interactive and communicative processes that affect the frame alignment (Gamson, 1985). The *frames* of framing theory are best described as the systems of interpretation which result from these multifaceted, and countless interactions between actors (Borrie, 2014). In the context of weapons disarmament, scholars have cited micromobilization amongst social activists as eventually reshaping the discourse on various, pernicious weapons such as landmines and cluster munitions. The eventual result of this reframing, and the strongest indicator of its transformative ability, are examples of state policy makers reversing their long held beliefs on said weapons.

Framing Theory must not be confused with Thomas Kuhn's more radical concept of a paradigm shift, which he applied to the hard sciences but which has been appropriated by social scientists as well. Examples of a paradigm shift are the scientific revolutions ushered in by the supersession of the Ptolemaic system by Copernicus' Heliocentric model of the universe, or Einstein's publishing of the Theory of Relativity. In both these instances, radical changes in even the definitions of the most basic concepts were witnessed, which prompted entirely new methods of conducting research. In the frame alignment process that this paper seeks to employ, the framing variant in question pertains to “a domain seen as normative and acceptable is reframed as an injustice that warrants change” (Borrie, 2014, p.636). In short, the change expressed in the domain-specific framing is less expansive and extreme than the paradigm shift, and incorporates a uniquely held normative aspect. As was noted following the reframing of cluster munitions debate in the early 21st century, even after the framing occurred, “states continued to act as states often do, and this was especially visible in the bargaining behavior on draft [Convention on Cluster Munitions] provisions during its negotiation” (Borrie, 2014, p.642). Unlike the paradigm shift, the reframing, which occurred in a transitory time and space, did not result in any real fundamental alteration in state behaviour, and even now, many states have yet to ratify the treaty’s contents.

When weighing civil society’s framing strategy against other possible strategies, such as the conventional practice of letting states deliberate disarmament issues at the CCW, a short analysis of recent disarmament history elucidates that the former is a far more effective option than the latter. That is not to say that states should not debate autonomous weapons at the CCW – in fact quite the opposite as UN fora are ideal grounds for civil society to disseminate their humanitarian appeals. However, taken alone, allowing states sole proprietorship in the drafting of a treaty is an impoverished and myopic approach. After three years of informal talks, it seemed the CCW was beginning to take substantive steps towards a treaty when it slated a Group of Governmental Experts for two weeks of meetings, one in August and the other in November of 2017. The panel’s first meeting date was cancelled due to a shortfall in member payments, and the most recent meeting in November ended with the unambitious decision to roll the 2017 mandate into 2018 (Stop Killer Robots, 2017). Even for the UN, where progress is measured in glacial terms, the discussion about autonomous weapons has languished in the CCW. States seem hard-pressed to relinquish their hard security mindset. In July 2017, China produced its Next-Generation Artificial-Intelligence Development Plan, which designates AI as the transformative technology ensuring economic and military pre-eminence. In September of the same year, Vladimir Putin told Russian children returning to school that "artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia but for all of mankind…whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world" (quoted in The Economist, 2018, para. 17). It is with these provocative statements in mind that we turn to a brief history of civil society's success in tempering naked pursuit of national supremacy, by reframing several disarmament issues as ultimately humanitarian ones with substantive results to show.

Injecting humanitarianism in disarmament diplomacy has correlated with the outright proscription or regulation of various weapons systems by way of binding treaties. Humanitarianism's place in disarmament diplomacy was cemented in the 1997 Ottawa Treaty banning landmines, the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, and more recently in the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. These treaties were spurred by the efforts of civil society coalitions, including the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) and the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) to redraw landmines, cluster munitions and nuclear weapons respectively as devastating humanitarian threats. Early calls for banning landmines and cluster munitions in the 1970s focused on the unnecessary suffering cluster munitions cause combatants and largely ignored the humanitarian consequences of these weapons on non-combatants (Borrie, 2014). The ICBL began the process, prior to the drafting of the 1997 Ottawa Treaty banning landmines, of reframing landmines as a pernicious humanitarian threat to civilians. [5] Buttressing their arguments with data-gathering in the field, the International Campaign to Ban Landmines formed a sort of epistemic community by drawing a clear picture of just how ordinances were afflicting civilians' lives (Borrie & Randin, 2006). To aid their cause, survivors were enlisted as ban advocates, and just as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots applauds humanitarian-minded states and shames those states that are less so, the ICBL was adept at rewarding and shaming states (Borrie, 2014). These practices culminated in the Ottawa Treaty, whereby the number of allied states (principally small and medium sized progressive states and many from the Non-Aligned Movement) noticeably grew. Though several of the world's superpowers refuse to ascend to the Ottawa Treaty, there is a widespread understanding that the humanitarian norms it has codified have universally proscribed any usage of landmines.

In subsequent years, as the CMC launched its humanitarian appeal against cluster munitions in 2003, those policy makers most susceptible to the ICBL's reframing efforts some ten years previously were the first the CMC lobbied. Rather than duplicating previous work, the CMC borrowed from the ICBL's strategies in constructing its own parallel humanitarian arguments against cluster munitions. In the language of Framing Theory, this is referred to as "frame bridging" (Borrie, 2014, p.638). On the coattails of the Ottawa Treaty, non-state actors had succeeded in reframing cluster munitions which "helped to empower champion states in terms of delineating the issues to be solved and identifying a plausible way forward towards

---

[5] The banning of landmines, for example, encompassed a multi-step effort in the form of the Ottawa Treaty and its flawed antecedent, the 1996 CCW Amended Protocol II. Many civil society groups and states were unsatisfied by the Amended Protocol II since it did not categorically ban landmines. The Ottawa Treaty of 1997 realized a total ban on landmines- an unimaginable feat to the state parties who drafted the CCW amendments a year prior.

meaningful action" (Borrie, 2014, p.635). From 2003 to 2007, the CMC built linkages with friendly small and medium state powers such as Norway in an effort to circumvent the CCW's stalled cluster munitions talks (Hulme and McGoldrick, 220). Eventually, Norway agreed to sponsor the Oslo Process, and in February 2007, 46 states agreed to the Oslo Declaration which established a timeline of just under two years to realize a treaty banning cluster munitions (Hulme and McGoldrick, 220). The CMC was instrumental in including a reference in the declaration to humanitarian ideals through the inclusion of a statement which affirms that these weapons "cause unacceptable harm to civilians" (clusterconvention.org).

The CMC movement culminated in a treaty ban, this time in 2008, and though there remains non-signatories, even those states most heavily addicted to planting landmines and cluster munitions have substantially curtailed these now stigmatized practices. For example, in March 2009 the US Congress passed a one-year moratorium on the transfer of cluster munitions with a failure rate of less than 1%, which represents the majority of the American arsenal (Garcia, 2012). The Obama administration had decided that after 2018, the US will only transfer and deploy munitions containing less than 1% unexploded ordnance (Garcia, 2012). The Trump administration has since reversed this policy of only deploying munitions with a lower than 1% failure rate, but retained the restriction that their deployment must first be cleared by the combat commander (Arms Control Association, 2017). In short, even the world's greatest military power, and a non-signatory of the cluster munitions treaty, has altered its behaviour in the face of the treaty's normative force.

Even five years ago, it might have been absurd to many to attempt to transpose this humanitarian logic from landmines and cluster munitions treaty making (which are similar in some notable respects) to weapons that are so intimately linked to great power struggles, such as nuclear bombs. However, just last year, in a direct rebuke to the stratified nuclear world order perpetuated by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the International Coalition to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) successfully drafted the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The majority of the TPNW's support comes from the Non-Aligned Movement, whose ambassador to the CCW mentions in the same breath the Movement's support for an autonomous weapons ban and the TPNW on humanitarian grounds (UN General Assembly, 72nd Session). ICAN campaigners successfully indulged in frame bridging as they explicitly linked their call for a nuclear ban treaty with other weapons such as landmines and cluster munitions that are deemed to have unacceptable effects on civilian populations (Borrie, 2014). Those campaigners who were involved in the Oslo processes for cluster munitions persuasively remarked that, much like the reasoning behind the cluster munition ban, nuclear weapons would saturate large surfaces areas with explosive force, thereby imperilling civilian lives. All this to say that the detractors of a pre-emptive ban, who rightly argue that autonomous weapons are a unique case in point (mainly because they are not a specific weapon but rather a weapon system/modality and that they do not yet exist), are wrong to infer that these differences nullify any prospect of a ban. Humanitarian concerns for the wellbeing of civilians and combatants alike are ubiquitous, no matter the weapon or weapon system in question. Though the TPNW seems to have added to the polarization which defines nuclear armed countries and the non-nuclear majority, the more NPT nuclear weapon states and its allies dismiss humanitarian concerns, the more they cause a feedback loop where these dismals contribute to civil society's framing of the issue as driven by a few problem states who are unpreoccupied with humanitarian ideals (Borrie, 2014). The same could be expected with LAWs, where presumably the most advanced powers would control the most advanced autonomous weapons. Thus, there is hope for humanitarian framing to precipitate a treaty even if this treaty was not pre-emptive.

Conclusion

This text wishes to humbly express a warning to the proponents of a humanitarian ban for autonomous weapons. Such movements can fall prey to infighting and can be equally impassive when faced with adversarial states. Going forward, it will be essential that the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and other stakeholders remain abreast on research on LAWs and receptive to some of the potentially positive effects of their existence. For instance, defensive autonomous systems will surely not be as threatening as those used for offensive combat. Already, these defensive technologies are very advanced, with some examples being the U.S. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System and Israel's Iron Dome. Disarmament issues are inextricably linked to states' jealously guarded assertions of sovereignty, and it is more than likely that any pre-emptive treaty wishing to ban autonomous features on defensive systems would be a sticking point. However, the first humanitarian argument raised by this paper, against the existence of offensive autonomous weapons systems that fall within the ambit of man *on* the loop without veritable human control and *off* the loop systems, remains intact. As was outlined, this humanitarian approach is derived from existing IHL in the form of both the military necessity principle and the Martens Clause, and what many scholars now consider to be an emerging IHL norm of meaningful human control. What followed was the upholding of the humanitarian argumentation as the best strategy for achieving a pre-emptive ban. Drawing on framing theory to understand the recent shift towards a humanitarian lens in disarmament fora, this paper conducted a brief analysis of the consecutive successful attempts of civil society campaigns at building humanitarian arguments and borrowing best practices to galvanize the traditionally state-dominated treaty making process. Guiding this second argument is the old adage posing the rhetorical question of why reinvent the wheel. If humanitarian reframing has been so persistently successful for the making of treaty bans that cover vastly different weapons, would current stakeholders in the age of autonomy not be remised to heed to this accumulated wisdom?

References

Anderson, K. & Waxman, M. (2012). Law and ethics for robot soldiers. (Report). *Policy Review, 176*, 35.

Arms Control Association. (2017). *Cluster Munitions at a Glance.* Retrieved from https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/clusterataglance

Arkin, R. (2009). *Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots*.

Arkin, R. (2011). Governing Lethal Behavior in Robots [T&S Interview]. *Technology and Society Magazine, IEEE, 30*(4), 7-11.

Arkin, R., Ulam, P. & Wagner, A. (2012). Moral Decision Making in Autonomous Systems: Enforcement, Moral Emotions, Dignity, Trust, and Deception. *Proceedings of the IEEE, 100*(3), 571-589.

Asaro, P. (2016). Jus nascendi, robotic weapons and the Martens Clause. In Calo, M., Froomkin, M. & Kerr, I. (2016). *Robot law*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

---. (2012). On Banning Autonomous Lethal Systems: Human Rights, Automation and the Dehumanizing of Lethal Decision-Making. *International Review of the Red Cross*, *94(886),* 687-709. Retrieved from https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/ article/ review-2012/irrc-886-asaro.htm

Bills, G. (2014). LAWS unto themselves: Controlling the development and use of lethal autonomous weapons systems. *George Washington Law Review, 83*(1), 176-208.

Borrie, J., Randin, V. M. (2006). *Disarmament as Humanitarian Action: From Perspective to Practice*. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

Borrie, J. (2014). Humanitarian reframing of nuclear weapons and the logic of a ban. *International Affairs, 90*(3), 625-646.

Carpenter, C. (2016). *Rethinking the Political / -Science- / Fiction Nexus: Global Policy Making and the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots*. Perspectives on Politics, 14(1), 53-69. doi: 10.1017/S1537592715003229

Clusterconvetion.org. (2008). *Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions 22-23rd February 2007 Declaration.* Retrieved from http://www.clusterconvention.org/files/2012/11/Oslo-Declaration-final-23-February-2007.pdf.

Defense Science Board. (2016). *Report of the Defense Science Board Summer Study on Autonomy.* US Department of Defense. Retrieved from https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=794641

Gamson, W. (1985). Goffman's legacy to political sociology. *Theory and Society, 14*(5), 605-622.

Garcia, D. (2012). "Banning Evil: Cluster Munitions and the Successful Formation of a Global Prohibition Regime." *Cornell International Affairs Review*, *5*(2). Retrieved from http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=1244

Human Rights Watch & Harvard Law School's International Human Rights Clinic. (2012). *Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots*. Bonnie Docherty. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/losing-humanity/case-against-killer-robots

International Committee of the Red Cross. (2015). *International Humanitarian Law: Answers to Your Questions*. Retrieved from https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/0703-international-humanitarian-law-answers-your-questions

Kerr, I. & Szilagyi, K. (2016). Asleep at the Switch? How Killer robots become a force multiplier of military necessity. In Calo, M., Froomkin, M., Kerr, I. (2016). *Robot law*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Pub.

Lin, Patrick, Abney, Keith, and Beckey, George. (2012). *Robot Ethics*. Cambridge: MIT University Press.

Melzer, N (2009). Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, *International Committee of the Red Cross*. Retrieved from https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/0990-interpretive-guidance-notion-direct-participation-hostilities-under-international

The Economist. (2017, January 25). Special Report: Getting to grips with miliary robotics. *The Economist*. Retrieved from https://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21735478-autonomous-robots-and-swarms-will-change-nature-warfare-getting-grips

Pagallo, U. (2011). Robots of Just War: A Legal Perspective. *Philosophy & Technology, 24*(3), 307-323.

Sartre, P. & Hosotte, O. (2012). New publications in humanitarian action and the law. *International Review of the Red Cross, 94*(887), 1173-1187.

The Future of Life Institute. (2015). *Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter From AI & Robotics Researchers.* Retrieved from https://futureoflife.org/open-letter-autonomous-weapons/

United Nations General Assembly, 72nd Session. First Committee. *Statement by H.E. Ms. Ina H. Krisnamurthi.* New York, 2017.

Wallach, W. (2017). Toward a ban on lethal autonomous weapons: Surmounting the obstacles. *Communications of the ACM, 60*(5), 28-34.

Dylan Edmonds graduated from the University of Ottawa in April 2017 with a Specialization in Political Studies. Next Fall, he will be pursuing joint civil and common law degrees at the McGill Faculty of Law where he hopes to continue studying and building a career in International Humanitarian Law, Military Law and Weapons Review policy.

Regional Security in the South China Sea: what are its Ramifications for Chinese National Security?

Nicholas Scott, Queens University, Kingston, Canada

Abstract

This article explores how the regional security framework of the South China Sea heavily influences Chinese national security concerns. The history of conflict between states in the South China Sea, coupled with the collective counterbalancing of ASEAN and the presence of the United States, has led to paranoia for the Chinese military and government. China's economic security, a major tenant of national security, is also directly tied to the region. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has undermined Chinese claims to these contested islands through its creation of exclusive economic zones (EEZs), which pose as a direct legal challenge to Chinese historical claims to the islands. China's national security concerns are strongly influenced by the South China Sea's regional security framework, which includes China's ongoing aggression, the lack of cohesion of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and attempts by the United States to balance power. If China hopes to strengthen its economic and national security, it must acquire new sources of energy to sustain its industrial economy, which raises the question of what new developments will occur in the South China Sea if the nation decides to pursue its desires.

Keywords: South China Sea, Spratley Islands, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), regional security, nationalism.

Introduction

The contemporary system of international politics is characterized by an array of unitary states loosely bound together through a plethora of bilateral, multilateral, and global structures. These linkages are established along militaristic, economic, and (occasionally) cultural lines with the purpose of symbiotically linking states together to mutually reinforce their security and sovereignty. A key area of alliance development is national security. National security, as depicted by renowned political theorist Barry Buzan *People, States & Fear* (2008), is orientated around the protection of the three most fundamental components of the state: the idea, the physical base and the institutional expression of the state (71). Any state with the goal to become – or maintain its status as – a "strong state" must ensure that both internal and external threats to the idea, physical base, and institutional expression of it as a state are at the very least controlled, if not prevented. The concept of national security exists as the subcomponent of a much greater theoretical framework within the discipline of international relations: the levels of analysis approach to security studies, postulated by Kenneth Waltz (1959).[1] The levels of analysis framework is utilized to study security at multiple levels, but maintains a focus on national security. The original levels of analysis framework consisted of three analytical levels: the individual, societal/state, and international tiers.

The theory has since been developed from its original conception to include an additional level of analysis, titled the "regional level" (Buzan 2012; Soltani, Naji & Amiri 2014).[2] The term "region", as a security concept, is defined by Buzan as "… a distinct and significant subsystem of

[1] Kenneth Waltz's *Man, the State, and War: a Theoretical Analysis* (1959) created the "levels of analysis" approach to studying International Relations. Waltz postulated three images: images, states and the international system. These images were used to analyze patterns of war and conflict in and between human societies.
[2] In the original edition of Buzan's *People, States & Fear* (1983), the Copenhagen School of International Relations was at its beginnings and was therefore theoretically underdeveloped. In later editions of *People, States & Fear* (see Buzan 2008, Lynne Reinner edition), a greater discussion of regional security is provided and the term itself is expanded upon.

security relations [that] exists among a set of states whose fate is that they have been locked into geographical proximity with each other" (Buzan 2008, 158). Through the adoption of the regional level of analysis, a security studies scholar can study how the specific geography of an area, including its natural resources, patterns of amity and enmity, and history, affect each states' national security policy. Adopting the regional security level of analysis leads to the concept of the *regional security complex*: "… [a] set of [states] whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another" (Buzan 2012, 1). The regional security complex is a distinct phenomenon that affects many smaller states, such as those in East and Southeast Asia. These smaller states are not physically large enough, nor militarily or economically strong enough, to have a tangible impact on the international level. It is therefore difficult to study such states from at international level; instead, we must use the regional level of analysis to investigate these states' security issues.

In addition to the smaller states within a region, there is also the possibility that larger and more powerful states may be a part of a regional security complex, such as China in Southeast Asia. Continuing with this vein, this paper will investigate the regional security complex of Southeast Asia, focusing on the South China Sea. Various attempts at power balancing have occurred in the South China Sea, primarily orchestrated by the smaller states of Southeast Asia in an effort to challenge the dominance of China, the regional hegemon. As of the past few decades, the United States (despite being geographically external to the region) has also occupied a position in the region, both for the purpose of checking China's power and ensuring that international law is upheld (Buszynski 2012; Buzan 2012).[3] Through the investigation of the

[3] "The Asian "supercomplex" has taken shape: this is evident within the crossmembership model to Asian intergovernmental organizations and through the appearance of political counterweights to China … The United

regional security complex in the South China Sea, coupled with its ramifications for Chinese national security, this paper will argue that the most prominent threats to Chinese national security lie in the country's immediate regional vicinity. Chinese national security interests are inextricably linked to the contested islands of the South China Sea; these islands – the Paracel, Spratley, Zhongsha, and Pratas archipelagos – are a matter of economic security and national pride for China, making them extremely valuable to the Chinese state.

Regional Security in the South China Sea

The South China Sea has an area of approximately 3.5 million square kilometers and is semi-enclosed by Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. It contains four major archipelagos: the Paracel, Spratley, Zhongsha and Pratas islands. There exists an abundance of natural resources in the region, including natural gas deposits, underwater oil reserves, and large fisheries (Petallides 2016). The following is but a single example of the immensity of natural resources found in the South China Sea: a series of exploration missions in the early 1990s, conducted by the Chinese and Vietnamese governments, found the equivalent to roughly 105 billion barrels of oil in offshore seabed deposits near the Spratly Islands. The Spratlys are only one of the four major archipelagos in the region, and all four archipelagos are expected to contain a large amount of oil in their surrounding seabeds (Guoxing 1998; Raine 2012). Additionally, the South China Sea forms an integral maritime trade route for its littoral (sea-bordering) states, granting East Asian and Southeast Asian states the ability to engage in cross oceanic trade with partners in Asia, Africa, and the rest of the world. This makes it an

States' engagements in East and South Asia are also part of this supercomplex. The hardening of Beijing since 2008 has helped maintain U.S. influence in Asia, despite Washington's decline on the international stage" (Buzan, Barry. "Asia: A Geopolitical Reconfiguration." *Politique Etrangère* 77, no. 2 (2012): 1).

extremely important body of water in terms of the significance it has for international trade and commerce (Gao & Jia 2017).

Many of the islands and trade routes are located within the national boundaries of littoral states, giving these countries sovereignty over them. Sovereign jurisdiction was initially predicated on “acquisition by discovery”, meaning that whatever state found and laid claim to the island and its waters first was the rightful holder of its title (Guoxing 1998, 103). However, in 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was created. The purpose of UNCLOS is to provide a concrete framework for determining island/waterway claims and questions of ownership; it was an answer to the overly simplistic “acquisition by discovery” argument that was both outdated and unprovable (Lee 2017). UNCLOS seeks to remedy conflicting claims between states (UNCLOS 1982). UNCLOS determined that all littoral states have *exclusive economic zones* (EEZ), meaning that every littoral state has an undisputed and privileged access to the body of water immediately adjacent to its respective coastline for up to 200 nautical miles – this includes the continental shelf. EEZs gives states the right to unrestricted exploration within their EEZ, as well as the unilateral control of all natural resources within the 200 nautical mile radius (Buszynski 2012; Rosenberg & Chung 2008; Scott 2012).

EEZs differ from territorial waters and contiguous zones. In a state’s territorial sea (12 nautical miles from the coast), the state has complete sovereign rule and can apply maximum enforcement of its national law onto any actor. In contiguous zones, which are up to 24 nautical miles after the territorial sea, states can exercise a limited legal authority. By contrast, EEZs are not under the jurisdiction of the state; they are international waters, but states maintain control over underwater natural resources within their own EEZ (UNCLOS 1982). Any disputes that arise in an EEZ can be brought to The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLS), an independent judicial body within UNCLOS that operates as a forum for conflicting states to engage in arbitration (UNCLOS 1982). The ITLS prevents states from attempting to solve matters on a state versus state basis – a practice that oftentimes leads to greater security issues (Scott 2012).

Key Actors in the South China Sea Security Complex (China, ASEAN, & the United States)

The regional security dynamic of the South China Sea is composed of a variety of actors: China, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the United States. The security complex of the South China Sea is labelled as a "high level security complex" by Buzan (2008) because of two reasons: 1) China, a global power, is part of the geography; and 2) the United States maintains a strong military presence in the region via its blue water navy.[4] ASEAN, created in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, is a conglomerate of smaller states in South China Sea that now includes ten countries. ASEAN occupies a power-balancing role in the region, providing a forum for the smaller Southeast Asian states to pursue mutually-benefitting policies in the South China Sea. At the same time, ASEAN acts as a unified body with the aim to counterbalance any aggressive policies of Beijing. For the smaller littoral states of the South China Sea, national security concerns are defined by the regional security complex of the South China Sea, and that alone (Buzan 2012). China, by contrast, has national security issues that stem from the region, but also has national security interests at the global level.

As with ASEAN, the United States plays an active role in balancing China in the South China Sea. The U.S. has specific alliances with the Philippines and Vietnam, but is also allied with ASEAN itself (Buszynski 2012; Buzan 2012). History has shown many different patterns of

[4]A "high level security complex" contains great powers or states whose physical size may constitute a region in itself like Russia or China. This type of security complex intermeshes the regional and international levels, thus making it a regional security complex within the global context. The extent to which the regional complex may also have global implications depends on the ability of the great power(s) of the region to outwardly project their power beyond the immediate regional geography (Buzan 2008, 16).

amity and enmity in the South China Sea, including internal rivalries within ASEAN; countries such as Vietnam have also been anti-American in the past.[5] Despite these episodes of animosity, the smaller Southeast Asian states have engaged in alliance-building in order to have a more tangible impact on the security complex of the South China Sea. China has been the most consistent aggressor in the region for the last century. Because of this, the smaller littoral states have attempted to counterbalance China, in part by encouraging the involvement of the United States. China has made headway with ASEAN in recent years, especially at the expense of American interests, but the U.S. remains a key player in the region and cannot be removed from any discussion of South China Sea regional security (Valencia 2017).[6] The combination of the United States and ASEAN comprises a major national security concern for China, and this concern is amplified because of its proximity to Chinese territory.

The concept of regional security can be used to study China's national security concerns because China not only has to be aware of ASEAN in the South China Sea, but also has to be wary of the American presence in their geopolitical hemisphere. In particular, China must be vigilant of how their actions in the South China Sea may impact the Sino-American relationship. Therefore, the concept of regional security – in the South China Sea – offers a useful approach for analyzing Chinese national security issues, even though China's national security outlook is

---

[5] Consider reading Zhiguo Gao, & Bing Bing Jia's article "The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications" (2017) for a history of China's conflictual relations with other Southeast Asian states. Leszek Buszynski's "The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.—China Strategic Rivalry" (2012) article also depicts a relevant account of historic and ongoing disagreements between China and other Southeast Asian countries in the South China Sea, centering on resource claims.

[6] In *People, States and Fear* (2008), Barry Buzan notes the following: "In Southeast Asia for example, the local dynamics have to compete with much more powerful outside pressures on the region than in the case in South Asia" (163). This quote refers to the presence of the United States in Southeast Asia. The smaller states of Southeast Asia consider a hegemonic China to be dangerous for their collective interests, so they encourage some form of American power projection into their midst in order to mitigate China's aggressive territorial claims and pursuits.

both regionally and globally-orientated. The succeeding paragraphs of this paper will depict how Chinese national security interests can be accurately examined through a regional lens.

Territorial Disputes in the Spratly and Paracel Archipelagos: Contested Waterways & Ownership Claims to Natural Resource Deposits

States in the South China Sea have proposed serious problems for UNCLOS. Among these problems are the highly-contested Spratly and Paracel Archipelagos, as noted by David Scott (2012): "Vietnamese and Chinese claims are similar in nature: a continental shelf and a 200-nautical-mile EEZ, as well as historical control claims over two archipelagoes, the Paracel Islands (in Vietnam known as Hoang Sa; in China, Xisha) and the Spratly Islands (in Vietnam Truong Sa; in China, Nansha) in the South China Sea" (1028). China boasts historical claims to both island groups, premised on their nine-dash line. Vietnam, as a counter argument, claims the archipelagos under the UNCLOS EEZ proviso, seeing as the islands fall within 200 nautical miles of their coastline. The Philippines and Malaysia also stake similar claims to the Spratly Islands under UNCLOS.[7]

The Spratly and Paracel Islands are of strategic and economic importance to every littoral state in the South China Sea. The islands are positioned parallel to the sea lanes with the highest traffic in the South China Sea, acting as a gateway to the rest of the world. Furthermore, some of the larger islands are substantive enough to support infrastructure, thus providing land for whatever country claims sovereignty over them. This land can be used to build frontline military outposts, giving the occupying country an upper hand in any potential military conflict. Massive

[7] The "nine-dash line", originally published by the Chinese government as the eleven-dash line in 1947 (later redrawn and renamed), is a series of lines in the South China Sea that demarcate waters and islands believed to be under Chinese jurisdiction. The nine-dash line is embedded in "acquisition by discovery", therefore making it contestable under UNCLOS. China has declared in official state policy that it has a historical right to all that lies within the nine-dash line, spanning downwards from the Paracel islands in a "U shape" towards the coast of Malaysia, then circling back up the coast of the Philippines upwards to Taiwan (Gao & Jia 2017).

oil and natural gas reserves have been found in the geographies of the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos, creating huge incentive for states to claim them as sovereign territory. Many of the islands also boast enormous fishing opportunities (Buszynski 2012; Guoxing 1998; Scott 2012). These islands pose a serious threat to regional security because no group of islands remain uncontested; competition for ownership of the islands (and their surrounding natural resource deposits) has led a constant struggle between littoral states in the South China Sea, creating the regional security complex (Kuok 2017). UNCLOS stipulates that developing states are to be prioritized over developed states in terms of their access to natural resources in contested areas (UNCLOS 1982).[8] This UNCLOS clause is specifically harmful to Chinese interests in contested areas of the South China Sea because it essentially forces China to cede disputed islands to other littoral states who are less developed; China, as the most developed state in the region, is the biggest loser of UNCLOS prescriptions regarding the South China Sea.

In the decade following WWII, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines all scrambled for islands in the South China Sea. In the next decade, Vietnam joined the race. This began the contemporary regional security dilemma in the South China Sea: states built up their respective navies, reinforced their defensive capabilities, and sought to acquire as much territory as they could. This decade preceded UNCLOS, but even since the convention's conception, these states continue to publish nationalist statements depicting their rights to certain islands, waterways, and territories. States have also conducted unsolicited exploration missions into contested areas and even (in the case of China) built infrastructure on contested islands (Buszynski 2012; Raine 2011). The regional security dilemma is perpetuated when one state

[8] UNCLOS Part XI: Area, Section III: Development of Resources of Area, Article 150: Policies relating to activities in Area – specific UN policy that requires developed states prioritize the needs of less developed states in the region, seceding contested territories to developing states in order to promote economic and human development.

stakes a claim to an island. In doing so, they push neighboring states to act similarly. In the height of competition, states may vie for the same territory, resulting in either diplomatic or militaristic ends. Conflicts have occurred for multiple reasons that can be attributed to nationalism and historic entitlement; the desire for resources; and, for China, the need to reassert their dominance as the regional hegemon in the face of the United States.

The Implications of South China Sea Regional Security for Chinese National Security

The regional security of the South China Sea is chiefly related to maritime security (Rosenberg & Chung 2008). More specifically, the security concerns of littoral states in the South China Sea are almost exclusively related to past and ongoing territorial disputes regarding the regions' contested territories. Territorial disputes are themselves a national security threat, regardless of whether or not the state is directly involved in the dispute: in such a semi-enclosed region as the South China Sea, any threat to regional stability translates into a national security issue. As discussed earlier, the Spratly and Paracel Islands (and to a lesser extent the Zhongsha and Pratas Islands) provide a considerable strategic vantage point because of their location to sea lines of communication (SOL). The islands also boast an abundance of natural resources that can be harnessed by their holders under the UNCLOS EEZ proviso (Guoxing 1998; Raine 2012; Rosenberg & Chung 2008). Each archipelago remains heavily contested by a contingency of actors, ranging from individual states to intergovernmental organizations (i.e. ASEAN). China, as the regional power and global superpower, has attempted to commandeer these islands many times, believing that it has a legal claim to the territories. China also feels as if it has – for the most part – operated within the confines of international law (Guoxing 1998; Scott 2012). These islands and their waterways are the main element of the regional security dilemma in the South China Sea, but they are also a primary national security interest for China.

China's national security concerns in the South China Sea stem from their history of invasion and occupation at the hands of foreign powers. Since the Han Dynasty over 2100 years ago, various external entities have attacked China from its South China Sea seaboard. Attackers included forces such as the British and French colonial fleets, the Japanese, and in earlier eras, rival warring empires. For as long as China has been threatened by actors in the South China Sea, they have also laid claim to the Spratly and Paracel Islands (Rosenberg & Chung 2008). There has been a Chinese presence on these islands since the Han Dynasty, even though fiscal and structural limitations prevented China from establishing permanent settlement on the islands at the time of their discovery. The Spratly and Paracel disputations undermine China's historical claims. As identified by Sarah Raine (2011), one of China's predominant national security objectives in the South China Sea is to use territorial issues as a method for the "…management of domestic nationalism …" (77). Through an investigation into domestic issues in China, Raine (ibid) found a resurgence in Chinese nationalism, referring to this phenomenon as the rise of "angry young men".[9] The Chinese government, in order to prevent an internal revolution at the hands of its disappointed populace, has acted more aggressively in the South China Sea to appease its population. The Spratly and Paracel Islands are considered to be a part of Chinese heritage and must be protected; failing to do so could potentially result in an internal security crisis for the Chinese government. The connection between the Spratly and Paracel islands and Chinese heritage exemplify how the regional security of the South China Sea is intrinsically related to Chinese national security.

[9] In Sarah Rain's "Beijing's South China Sea Debate" (2011), she accredits the resurgence of Chinese nationalism to an increasingly dissatisfied Chinese middle class. This trend exemplified by the fact that 92% of Chinese internet respondents on an internet survey in the *Global Times* said disputes in the South China Sea should be resolved militarily. Of this class of people, males in particular feel as if Chinese government is not doing enough on the international scene to put China's interests first. Furthermore, they believe that the Americans are exerting too much power over the Chinese and are embarrassing China; this plays into a long historical pattern of Western domination over China that many Chinese will not accept, especially given China's current position as a global power(81).

Far more tangible than an internal resurgence of Chinese nationalism is China's need for new sources of oil. China's national economic security is vital for the perpetuation of its great power status. China relies on its productive capacity and enormous amount of exportation to feed its economy. The nature of China's economy requires unparalleled amounts of oil for manufacturing and transportation purposes. China has already depleted a staggering amount of its national oil resources and, because of this, has become oil-dependent on the Middle East (Guoxing 1998). The regional security of the South China Sea is important for China's oil concerns on two fronts: 1) China needs to ensure that all incoming oil has a safe passage to its shores and 2) untapped and unclaimed oil deposits are located throughout the South China Sea seabed and are waiting to be drilled. The former front is a mere Band-Aid solution to China's oil problems, but still requires regional stability in the South China Sea. The latter, however, is much more enticing to China: if China were to be legally recognized as the sovereign of the Spratly and Paracel Islands, it could claim the surrounding oil as its own in accordance with UNCLOS EEZs, thus loosening China's dependence on foreign oil and making the country less prone to market fluctuations (UNCLOS 1982). Although progress has been made between China and conflicting states regarding EEZ disputations, China remains unrecognized as the sovereign of the Spratly and Paracel Archipelagos.[10] If China wanted the oil in the South China Sea, it would have to breach international law to extrapolate it. China's national economic security is therefore tied to the regional security of the South China Sea because of oil, both in terms of the safe passage of

[10] Between the years of 2002-2005, two deals were made between PRC-Philippines and then PRC-Philippines-Vietnam about access to oil near the Spratly and Paracel Islands. The agreements were for each country's state-owned oil companies to operate joint business ventures in oil extraction from the contested deposits. As of 2008, these relationships ended and were not renewed. Since then, the relationships have soured (Scott, David. "Conflict Irresolution in the South China Sea." *Asian Survey* 52, no. 6 (2012): 1032)

foreign oil to Chinese shores, and because of the contested oil in the South China Sea that China believes is rightfully theirs.

Like oil, food security is also in the national security interests of Beijing. China's population is massive and demands unprecedented amounts of food to maintain its livelihood. As of 2014, over 40% of China's farmland has become damaged, some of it so unfertile that any meaningful agricultural production is impossible (Patton 2014). Despite these concerns surrounding food production, the Chinese population continues to grow. To avoid incurring the expenses involved with importing large quantities of food, Beijing has looked for solutions within the immediate vicinity of China. One possible solution, similar to the solution for China's oil shortages, is manifest in the Spratly and Paracel Islands: encompassing these islands are shallow waters with an abundant array of fish. The potential for industrial fishing is great; industrial fishing would help remedy Chinse food security concerns, while also providing jobs for Chinese citizens in the commercial fishing industry (Buszynski 2012; Gao & Jia 2017). Like the situation with oil, China would have to transgress international law and fish outside of their own EEZ. When countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines fish in the contested waterways of the region, Chinese food security, and therefore national security, is jeopardized.

***Overlay* in the South China Sea: the American Presence and ASEAN Cooperation**

Patterns of amity and enmity in the South China Sea have inevitably included a Chinese element to them because of China's status as the regional hegemon. In the years directly after World War II, as well as throughout the Cold War, the South China Sea regional security dynamic was greatly unstable. ASEAN in the 1960s and 70s was foremost an economic alliance, but at the turn of the 21st C., it became more militarized and defense-orientated (Buszynski 2012). ASEAN is not free of internal disagreement, but the general consensus of its members is that they must balance China in the region. As a result, ASEAN can be considered as the catalyst for the internal transformation of the regional security dynamic in the South China Sea (Buzan 2008).[11] Coupled with the internal transformation of regional security by ASEAN is the increased activity of the United States in the South China Sea.

The U.S. presence represents what Barry Buzan (2008) calls an *overlay*: a situation where one or more external powers moves directly into a local security complex, suppressing the indigenous security dynamic (181). The contemporary climate of South China Sea regional security is one of security interdependence between ASEAN and the United States, counterbalancing the Chinese. The U.S. has renewed its interest in the South China Sea and acts as deterrent towards Beijing so as to dissuade the Chinese government from pursuing aggressive military action in the region. The U.S. has military ties to a host of Southeast Asian states (i.e. the Philippines and Vietnam) and has ensured these states that they will protect in conflict. The Americans also have a desire to ensure that all sea lines of communication in the South China Sea remain open, seeing as a large percentage of American imports travel through these waters. The U.S. needs to prevent conflict in the region because the American economy is heavily dependent on the international trade that runs through the South China Sea (Raine 2011).

America's re-emergence in the South China Sea has created a new security dynamic that places greater limitations on China's own policies, therefore implying that regional security has a direct effect on Chinese national security. Although China is a global power and has national security interests beyond the realm of the South China Sea, history shows that China's primary area of concern is in their local vicinity, particularly when it comes to military security

---

[11] An *internal transformation* of a region's security complex occurs when there is a dramatic internal power shift or change in hostilities from parties within the given region. (Buzan, Barry. 2008. "Regional Security." In *People, States and Fear,* edited by Peter Kennedy, Ian O'Flynn, Alexandra Segerberg, & Laura Sudulic, 157-188. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.)

(Muscolino 2013). Not only is China's military security in the South China Sea under question, but so too is there energy and food security. Therefore, the combination of ASEAN and America in the South China Sea present a cause for worry in Beijing.

Attempts at Conflict Mitigation and Future Developments in the South China Sea

Despite the high level of tension in the South China Sea, recent years have shown that Sino-American and Sino-ASEAN agreements are possible. China's foremost national security interest is premised on economic security, which can only be guaranteed through regional stability. Without stability, the importation of oil and exportation of Chinese-made goods would be severely hampered, resulting in major repercussions for China's economy. Therefore, China is somewhat obliged to coopt with ASEAN and the United States. In 2002, China and the ten ASEAN states signed the *Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea*, expressing commitment from each signatory state to work towards adopting a legally binding code of conduct in the South China Sea, while at the same time promising to refrain from any escalation in current territorial disputes (Raine 2011; Scott 2012). Like the *Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea*, The East Asia Summit, an annual forum since 2005, involves a host of countries from the South China Sea, but also expands outwardly to include countries from Central and South Asia. As of 2011, membership was expanded to 18 countries, including the United States and Russia (Buzan 2012). This forums provides an arena for conflict resolution and mediation, suggesting that the South China Sea is less hostile than in previous eras.

However, some scholars, such as Wei-Chin Lee (2017), maintain that "… the South China Sea disputes [should be] … considered as a proxy for US-China strategic wrestling for power dominance, alliance realignment, and regional trade and economic rebalancing" (183). For example, the U.S. has reignited the U.S.-Vietnam Strategic Dialogue, independent of ASEAN, to increase America's presence in the region. China considers this as an attempt to internationalize territorial conflict in the South China Sea by drawing on the U.S. as a counterbalance (Scott 2012). Although China and ASEAN have committed to reducing hostilities, China has steadily increased its naval forces, including the deployment of *Jin Class* submarines in 2004 (Buszynski 2012). Furthermore, China publicly declared in 2009 that they have "… indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters …" and that any country seeking to contest this reality would be infringing upon Chinese sovereignty; the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia all responded to these claims with their own public statements, exacerbating tensions (Gao & Jia 2017, 106). In 2013, the Philippines initiated Article 287 and Annex VII of UNCLOS against China with regard to their maritime disputes in the South China Sea, resulting in a 2006 ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal that rendered China's nine-dash line as unlawful (Lee 179). It appears as if hostilities are being reduced in some areas while being ignited in others, resulting in little overall change to the regional security dynamic of the South China Sea.

Conclusion

As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the regional security of the South China Sea is turbulent. Efforts to bolster regional stability have had momentary effectiveness, but ultimately have been rendered futile. China's perpetual aggression, ASEAN's lack of cohesiveness, and America's attempts at balancing power have left the region as fragmented as ever. China's government is under increased internal pressure to pursue aggressive national security policy, while at the same time being kept under constant supervision by the international community. China's national security policy is in constant flux because of these dichotomous pressures, leading to a varied approach to territorial disputes and diplomacy in the South China Sea. The regional security of the South China Sea will always include a Chinese element because of the country's great power status, thus creating the constant threat of resource wars in the succeeding decades. China's increased hegemony in the Asian Pacific may ultimately force the Americans out of the region, thus leaving a power vacuum in the South China Sea whereby China could oppress ASEAN and further stake its claims to the surrounding islands.

The advent of UNCLOS is a strong attempt at mitigating the possibility of conflict in the South China Sea, but as resources become scarcer while China's economy grows, the demand for access to the region's natural resources may become too strong for the Chinese government to ignore. The UNCLOS legal framework imposes a large degree of "soft power" deterrence on South China Sea states, but lacks the "hard power" to threaten China if the UNCLOS codes are breached. China, as one of the world's most productive countries, is crucial for the world economic system. The Chinese are wary of this and are therefore in a strong position to oppose UNCLOS because they know that the threat of economic sanctions is minimal. In order to sustain its growth, China must acquire additional resources to fuel its industry. The South China Sea region would provide ample resources for China without causing any fiscal burden to the Chinese state; if China were to pursue an alternative method of acquiring oil, it would most likely involve the purchase of oil from overseas, such as from the Middle East. The best option for the Chinese lies in their regional vicinity, implying that China's foremost economic security concerns lie directly at their doorstep.

Chinese economic security is paramount. While China values the region's islands for their natural resources, they also consider the islands to symbolic and nationally significant to China. Because of this, Chinese claims to the islands are not only economic in nature, but also cultural. The combination of state survival (in the form of economic security) and national pride has the potential to create a dangerously incentivized and impulsive Chinese government. The internal and external forces that the Chinese state faces may prove to be overwhelming, thus compelling the Chinese government to disobey UNCLOS and pursue its claims to the contested islands. The ramifications of this would be manifold and uncertain. However, it is clear that the already unstable dynamic of the South China Sea region would be further destabilized if such a dramatic shift in Chinese governmental policy occurred.

References

Buszynski, Leszek. 2012. "The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.—China Strategic Rivalry." *The Washington Quarterly* 35, no. 2: 139-156. Retrieved from: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0163660X.2012.666495.

Buzan, Barry. 2012. "Asia: A Geopolitical Reconfiguration." *Politique Etrangère* 77, no. 2: 1-13. Retrieved from: https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/barrybuzanengpe22012.pdf

Buzan, Barry. 2008. "Regional Security." In *People, States and Fear,* edited by Peter Kennedy, Ian O'Flynn, Alexandra Segerberg, & Laura Sudulic, 157-188. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Gao, Zhiguo & Bing Bing Jia. 2017. "The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: History, Status, and Implications." *The American Journal of International Law* 107, no. 98: 98 -123. Retrieved from: https://doi.org/10.5305/amerjintelaw.107.1.0098

Guoxing, Ji. 1998. "China Versus South China Sea Security." *Security Dialogue* 29, no. 1: 101-112. Retrieved from: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0967010698029001010

Kuok, Lynn. 2017. "South China Sea Dispute Undermines Maritime Security in Southeast Asia." *The Asia Foundation*, August 23, 2017. Retrieved from: https://asiafoundation.org/2017/08/23/south-china-sea-dispute-undermines-maritime-security-southeast-asia/

Lee, Wei-Chin. 2017. "Introduction: the South China Sea Dispute and the 2016 Arbitration Decision." *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 22: 179-184. Retrieved from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/314977821_Introduction_the_South_China_Sea_Dispute_and_the_2016_Arbitration_Decision

Muscolino, M. S. 2013. "Past and Present Resource Disputes in the South China Sea: The Case of Reed Bank." *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review* 8: 80-106. Retrieved from: https://cross-currents.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/e-journal/articles/muscolino.pdf

Patton, Dominique. 2014. "More than 40 percent of China's arable land degraded: Xinhua." *Reuters*, November 4, 2014. Retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-soil/more-than-40-percent-of-chinas-arable-land-degraded-xinhua-idUSKBN0IO0Y720141104

Petallides, C. J. 2016. "Competing Claims in the South China Sea Viewed Through International Admiralty Law." *Inquiries Journal* 8 no. 1:1-3. Retrieved from http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/a?id=1339

Raine, Sarah. 2011. "Beijing's South China Sea Debate." *Survival* 53, no. 5: 69-88. Retrieved from: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2011.621633

Rosenberg, David & Christopher Chung. 2008. "Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Coordinating Coastal and User State Priorities." *Ocean Development and International Law* 39: 51-68. Retrieved from: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00908320701641602

Scott, David. 2012. "Conflict Irresolution in the South China Sea." *Asian Survey* 52, no. 6: 1019-1042. Retrieved from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2012.52.6.1019

Soltani, Fakhreddin, Saeid Naji, & Reza E. Amiri. 2014. "Levels of Analysis in International Relations and Regional Security Complex Theory." *Journal of Public Administration and Governance* 4, no. 4: 166-171. Retrieved from: http://www.macrothink.org/journal/index.php/jpag/article/view/6973

Valencia, Mark. 2017. "Is America Losing the Soft Power Contest in Southeast Asia?" *The Diplomat*, August 12, 2017. Retrieved from: https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/is-america-losing-the-soft-power-contest-in-southeast-asia/

United Nations. Division for Ocean Affairs and Laws of the Sea. Third Conference United Nations Conference on the Laws of the Sea. *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea* (1982). Last updated 4 May, 2017. Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

United Nations. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Treaty* (1982). Effective 16 November, 1994. Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

Waltz, Kenneth. 1959. *Man, the State, and War: a Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Nicholas Scott is a fourth-year Political Studies Major at Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario. During his time at Queen's, he was granted the opportunity to attend Sciences Po in Paris, France for one semester as a part of Queen's academic exchange program. His research interests include, but are not limited to, security studies and securitization, European and Asian politics, NATO, regionalism, and transatlanticisim. He will be undertaking a Master's Degree next year in Political Studies at Queen's, focusing on international relations.

Memes of Mass Destruction: What Do Memes Indicate About Nuclear Power Relations?

Jennifer Clark[1], Fordham University, New York City, United States of America

Abstract

What is the relationship between diplomatic discourse and political memes? What do these themes show us about contemporary power relations? In concentrating on the United States' nuclear relationship with North Korea, I seek to provide a critical examination of the way in which diplomatic discourse is compressed into visual digital arguments also known as Internet memes. In this paper, I gain insight into this topic by analyzing memes on Kim Jong-Un in conjunction with President Obama's discourse regarding North Korea circulating between 2011-2016. This analysis shows that memes about Kim Jong-Un reflect and reinforce the recurrent motifs of President Obama's diplomatic rhetoric: oriental masculinity, isolation, and nuclear terrorism. Based on this research I argue that memes represent a new form of visual political rhetoric that reflect the current international political environment and condense theories of diplomatic relations to a single picture. This article also demonstrates how future scholars can conduct similar analyses of this emerging form of communication.

Keyword: Communications, Memes, Discourse Analysis, North Korea, United States, Nuclear Power Relations, International Relations, Social Media

---

[1] I would like to thank my thesis advisor Zein Murib whose ceaseless patience and insight helped me in completing my thesis and this article. I cannot say thank you enough! I would also like to give thanks to my parents and my dog, Pig.

Introduction

“Humor can serve as a unique key for the understanding of social and cultural processes.” - Limor Shifman (Shifman, 2007, p. 187)

On November 28th 2017 North Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the mainland of the United States, the most recent in a long line of antagonistic nuclear action by North Korea (North Korea Nuclear Timeline Fast Facts, 2017). The relationship between the United States and North Korea has a complicated history that has only escalated in a growing understanding gap and controversy in recent years. Over the years North Korea has become deeply entrenched in America’s contemporary, domestic politics. This is due in part to the fact that nuclear weaponry is arguably the most delicate and divisive issue that the international community faces. The 21st century has brought a wave of states, like North Korea seeking involvement in the nuclear community, which further complicates international power structures. With this has also come an escalation in the many forms of discussion surrounding the conflicted relationship, from diplomatic communication to digital discourse. The relationship between these mediums and the way in which the international system’s power hierarchy diffuses throughout larger society and is reflected in the digital media provides a unique window into the study of international relations and power hierarchies. Methods of communication have evolved with the digital age and memes are an important component of this evolution, especially in the communication of power structures.

The central question of this research project is: what is the relationship between diplomatic rhetoric and political memes? What does this relationship indicate about power relations in the contemporary international community? I seek an answer to these inquiries through an exploration into the history behind the United States and North Korea’s discordant relationship, as well as an in-depth discourse analysis of presidential speeches and political memes. By examining these memes, I argue that memes act as an expression of power through the reiteration of discursive that reinforces US-North Korea antagonisms by propagating a growing knowledge gap.

A Complicated Relationship from the Start

The United States has had a fraught relationship with North Korea since even before its founding in 1948, with historical trends that can be found in key themes of President Obama's diplomatic rhetoric, as well as in memes about Kim Jong-Un. This relationship has been marked by defiance, intimidation, and nuclear threat from its conception. It is important to note that not only was the United States the first of the two to create the initial looming nuclear threat, but also that North Korea has operated under nuclear intimidation longer than any other existing international state (Kim, 2010). Due to an imminent fear of nuclear attack from the West following the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea began developing its nuclear program in the early 1980s with help from the Soviet Union (Boghani, 2017). Security for the purpose of progress, especially economic, was a primary motivating factor in North Korea's original pursuit of nuclear power and weaponry (Chung, 2016). North Korea's initial nuclear program was branded as a peaceful endeavor, and the state even joined other nuclear world leaders in the NPT in 1985 (Chung, 2016). Nonetheless, conflict embroiled North Korea's international and nuclear relations almost from the start.

Obama is not the first to group North Korea as part of the global issue of terrorism, as the state became an officially listed terrorist state according to the United States Department of State in 1987 when two North Korean agents bombed Korean Airlines flight 858 (Wertz, 2017). Although the state was removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism in 2008, rhetoric grouping North Korea with terrorism and international menace has continued. Further deteriorating its international image, North Korea has continued to violate its agreement to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) continuously since 1992 (Wertz, 2017). The state's reputation as a distrustful rising nuclear power amongst the international community only grew as the years passed. Following a 1994 conflict wherein North Korea threatened that it would begin to extract weapons grade plutonium from its nuclear reactors, as well as the collapse of the Agreed Framework under the Bush administration, global distrust increased (Boghani, 2017). President Bush went on to infamously label North Korea as a member of the 'Axis of Evil' along with Iran and Iraq in his 2002 State of the Union Address, proclaiming these states to be seeking weapons of mass destruction (Bush, 2002). This embedded a negative international perception of North Korea even deeper into the public's conscience.

Since 2006 North Korea has continued to test the limits of its nuclear program at a rate that has only accelerated since Kim Jong-Un came to power following Kim Jong-Il's death in 2011. The United States and the United Nations Security Council have condemned each of its nuclear endeavors. Kim Jong-Un has agreed once to a moratorium on long-range missiles and nuclear activity in exchange for humanitarian aid. However, Kim Jong-Un has also conducted about seven antagonistic military exercises, six of which involved weapons of mass destruction. Due to this escalation, we find ourselves in an environment of contentious discourse surrounding North Korea's international image. This study is especially pertinent to the present because today's level and volume of hostile and binary discourse did not exist in previous administrations.

North Korea's long pursuit of nuclear weapons has sparked international outrage and fear, resulting in ever tightening embargoes and sanctions that isolated and crippled North Korea, suffocating its ability to develop from the start. Without nuclear programs, North Korea believed it would have an extremely difficult time progressing free from the threat of interference by other states. However, as long as it maintained a nuclear program, North Korea would continue to be seen and to suffer as a pariah of the international community. Given this situation, North Korea finds itself in a catch-22 in which the state feels damned without nuclear weapons, and damned with them. There is a responsibility gap between the United States' intimidation tactics in the Korean Peninsula and the general portrayal of North Korea as an irrational actor in the United States' international discourse. This trend is not expected to end anytime soon as powerful states and American allies geographically surround North Korea: China, South Korea, Russia, and Japan (Wessells, 1995).

Therefore, the way in which this topic is represented through diplomatic and digital discourse is vital to the understanding of pervasive themes of international nuclear power relations. These tense, political relations are now reflected in digital media, especially in the format of memes. If memes can be understood as amalgamations of participatory political action, then the key themes found within them can give both an explanation and visual history of political trends. This study shows that theories of international relations can be found in places as serious as Presidential speeches as well as the humorous corners of the Internet. Furthermore, discourse affirms and reinforces power relationships. The way that world leaders are portrayed visually and through spoken word has a role in this reinforcement. Therefore, the relationship between political discourse and political memes solidifies itself as an important one. Understanding the circulation of these ideas and the extent to which they reflect a state has the potential to teach us an incredible amount, as well as provide us with a new and ever evolving medium with which to study international relations.

In the following section I outline invaluable aspects of previous scholars that have been conducted on this topic thus far. The work of Limor Shifman, David Shim and Dirk Nabers, and Runa Das were especially helpful. These researchers respectively explored: memes as political action, the imaging of North Korea in photojournalism, and oriental masculinity in nuclear power relations.

Distorted Mirrors, Orientalist Masculinity, and the Imaging of North Korea: A Framework for Literature Review and Hypotheses

In this section I discuss literature focused on North Korea's image on the international stage. My goal is to connect scholarly theories on power relations and their portrayal of the way in which these theories are presently illustrated by the new wave of communication: Internet memes. Based upon my preliminary analysis of six years of President Obama's diplomatic speeches and in-depth research on the historical relations between the United States and North Korea, I expect to see North Korea represented as a weaker, criminal, and irrational state. This literature review helps to provide some insights into how, why, and to what extent these representations may be found in Internet memes.

First, it is necessary to explore the process of deteriorating relations and misrepresentations between states to understand the nationalistic narratives of presidential discourse and memes that function as cogs in the wheels of international power hierarchies. Kenneth Boulding and Urie Bronfenbrenner argue that relationships between nuclear states are so fraught because of the long ingrained national image of states and their distorted perceptions of one another. Kenneth Boulding argues that nation states are a complex aggregate of the public's images of the state. These national images are the combination of a state's "…mythological past and forward into an imagined future." (Boulding, 1959, p. 122) Individuals are born into the fantasy of their state's national image and have it continuously reinforced by their community's belief system (Boulding). In this way national images trickle down into almost all aspects of our lives until they become popularly accepted and almost instinctive. This relates to the living psychological study Bronfenbrenner conducted on Russian people during the height of the Cold War. He found that states often look at one another through what he called a "distorted mirror" (Brofenbrenner, 2010). Through this lens, each state in the nuclear conflict views the other as more hostile, exploitative, untrustworthy, and irrational (Brofenbrenner, 2010, p. 429-34). These misconceptions are the result of a cognitive dissonance common among humans as well as a gap in knowledge and understanding. According to this theory, there is a human tendency to incorporate new and unfamiliar concepts into our existing and often inconsistent frameworks of thought (Brofenbrenner). Once a perception exists and is firmly incorporated into the national image, it is exceedingly difficult to alter this way of thinking.

When individuals begin to think of another state's citizens as blurred faces part of a larger, hegemonic, and hostile organization, everything that they do also becomes hostile. It is a common phenomenon that individuals mentally fight to maintain their view of others as compatible with these existing frameworks (Brofenbrenner, 2010). Because of this, the images that states hold of each other become self-confirming and therefore self-perpetuating. By doing so, this "strain toward consistency" erases distinctions and categorizes the other into artificially simplistic binaries (Brofenbrenner, p. 433-34). This fosters a harmful dichotomy between good and evil, one that becomes harmful when reinforced constantly on the diplomatic and digital stages. If presidential speeches and political memes reinforce the distorted mirror, they fortify an ever-growing gap of understanding between the two nuclear states that harms the international community as a whole.

It is also imperative to discuss the toxic role of gendered relations in international power hierarchies, and how they have leaked into general discourse. There is a tendency among Western, developed nations to establish themselves as the obligatory caretakers of the Eastern and developing states of the world. Runa Das labels this phenomenon, "orientalist masculinity" and explains it as rhetoric in the international community that solidifies a hierarchy of international power organized by gendered coding (Das, 2014, p. 88). Das cites that masculine language is often found in instances of nuclear discourse, especially implemented by the United States. It is often used to claim legitimacy over their nuclear policing of the world. In nuclear rhetoric there is a tendency for Western powers to separate themselves geographically and politically from the "unruly other." (Das, 2014, p. 87) Orientalist masculinity is a perpetuation of a historical dichotomy between developed and developing nations that views developing nations as children that must be taken care of and guided by patriarchal, strong Western wisdom and influence. Orientalist masculinity is a theme that becomes apparent throughout this study.

An additional study on the international imaging of North Korea conducted by David Shim and Dirk Nabers combines the above-mentioned ideas. Shim and Nabers found a paradoxical trend in which North Korea is portrayed as a rational yet irrational, threatening yet weak, state. Somehow, North Korea is seen as both an immediate international threat *and* a global outsider of the international community (Shim & Nabers, 2013). As an outsider North Korea fails to uphold the obligations that come with such membership, and is therefore denied the benefits that come with inclusion. This contradictory depiction is confusing and has conflicting key themes such as: backwardness, danger, isolation, poverty, scarcity, weakness, calculation, and madness (Shim & Nabers). These inconsistent motifs are often adapted to fit whatever narrative is most convenient and beneficial at a given time, which manifests as trends that can also be found in diplomatic speeches and memes on the subject. While Shim and Nabers's study provides a helpful starting point, it only analyzes photographic portrayals of North Korea created by singular photographers. However, their focus on photography presents a unique opportunity to extend their theories to another visual form of communication: Internet memes.

The themes found within these scholarly works are nearly identical to those found in political discourse and memes on Kim Jong-Un and North Korea. By extending these ideas to this study, it is possible to gain a deeper understanding of how diplomatic discourse is digitally condensed into arguments about nuclear North Korea.

The Political Currency of Memes

In the 21st century memes have come to be recognized as a means of unlocking cultural and political truths about our own societies (Shifman, 2014). Shifman claims that there are three key political functions of memes: political advocacy, grassroots action, and modes of expression and public discourse. In this study I focus on their function as participatory political action and discourse.

Traditional forms of political discourse rely on highly organized resources, formation, and group identity (Shifman, 2014). Memes operate in a similar fashion; however, they allow people to participate in the public sphere from the comfort of their private sphere. By incorporating secondary content, political memes add new layers of meaning to any given subject. This highlights the importance of intertextuality in Internet memes, making the contextual meaning even more important. This format of shared cultural references provides frameworks that are easy to replicate and spread.

The dissolution of the border between the public and private spheres is an important aspect in this new system of international communication. As Shifman points out, at the heart of a litany of political scandals (i.e. the Clinton-Lewinski Scandal, Watergate, etc.) is the obliteration of the line between the "front stage" and "backstage." (Shifman, 2014, p. 140-41) The front stage represents the public sphere in which political figures intensely stage manage the appearance of their character and endeavors, all in the effort to project what they feel to be a desired manner of being to the public (Shifman). Conversely, the backstage is a place of privacy and intimacy in which projections of character do not need to be as aggressively mediated (Shifman, 2014). Memes effectively bring hidden backstage characteristics to the light of the public, often in derision and parody.

Additionally, memes lend evidence of public opinion about global political developments because one meme represents an aggregation of cultural relics, "...remixed by countless participants employing popular culture for public commentary." (Shifman, 2014, p. 140-41) By examining iterations of memes, it is possible to get a closer and more comprehensive look at the theories and power relations behind mediated commentary on public events (Shifman).

Previous forays into the study of memes in relation to politics and communication have laid out valuable groundwork and working definitions. However, these studies have predominantly focused on domestic political movements within a singular country. Few, if any, have utilized in depth analysis of memes to draw conclusions regarding diplomatic and political relations between separate states. Additionally, existing studies predominantly focus on memes as participation in political movements or protests. I have found none that examine memes depicting a state's leader as a way to uncover the dynamics of said state's global power position, or as condensed products of historical trends.

Method and Data

Having already set out the defining terms being used, the general frameworks of nuclear relations, and outlining the United States and North Korea's history, I now seek to identify how these frameworks relate to the case studies of the United States' discourse, presidential and digital, on North Korea. First, I will analyze the rhetoric, context, and themes found in speeches made by President Obama on these subjects between 2011 to 2016. I have chosen to focus on presidential speeches because state leaders are a country's most visible diplomats, and their words are likely to receive a high degree of publicization. Therefore, the strategic undertone of Obama's speeches is most likely to have a far-reaching effect. Second, I will analyze the visual political rhetoric of viral Internet memes about Kim Jong-Un of North Korea that circulated within the same time period of 2011-2016. In quantitative terms, this can be understood as speeches as the independent variable and memes as the dependent variable. A confounding variable in this research is the fact that not every person has access to, views, or shares political memes; minimizing their potential influence and importance as a piece of rhetoric. In the final section I will evaluate the connections, if any, which can be found between Internet memes and international political discourse.

The speeches I will study were selected for containing the phrase, "North Korea." The Internet memes I will analyze were selected because they feature images of Kim Jong-Un as the focal point. Speeches and memes selected are coded for: (1) language framing North Korea as isolated, (2) language referencing North Korea as a threat, and (3) rhetoric exemplifying the United States as a paternalistic figure. Accordingly, conclusions I draw on this digital dimension of international relations may open the door for modernized political discussion. Below are tables illustrating the presidential speeches studied, as well as the key themes and their respective indicating phrases used for analysis. What follows are the findings of this exploration broken up into three subsections.

Figure 5.1: Themes Coded For[2]

Theme	*Key Indicating Phrases*
International Pariah	Isolation, violation of international norms/obligations/law/responsibility,
Global Threat	Threat global/domestic, security, proliferation
Paternalistic United States	Behavior (good or bad), reward, punishment, provocation, send message, protect

[2] These themes and indicating words were chosen due to the overwhelming frequency with which they were incorporated into President Obama's diplomatic rhetoric. Coding for mentions of North Korea's "violations" of international norms/obligations/responsibilities is included under the "Isolation" section because failure to uphold these standards leads to a negligible position within the international community. The chosen phrases coded for North Korea as a threat were chosen to obtain a more detailed look into the different ways that the state is framed as a nuclear threat. Finally, the language chosen to indicate the key theme of oriental masculinity as indicated by phrasing used in Runa Das's work and other words (such as good versus bad behavior, or punishment) associated with paternalist behavior.

Figure 5.2: Speeches Analyzed

Press Conference with President Hu of the People's Republic of China	January 19, 2011
State of the Union	January 25, 2011
Message to the Senate on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty	February 2, 2011
Remarks by the President to Parliament in London, United Kingdom	May 25, 2011
News Conference With President Lee Myung-bak of South Korea	October 13, 2011
Remarks to United State Military Personnel at Camp Bonifas, South Korea	March 25, 2012
News Conference with President Lee Myung-bak of South Korea	March 25, 2012
News Conference with Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda of Japan	April 30, 2012

Remarks Prior to a Working Session With Group of Eight Leaders at Camp David, Maryland	May 19, 2012
Message to the Congress on Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to North Korea	June 18, 2012
State of the Union Address	February 12, 2013
News Conference With President Park Geun-hye of South Korea	May 7, 2013
Joint Press Conference With President Obama and Prime Minister Abe of Japan	April 24, 2014
News Conference with President Park Geun-hye of South Korea	April 25, 2014
Remarks by President in Year-End Press Conference	December 19, 2014
Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe of Japan in Joint Press	April 28, 2014

Conference	
News Conference with President Park Geun-hye of South Korea	October 16, 2015
Press Conference by President Obama	April 1, 2016
Remarks by President Obama at the Closing Session of the Nuclear Security Summit	April 1, 2016
News Conference with Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany in Hannover, Germany	April 24, 2016
Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe after Bilateral Meeting	May 25, 2016
Post G7 Press Conference in Japan	May 26, 2016
Remarks by President in Commencement Address to the United States Air Force Academy	June 02, 2016
Message to Congress on Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to North Korea	June 21, 2016
Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Lee of Singapore in Joint Press Conference	August 02, 2016
Remarks of President Obama to the People of	September 06, 2016

Laos	
President's News Conference in Vientiane, Laos	September 8, 2016
Address by President Obama to the 71st Session of the United Nations General Assembly	September 20, 2016

Discursive Themes

Key themes identified through the discourse analysis conducted on President Obama's speeches are inter-contextual and mixes of them are found in almost every speech on the topic of North Korea. Although all the rhetorical themes are interrelated, I have separated them into three major categories of imaging: North Korea as an international pariah, North Korea as a global threat, and the United States as a paternalistic figure. What follows is a more detailed synopsis of major themes echoed throughout Obama's many presidential speeches.

An Isolated Pariah

One of the most pervasive themes found within President Obama's rhetoric is North Korea's position as an isolated state within the international community. As indicated in the literature review, a major motivating factor for developing states to acquire nuclear weapons is to save themselves from the margins of the international community. In the 28 speeches analyzed, 75% (21 of the 28 speeches on North Korea) contained language that othered North Korea from the international community.

I found that the term "isolation" was used as both a descriptor and a threat. The term, "isolation" confirms that a developing state has already fallen into the neglected folds of the global society. During a news conference in 2012, Obama compared North and South Korea stating, “You were there at the DMZ [demilitarized zone], and it's like you’re looking across 50 years into a country that has missed 40 or 50 years of progress.” (Obama, 2012). Phrasing such as this implies that North Korea is not only on the sidelines of international norms, but also that its progress and modernization have stagnated drastically in comparison to its regional neighbors and the world. Interestingly, isolation was also used as a threat from the United States in response to North Korea’s repeated nuclear actions. In all the analyzed speeches that mentioned “isolation,” about 46.15% presented isolation as a threat of disciplinary action. Obama’s speeches made it clear that while North Korea continues developing its nuclear arms, the United States would enhance isolation with tighter sanctions enforcement supported with the backing of the international community as it has done numerous times in the past.

Another indication of North Korea’s exclusion from the norms of the international community is the frequent reference of the state’s “violations of international obligations.” The terminology surrounding violation suggests that North Korea is an international lawbreaker that should be held accountable for its crimes against the global society. Almost 10% of speeches analyzed contained language such as “irresponsible” and “reckless,” indicating the deliberate frequency of this trend.

The most striking trend in analysis of speech regarding the leadership of North Korea’s isolation is the United States’ overall delegitimization of any and all perceptions of power or cohesion in strategy. This tactic serves to create a gaping legitimacy deficiency between North Korea and the international community. The antiquated regime is both the cause of and consequence of its isolated position. North Korea’s categorization as an international pariah has led to extensive economic, political, and social restrictions outside its borders. Additionally, North Korea is held back from shaking off the label of “isolation” and normalizing diplomatic relations because it is cut off from basic international and regional commerce, as well as cultural and technological exchanges.

Global Threat

In the 28 speeches studied, around 85.71% framed North Korea’s nuclear program as a threat. Throughout discussion of its arms program, North Korea is simultaneously presented as a global threat, a domestic threat to the United States, and a terrorist threat.

Even North Korea’s label as a global threat is marginalized and isolated in statements such as, “North Korea is in a whole different category and poses the most immediate set of concerns for all of us, one that we are working internationally to focus on.” (Obama, 2016). This further exhibits the frequency with which North Korea is othered in international diplomatic rhetoric. It is useful to pose nuclear North Korea as a global and domestic threat to justify the United States’ continued military presence in the region as merely self-defense of itself and its allies.

Another effective justification for intervention and military presence in the Korean Peninsula region is to rhetorically link North Korea to terrorism. The use of phrases related to terrorism insinuates that North Korea is a piece in the larger puzzle of global terrorism and the fight against it. The United States has time and again used defending freedom and democracy in the face of terrorism as rationale for becoming embroiled in foreign conflict. However, North Korea is a regime, not a non-governmental organization. Therefore, it is odd for the conflict between these two states to be framed as an issue of terrorism. While Obama does not distinctly label North Korea as a terrorist in his speeches, by associating North Korea with the word, it indirectly can influence others to accept and perpetuate this judgment of criminalization and illegitimacy.

A Paternalistic United States

The United States' maintenance of a strong military presence in the demilitarized zone of South Korea is concerning and demonstrates its self-perception as the region's protector. Out of the 28 speeches analyzed, about 42.86% contained paternalistic language on behalf of the United States. This theme stems back to the concept of oriental masculinity. According to this line of thought, Obama effectively establishes the United States as a necessary caretaker of the region, justifying the need to protect South Korea and the world at large from the dangers of North Korean nuclear armament.

The position of protectorate is useful in the defense of the United States' own powerful nuclear presence in the international community. In the 2011 State of the Union Obama said, "Because we rallied the world, nuclear materials are being locked down on every continent so they never fall into hands of terrorists." (Obama, 2011). This affirms the United States' position as a nuclear world leader while again equating outlier states such as North Korea with terrorism. The theme of paternalism is reinforced by Obama's discussion of punishment and reward in relation to toleration of North Korea's actions. Obama typically labeled North Korea's actions as "bad behavior" or "provocations." These are words one would use in describing a disobedient child, making Obama's discussion of punishment and reward even more poignant. This select wording insinuates that the United States has the authority and permission to penalize and discipline other members of the international community. The United States' positioning as a parent-figure in Asia (specifically the Korean Peninsula) acted as both a justification of its continued military presence and as a reason to exercise its authority in an attempt to train North Korea towards better "behavior."

In the following section I will study a few of the many popular political meme iterations on Kim Jong-Un and explore the extent to which they reflect the above-mentioned frameworks of thought popularized by Obama.

Memes Analyzed

In this section I will apply the same method of discourse analysis to select memes featuring Kim Jong-Un. The man did not gain international recognition in digital culture until Kim Jong-Il named him his future successor. Much like Obama's speeches, these contain strong themes of paternalism, isolated pariah, and global threat.

Paternalism

Infantilizing imaging found in these memes is comparable to Obama's paternalistic language. It implies that Kim Jong-Un is similar to a bratty child driven to reactionary tantrums when denied his wishes. It is strikingly like Obama's News Conference with Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda of Japan in 2012 when he stated, "And what I've tried to do since I came into office is to make sure that the North Koreans understand that the old pattern of provocation that then gets attention and somehow insists on the world purchasing good behavior from them, that that pattern is broken." (Obama, 2012)

Both the rhetoric of this speech and the argument presented by similar political memes implies that North Korea's leader is an immature world leader. This perpetuates the historically popular tendency, as Das argues, among developed democratic nations to infantilize developing, non-democratic countries (Das, 2014). Words such as "irrational," and "irresponsible" add potency to the rhetoric of oriental masculinity. Because children have not matured enough to possess the quality of good rationality, they may make irresponsible choices such as eating ice cream for dinner, not wearing a coat in the cold, or detonating weapons of mass destruction.

[Image 7.1, Red Button]

For example, in [Image 7.1] Kim Jong-un cries with the phrase, “But the red button looked so fun.” superimposed over his image. The meme conveys that Kim Jong-Un is not permitted by the global community to utilize nuclear weapons due to the fact that he simply does not understand the magnitude of his actions nor the number of people they could negatively affect. This communicates in a different way the kind of international condemnation Obama stated in instances such as his 2015 news conference in South Korea, “Today President Park and I are reaffirming that our nations will never accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state.” (Obama, 2015) The implication here is that Kim Jong-Un is not a legitimate political leader with legitimate defense strategies, but instead he is a juvenile who cannot be trusted, left to his own devices, nor approved by the global community. The positioning of people who are fellow mourners behind Kim Jong-Un gives the impression that these are his handlers, reinforcing the idea that the leader must be babysat. The wording of the meme further reinforces this sentiment. The protesting language of "but" insinuates that Kim Jong-Un objects to something that he was not permitted to do. In this case, the action that was not permitted was the hypothetical deployment of nuclear warheads. The language used here draws parallels between a child not being permitted to play with his "fun" and entertaining toys, and a state leader not being permitted to make major political decisions for his own country.

[Image 7.2, It's Not a Phase, Mom]

In the next meme, [Image 7.2] of Kim Jong-Un displays him as a feminine adolescent dressed in Goth style and protesting their mother. The intended message of the meme appears to be that Kim Jong-Un is an adolescent who is not capable of making serious decisions. Although this may be a step up from portraying the leader as an infant, it still does not bode well for his legitimacy on the world stage. This meme implies that as North Korea is experiencing a period of transition of leadership, Kim Jong-Un is experiencing a transition himself. This comparison likens Kim Jong-Un to a leader experiencing a crisis of identity and confidence, further delegitimizing his leadership position. Another implication of this framework is that his decision to build up North Korea's nuclear missile systems is an irrational and unplanned strategy with no predicted outcome. This could not be more different than the reality of North Korea's nuclear deterrence program that was born of threats from America and a desire for autonomy free from great power interference. It also fails to consider the rational reasons countries have for amassing nuclear weapons as highlighted earlier.

Another point reinforced by the dichotomy between infantilizing and discipline is the commonly held belief of American exceptionalism. These memes make the argument that Kim Jong-Un is not a rational enough actor to be trusted with the military and political power of nuclear weapons. However, to present day the United States is the only country in the global community to use weapons of mass destruction against another state. This highlights the American exceptionalism and paternalism previously demonstrated in Obama's speeches.

Isolated Pariah

Memes depicting Kim Jong-Un often remix his appearance or context to place the leader in marginal positions. Whether he is made to appear oblivious, or as a teenager belonging to a fringe group [Image 7.2], Kim Jong-Un's image is often that of an outcast. The choice to present Kim Jong-Un in gothic clothing further emphasizes North Korea's isolated global position [Image 7.2]. Goths are known generally as a marginal subsect of teenage cliques that are often isolated and looked at as strange and to be avoided. This description is strikingly similar to the way that North Korea's power position is established through Obama's diplomatic discourse. Similar to this, another meme [Image 7.1] portrays Kim Jong-Un as a child. The greater significance of this imaging is that North Korea is considered an immature, less powerful actor in the international community.

[Image 7.3, With This Technology]

Another meme [Image 7.3] presents an image of Kim John-Un sitting in on what appears to be an official governmental congregation holding a floppy disk. The textual message states, “With this technology, we will bring the United States to its knees.” The message conveyed by this meme is that North Korea believes that the floppy disk will be sufficient means of technology with which to operate an attack against the United States. The “outdated” floppy disk is important. It signifies that not only is North Korea technologically unadvanced, but also the Kim Jong-Un is not intelligent enough to understand the modern complexities of nuclear warfare. This correlates to the constant theme of North Korea’s isolation found in Obama’s international discourse and reinforces North Korea’s position as a marginal global actor. Finally, it is humorous to note that the United States’ own nuclear codes remain safeguarded on 1970’s level technology (including floppy disks) to this day (Kennedy, 2016)

Global Threat

North Korea is often presented as the rogue, irresponsible, and irrational other in comparison to the United States. This imaging implies that North Korea deserves less respect on the diplomatic stage.

The language of [Image 7.3] is telling. The phrasing, "...bring the United States to its knees" presents North Korea as an aggressor. This is despite the popular international theory that a key reason developing states develop nuclear power is because they seek deterrence of foreign interference. Instead, North Korea is presented as the military intimidator bent on invading a foreign country, a sentiment starkly contrasting the state's actual international strategy yet enforcing the rhetorical theme of the state's willful violation of international obligations.

[Image 7.1] continues the emphasis of North Korea as a global threat can be found. Here the use of the phrase "The red button" is important. In the true nature of memes, this piece expects the reader to understand the "red button" reference and its many violent connotations without explanation. It is a play on a classic cinema trope found in many a Hollywood movies and television (TV Tropes). Hollywood is a major part of the American ethos, and cinema helps to frame our image of the world as much as any other form of popular propaganda. Movies have trained us to inherently recognize tropes like this and their connotations. This represents the true nature of memes and their tendency to appeal to the popular culture of its audience (Milner, 2013). In audience's imagination, the presence or mention of the red button is designed to bring thoughts of imminent danger or global threat to the mind of the audience. The person with potential to press the red button is typically an actor playing a wildly unhinged and evil individual. The creator of this meme inserted Kim Jong-Un into the position of even having access to the red button to portray him yet again as an irrational, imminently dangerous actor.

Conclusion: The Paradoxical Framing of North Korea

Through a detailed and empirical discourse analysis of President Obama speeches and political memes on the subject of North Korea, I have demonstrated overlapping themes in these two modes of rhetoric. Obviously, this collection of memes and speeches is only a small fraction of the plethora of discourse on Kim Jong-un. The number of political memes alone is even more staggering, and cannot be accurately measured due to the rapid rate with which memes are born, spread, and mutate. In spite of this limitation, this collection exhibits key trends that I found as I sifted through masses of visual digital content. These selections, amongst many others, illustrate Highfield's trend theory that the constant in a series of political memes tends to be the political figure's image (Highfield, 2016). They exemplify the way in which a leader's image is distorted and reimagined in new situations as a tactic for exposing what Shifman calls the backstage (2014). Moreover, while Obama uses the phrase "North Korea" to comment on the rule of Kim Jong-Un, memes use the image of Kim Jong-Un to articulate ideas about the country of North Korea. Ultimately, I argue that memes be considered as a serious, scholarly avenue for future explorations of international discourse.

Based upon the research conducted, I suggest that there is a connection between theories of international relations, presidential speeches, and memes. For example, one could follow a linear trail of exploration starting from the concept of oriental masculinity, through the repetitive theme of American paternalism in President Obama's speech rhetoric, all the way to the corners of the internet to [Image 7.1]. The rhetoric found within the presidential speeches analyzed affirms existing theories about nuclear power relations, and memes exhibit the way that these ideas trickle down to become a part of popular public thought.

President Obama's speeches express the wish that North Korea cease their nuclear program in the hope of normalized international relations for the sake of the suffering North Korean citizens. At the same time, the speeches assert resolute condemnation of North Korea's governing actions and promise punishment in response. Punishment in the form of economic sanctions is likely to hurt the people of North Korea rather than Kim Jong-Un. In denouncing North Korea as an international pariah and nuclear terrorist, Obama indirectly invites other world leaders to apply the same frameworks of judgement to North Korea.

Furthermore, memes evoke a pictured argument of what the world looks like to the creator, which in turn mirrors trends found in Obama's speeches. As Shim and Nabers asserted in their study of the imaging of North Korea, visual representation emphasizes and normalizes a specific way of seeing that fortifies boundaries between the ingroup and the other (Shim & Nabers, 2013). In the process of attempting to bring the backstage of Kim Jong-Un's leadership and persona to the mainstage, these memes instead bring reoccurring American biases towards North Korea to the forefront. In this manner, memes effectively create reproductions of power structures. This only serves to further distort the mirror through which the United States and North Korea view one another, creating a more dangerous international nuclear climate.

The relationship between diplomatic and memetic rhetoric that I have highlighted throughout this research demonstrates the value with which visual digital content should be looked at by scholars. Those who wish to study power relations should consider memes a valuable rhetorical source going forward. Scholars who do not view memes as worthy of inclusion in such studies reject an innovative form of rhetoric that is more widely accessible to the public than traditional modes of political participation and commentary. In future studies political memes can be utilized as an indicator of how the public shapes, interprets, and views their own reality in light of global developments.

Future work would do well to include a study of how North Korea is imaged by popular, traditional media sources such as major cable networks and newspapers. A majority, around 67.86% of the speeches I analyzed were news or press conferences conducted by President Obama. In attendance of such events are journalists from major news networks. The way in which journalists absorb and purport themes presented in Obama's speeches influences the way that developing stories on North Korea are presented in popular media. A more robust and in-depth study on political memes' place in popular discourse and its effects would produce more accurate conclusions. However, even this concentrated examination of memes allows me to argue that these two distinct forms of discourse have heavily overlapping themes of rhetoric that unfortunately broadens the knowledge gap between the two states, and that memes should be included in future studies of power relations and international relations.

It is necessary to clarify the limitations of this study. To begin with, this study only analyzes the relationship between two states: The United States and North Korea. Although the United States has produced a robust digital culture, North Korea's heavy censorship laws prevent a comparative study to be conducted. In addition to these limitations, it must be noted that not every demographic views, shares, or cares about the arguments that memes present, which suggests limitations for the effect of memes more broadly. In spite of these limitations, the strong correlation between themes found in diplomatic discourse and memes demonstrates that this new stage in the evolution of digital communication is an important site of inquiry.

References

Big Red Button. Retrieved from http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/BigRedButton. Boghani, Priyanka. (2017, October 4). *The U.S. and North Korea On The Brink: A Timeline*. Retrieved from https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/the-u-s-and-north-korea-on-the-brink-a-timeline/.

K.E., B. (1959). National images and international systems. *Journal Of Conflict Resolution*, (2), 120.

Braumoeller, Bear, Herrera, F. (2004). Discourse and Content Analysis. *Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section on Qualitative Methods. 2* (15-19).

Bronfenbrenner, U. (1961). The Mirror Image in Soviet-American Relations: A Social Psychologist's Report. *Journal Of Social Issues*, *17*(3), 45-56.

Chung, Y., Kim, Y., Moon, K. (2016). State strategy in the kim jong-un era: The "Byongjin" policy of pursuing economic and nuclear development. *Korea Observer*, *47*(1), 1-33.

Das, Runa. "United States-India Nuclear Relations Post-9/11: Neo-Liberal Discourses, Masculinities, and Orientalism in International Politics." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 49, no. 1 (2013): 16-33. doi:10.1177/0021909612471783.

Dawkins, R. (2006). *The selfish gene. [electronic resource]*. Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2006.

Feffer, J. (2011). *North Korea, South Korea [electronic resource] : U.S. policy at a time of crisis*. Seven Stories.

Bush, G.W. (2002) *State of the Union*. [Transcript] Retrieved from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29644

Hardy, Cynthia, Harley, Bill, Phillips, Nelson. (2004) Discourse Analysis and Content Analysis: Two Solitudes?. *Newsletter of the American Political Science Association Organized Section on Qualitative Methods 2* (19-22).

Highfield, T. (2016). *Social media and everyday politics*. John Wiley & Sons Inc. *Hormone-Addled Teenager*. Retrieved from http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Main/HormoneAddledTeenager.

Hymans, J. C. (2010). When Does a State Become a “Nuclear Weapon State”?. *Nonproliferation Review*, *17*(1), 161. doi:10.1080/10736700903484728

Jasinski, J. (2001). *Sourcebook on rhetoric : key concepts in contemporary rhetorical studies*. Sage Publications.

Kennedy, Merrit. (2016, May 26). *Report: U.S. Nuclear System Relies On Outdated Technology Such As Floppy Disks*. Retrieved from https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/05/26/479588478/report-u-s-nuclear-system-relies-on-outdated-technology-such-as-floppy-disks.

Kim, M. C. (2016). Nuclear Learning: Nuclear Coercion and the Proliferation Dilemma.

Kjeldsen, Jens E. (2000). *What the Metaphor Could Not Tell Us About the Prime Minister's Bicycle Helmet. Nordicom Review 21* (2). doi:10.1515/nor-2017-0387.
Kim Jong Un. Retrieved from http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/people/kim-jong-un.

Milner, Ryan, M. (2013). Pop Polyvocality: Internet Memes, Public Participation, and the Occupy Wall Street Movement. *International Journal Of Communication (19328036)*, 72357-2390.*North Korea Nuclear Timeline Fast Facts*. (2017, September 04). Retrieved from http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/index.html.

Obama, B. (2016). *Address by President Obama to the 71st Session of the United Nations General Assembly.* [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/20/address-president-obama-71st-session-united-nations-general-assembly.

Obama, B. (2014). *Joint Press Conference With President Obama and Prime Minister Abe of Japan.* [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/24/joint-press-conference-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-japan.

Obama, B. (2012). *Message to the Congress on Continuation of the National Emergency With Respect to North Korea*. [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/21/message-continuation-national-emergency-respect-north-korea.

Obama, B. (2016). *Message to the Congress on the Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to North Korea.* [Transcript] Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/21/message-continuation-national-emergency-respect-north-korea.

Obama, B. (2011). *Message to the Senate on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty*. [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/02/02/message-president-new-start-treaty-0.

Obama, B. (2016). *Post G7 Press Conference in Japan"* [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/26/remarks-president-obama-press-availability-ise-shima-japan.

Obama, B. (2016). *Press Conference by President Obama.* [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/01/press-conference-president-obama-412016.

Obama, B. (2011). *Press Conference with President Obama and President Hu of the People's Republic of China.* [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/press-conference-president-obama-and-president-hu-peoples-republic-china.

Obama, B. (2016). *Remarks by the President in Commencement Address to the United States in Air Force Academy.* [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/02/remarks-president-commencement-address-united-states-air-force-academy.

Obama, B. (2011). *Remarks by the President in State of Union Address*. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/remarks-president-state-union-address.

Obama, B. (2013). *Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address.* [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address.

Obama, B. (2014). *Remarks by the President in Year-End Press Conference*. [Transcipt]. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/12/19/remarks-president-year-end-press-conference.

Obama, B. (2012). *Remarks by President Obama and President Lee Myung-bak in Joint Press Conference.* [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/25/remarks-president-obama-and-president-lee-myung-bak-joint-press-conference.

Obama, B. (2015). *Remarks by President Obama and President Park of the Republic of Korea in Joint Press Conference*." [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/16/remarks-president-obama-and-president-park-republic-korea-joint-press.

Obama, B. (2016). *Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe after Bilateral Meeting*." [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/25/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-after-bilateral-meeting.

Obama, B. (2015). *Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Abe of Japan in Joint Press Conference.*" [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-abe-japan-joint-press-confere.

Obama, B. (2016). *Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Lee of Singapore in Joint*

Press Conference. [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/08/02/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-lee-singapore-joint-press.

Obama, B. (2016). *Remarks by President Obama at the Closing Session of the Nuclear Security Summit.* [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/01/remarks-president-obama-closing-session-nuclear-security-summit.

Obama, B. (2011). *Remarks by the President to Parliament*. [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/25/remarks-president-parliament-london-united-kingdom.

Obama, B. (2016). *Remarks of President Obama to the People of Laos*. [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/06/remarks-president-obama-people-laos.

Obama, B. (2012). *Remarks Prior to a Working Session With Group of Eight Leaders.* [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2012-book1/pdf/PPP-2012-book1-doc-pg640.pdf.

Obama, B. (2012). *Remarks to United States Military Personnel*. [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2012-book1/pdf/PPP-2012-book1-doc-pg347.pdf.

Obama, B. (2016). *The President's News Conference.*" [Transcript]. Retrieved from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=118941.

Obama, B. (2016). *The President's News Conference With Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany*." [Transcript]. Retrieved from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=117470.

Obama, B. (2011). *The President's News Conference With President Lee Myung-bak of South Korea.* [Transcript]. Retrieved from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2011/10/13/president-obama-and-president-lee-south-korea-hold-joint-press-conference.

Obama, B. (2014). *The President's News Conference With President Park Geun-hye of South Korea.* [Transcript]. Retrieved from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=105136.

Obama, B. (2013). *The President's News Conference With President Park Geun-hye of South Korea.* [Transcript] Retrieved from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=105136.

Obama, B. (2012). *The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda of Japan.*[Transcript]. Retrieved from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=100728.

Shifman, L. (2007). Humor in the Age of Digital Reproduction: Continuity and Change in

Internet-Based Comic Texts. *International Journal Of Communication (19328036)*, *1*187.

Shifman, L. 1. (2013). *Memes in digital culture*. Mit Pr.

Shim, D., & Nabers, D. (2013). Imaging North Korea: Exploring its Visual Representations in International Politics. *International Studies Perspectives*, *14*(3), 289-306. doi:10.1111/j.1528-3585.2012.00493.x*Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. [electronic resource]*. (2009). [S.l.]:Great Neck Publishing, 2009.

Wertz, Daniel. (2017, June 28). *Issue Briefs*. Retrieved from http://www.ncnk.org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/dprk-diplomatic-relations.

Wessells, M. G. (1995). Social-psychological determinants of nuclear proliferation: A dual-process analysis. *Peace And Conflict: Journal Of Peace Psychology*, *1*(1), 49-65. doi:10.1207/s15327949pac0101_7

Woods, M. (2007). Unnatural acts: Nuclear language, proliferation and order. *Journal Of Language & Politics*, *6*(1), 91-128.

Jennifer Clark is a senior International Studies student at Fordham University with a passion for current affairs, digital culture, and storytelling. Her interests of study and research include Middle Eastern culture and politics, history, and new forms of political participation. Her article was inspired by the growing influence digital culture has in forming political opinion, as well as the troubling relationship between the United States and North Korea. After graduating Jennifer hopes to continue honing her creative and technical studies.